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Abstract 
This thesis investigates growing use of civil and public law orders as tools of crime 
control by crime prevention partnerships. This development has been little explored in 
criminology. The proliferation of crime prevention partnerships is viewed by many 
criminologists as forming part of a bifurcation in criminal policy between serious 
crime and anti-social behaviour, in which the 'enforcement approach' of the criminal 
justice system is being focused upon the former and a non-legal 'partnership 
approach' advanced for the control of the latter. It is argued that the 'partnership 
approach' runs a risk of becoming an extension of and not an alternative to the 
'enforcement approach' of the criminal justice system. In investigating this risk, it is 
intended that this thesis should contribute to criminology in two ways. The first 
contribution is an investigation of the theoretical potential for the local to become a 
site of authoritarian crime control. The second is an investigation of the extent this 
potential is being realised in England and Wales. 
Empirical research centred on the development of crime prevention strategies in 
implementing the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. Fieldwork focused on the 
development of metropolitan borough s trategies in twenty-one London boroughs, and 
a police sector and two social housing estate strategies in the borough of Westminster. 
Resort to civil and publicilaw orders was found to be significant to the approach taken 
by the majority of London boroughs studied, including Westminster. One of the estate 
strategies at Westminster was found to be as authoritarian as the borough strategy, but 
the other estate strategy and the police sector strategy were not. Punitive views were 
not encountered among local practitioners on any of the three sites. Punitive views 
were encountered among local residents on the police sector, but not on either of the 
estates. Once the peculiarities of the institutions and areas studied were taken into 
account, it was concluded that there is a significant risk that crime prevention 
partnerships will take an authoritarian approach to crime control unless they are 
located in areas where there is a strong sense of geographical community, and their 
policies are shaped by local practitioners and local residents. 
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Chapter one 
Authoritarian Crime Control 
We are now in the middle of a deep and decisive movement towards a more disciplinary, 
authoritarian kind of society... The new laissez-faire doctrine, in which social market values 
are to predominate, many would say, like the old laissez-faire, is not at all inconsistent with a 
strong, disciplinary state [ ... ] Make no mistake about it: under this regime the market is to 
be 
Free; the people are to be Disciplined. (Hall, 1996: 257 and 259) 
Hall's analysis of the link between developments in crime control in England and 
Wales and the changing needs of western capitalist economies in the closing decades 
of the 20'h Century was originally published in 1980. Nonetheless, his central message 
that we are drifting into a law and order society is as relevant to analysis of criminal 
policy in the 1990s and 2000s as it was to criminal policy in the 1970s and 1980s 
(Scraton, 2004; Sim, 2000). Four aspects of this 'punitive turn' in contemporary 
criminal policy are of particular interest to criminologists: the increasing use of 
imprisonment, increasing public vindictiveness, the co-existence of corrective 
alongside punitive criminal justice practices, and the extension of criminal policy to 
local state and even non-state institutions (Young, 2002b). This doctoral thesis is 
concerned with the last of these issues, with a 'turn to the local' in the criminal policy 
of England and Wales, and in particular the growing use of civil and public law orders 
(henceforth referred to as legal orders), available to local authorities to manage their 
areas and the people that reside within them, as weapons of crime control. Formal 
partnership between the police and local authorities at a local level has developed 
largely in response to a perceived need for increased cooperation between state 
institutions in the control of minor crime and non-criminal nuisances (henceforth 
referred to as anti-social behaviour). Legal orders comply with this vision. Like the 
police power of arrest, legal orders are backed by coercive and often penal remedies, 
yet they may be targeted on a wider range of behaviour and are subject to lower 
thresholds of evidence. The legal orders of particular relevance to this thesis are 
I 
abatement notices, fixed penalty notices, injunctions, possession orders, anti-social 
behaviour orders, and parenting orders. The nature of these legal powers and their 
potential use as tools of crime control is explored in chapter four. 
In the 1970s and 1980s a number of criminologists joined Hall in his criticism that the 
state was taking a more authoritarian approach to crime control (e. g. Bunyon, 1976; 
Gordon, 1987; Hillyard and Percy-Smith, 1988; Scraton, 1985 and 1987; Sim et al., 
1987). Among these criminologists, Gordon focused on the growing emphasis that 
was being put on community policing and with it increased cooperation between the 
police and local authorities. He warned: 
... community policing is not an alternative to reactive policing... we must locate [it] in the 
context of the increasing disciplining of society by the state, the emergence of the 'strong' 
disciplinary regime' which, Stuart Hall has argued, is necessary 'if the state is to stop 
meddling in the fine-tuning of the economy, in order to let 'social market values' rip, while 
containing the inevitable fall-out, in terms of social conflict and class polarization'. It is an 
aspect of what Stan Cohen, writing of Foucault's 'punitive city', has described as a 
'correctional continuum'. (Gordon, 1987: 141) 
Gordon's (1986) analysis of community policing was written at a time when the 
police were the dominant partners of crime prevention partnerships (see Crawford, 
1997; Gilling, 2000; Gilling and Barton, 1997; Jones et al., 1994; King, 1989; Kinsey 
et al., 1986; Koch, 1998; Newburn, 2002; Tilley, 2002; Walklate, 2001; Weatheritt, 
1986 - covered in section 4.1). bordon was concerned with the prospect of local 
authority departments providing the police with information on offenders that could 
be used to inform criminal law enforcement. In the mid 1990s, however, local 
authorities took over the mantle of responsibility of partnership arrangements. The 
same period has also seen rapid growth in local authority use of legal orders as tools 
of crime control. This is a development that warrants equal attention. 
Recourse to legal orders is largely neglected in existing theoretical and empirical 
research on crime prevention partnerships, however. While government and academic 
studies have emerged to document the proliferation of crime prevention partnerships 
and growing resort to legal orders in crime control, the relationship between the two 
phenomena remains largely unexplored. Empirical studies of the use of legal orders as 
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tools of crime control make little reference to crime prevention partnerships, and 
while much academic literature recognises the potential for crime prevention 
partnerships to become exclusionary sites of social control, little note is taken of 
resort by crime prevention partnerships to legal orders. Furthermore, little attention 
has been given in academic literature to the relationship between the continuing 
proliferation of crime prevention partnerships and the recent introduction of youth 
offending teams, which are likewise developing in response to a perceived needs for 
increased criminalisation of anti-social behaviour. In chapter four it is shown that in 
England and Wales youth offending teams also involve cooperation between the 
police and local authorities at metropolitan borough and district council level, and 
have been largely inseparable from crime prevention partnerships since the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998. Yet, neither the latest edition of the Oxford Handbook of 
Criminology (Maguire et al., 2002) nor the latest edition of the Sage Dictionary of 
Criminology (McLaughlin and Muncie, eds. 2006) refer either to legal orders or the 
work of youth offending teams in their descriptions of crime prevention policy and 
practice (see Follet, 2006; Hughes, 2006a, 2006b and 2006c; Pease, 2002). 
Two broad assumptions appear to inform this silence. First, from a theoretical 
perspective, the proliferation of crime prevention partnerships is viewed by many 
criminologists as forming part of a bifurcation in criminal policy since the 1980s, in 
which the preventative role of the criminal justice system has been focused upon 
serious crime and a non-legal 'partnership approach' has been advanced for the 
control of anti-social behaviour. Second, this time from a political perspective, the 
proliferation of crime prevention partnerships is regarded as a victory, or at least a 
potential victory, for the egalitarian left, due to the potential they have for including 
local practitioners and residents in policy making. The object of this thesis is to 
explore the alternative view that one of the implications of the 'turn to the local' in 
crime control may, on the contrary, be an overall increase in law enforcement, 
replicating the failure of growing use of community sentences to reduce the use of 
imprisonment (see e. g. Cohen, 1985; Scull, 1983; Vass, 1990). In investigating this 
possibility, it is intended that this thesis should contribute to criminology in two ways. 
The first contribution, to theoretical criminology, is an analysis of the structural and 
political background to the potential for the local to become a new site of 
authoritarian crime control. This involves investigation of the changing economic and 
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social needs of post-industrial western societies in the latter decades of the 20'h 
Century, and the rise of moral communitarianism as a political force since the 1980s. 
This contribution is the focus of chapter two. The second contribution, to empirical 
criminology, is an'assessment of the potential for economic, social and political 
pressure on the local to become a site of authoritarian intervention to be realised on 
the ground. This was examined in two phases of empirical research. First, the history 
of crime prevention partnerships in England and Wales was investigated, from their 
inception in the 1970s to their statutory footing in the Crime and Disorder Act. This 
involved analysis of central and local government policy documents, and the 
immediate political climate in which they were produced. Having investigated the 
development of national crime prevention policy, attention was then placed on the 
production of crime prevention strategies in implementation of the Crime and 
Disorder Act. There were two aspects to this phase of the empirical research. The first 
was a comparative study of crime prevention partnerships across London. Among the 
partnerships studied, Westminster was selected for case study analysis. The research 
involved a review of policy documents, alongside observation of policy meetings and 
interviews with key players in Westminster. The second focused on the development 
of a police sector and two estate crime prevention policies falling within the borough 
policy in Westminster. It was also based on documentary analysis, observation and 
interviews. Both aspects of the fieldwork in Westminster were conducted over a ten- 
month period between July 1998 and April 1999. The research was conducted from a 
qualitative neo-Marxist critical standpoint, reflecting the view that it is impossible to 
be wholly objective in criminological research as "[c]rime and punishment are 
intensely political and moral issues" (Hudson, 2000: 175). The aims of the empirical 
research and choice of methodologies are covered more fully in chapter three. The 
results of the empirical research are presented in chapters four and five. 
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Chapter two 
The 'Turn to the Local' in Crime Control 
Opposed to inclusion, and the circuits that maintain it, stands exclusion. Not that the 
excluded are to be merely cast out - they are also to be subject to strategies of control. On the 
one hand, there are those strategies that seek to reaffiliate the excluded, through a principle of 
activity, and to reattach them to the circuits of civility... On the other hand there are the 
strategies which deem affiliation impossible for certain individuals and sectors, and seek to 
manage these anti-citizens and marginal spaces through measures which seek to neutralize 
the dangers they pose. (Rose, 2000: 330) 
If the integration of the social body cannot be achieved through persuasion, it must ultimately 
be guaranteed by force. (Stenson, 1999: 68) 
Contemporary social theory points to a reconfiguration of government in western 
societies in the latter decades of the 20th Century. This reconfiguration is affecting the 
objectives and targets of government, and the locality that government is realised. The 
object of this chapter is to investigate the links between government change and the 
proliferation of local crime prevention partnerships. in particular, it assesses the 
theoretical potential for this 'turn to the local' in crime control to result in the local 
becoming a site of authoritarian crime control. 
2.1. Contemporary Western Government 
Analysis of the 'turn to the local' in crime control comprises a number of interrelated 
though at times conflicting observations relating to changing political, economic and 
social needs in post-industrial western societies. 
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2.1.1. Changing Political Needs 
Five observations concerning changing political needs of western government are of 
particular relevance to the 'turn to the local' in crime control. The first relates to an 
exposure of the failings of the modernist paradigm of maximum state intervention. 
Young explains that as a result of a "crisis of aetiology" and a "crisis of penality" 
caused by the failure of rising standards of living and punishment in mid to late 20th 
Century to control poverty, discrimination and crime, "[t]he twin pillars of the 
modernist Project of reason and progress, the use of law in the control and 
adjudication of human affairs and the intervention of government to engineer a just 
social order totter under the weight. of their own inconsistencies" (1998b: 262). In 
consequence, western states are looking for ways to pass responsibility for 
government onto the public (c. f. Dean, 1999; Garland, 1996,1999 and 2001; 
O'Malley, 1992; Pavlich, 1999). Note is taken of Foucault's (1991) observation that 
the power that the state wields pales into insignificance alongside that of the 
population it is in charge of. This "responsibilisation strategy", as Garland (1996 and 
2001) describes it, is resulting in a blurring of the boundary between the public and 
private at both national, international and, more importantly for current purposes, 
local levels (Shearing and Wood, 2003; cf. Crawford, 1999). Of equal significance, it 
is also resulting in a move away from 'anatomo-politics', in which the objective of 
government is to make specific economic and social use of the population, and so a 
reduction of government to the 'bio-political' need to ensure that the population is 
economically and socially utile: that the population is enveloped in 'apparatus of 
security' (for discussion of the terms 'anatomo-politics' and 'bio-politics', see e. g. 
Foucault, 1979 and Gordon, 1991; for discussion of the term 'apparatus of security', 
see e. g. Dupont and Pearce, 2001 and Foucault, 1991). 'Apparatus of security' include 
physical and mental health. They also include personal security. The 
'responsibilisation strategy' is said to be having a marked effect on all areas of 
criminal policy: 
... government authorities have become increasingly aware that crime control is 'beyond the 
state'... inasmuch as the institutions of the criminal justice state are severely limited in their 
crime control capacities... [But also] inasmuch as there are crime control mechanisms 
operating outside the state's boundaries, and relatively independently of its policies. The 
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effort to address these limits, first by reforming the state institutions, and subsequently by 
mobilizing and harnessing non-state mechanisms has been the basis of the most innovative 
policies of the recent period. (Garland, 2001: 123) 
The possibility that the 'responsibilisation strategy' has as much to do with economic 
change as failed government is explored in section 2.1.2. 
Garland highlights the proliferation of crime prevention partnerships as an example of 
the 'responsibilisation strategy', and moreover as a development that does not involve 
resort to law. The alternative possibility that the 'responsibilisation strategy' will 
result in more rather than less authoritarian crime control is explored later in this 
chapter in section 2.2.1. 
The second observation relating to changing political needs of particular relevance to 
the 'turn to the local' in crime control is also concerned with change in the locality of 
government, though this time away from central to local government. Jessop (1997) 
explains that the nation state is now considered, "too small to solve the big problems, 
and too big to solve the small problems" (cf. Amin, 2005; Geddes, 2005; Raco, 2003; 
Swyngedouw, 
_ 
1996). Jessop focuses on the effects of economic change, covered in a 
moment, but his observations are also relevant to the argument that the locality of 
government is shifting due to the political failures of the past. The effect of this 
change in the locality of government on crime control is also returned to in section 
2.2.1. 
The third observation follows from the first. The 'responsibilisation strategy' has been 
accompanied by a switch in emphasis in correctional controls away from disciplinary 
"technologies of dominatioW', which normalise the subject's behaviour through 
subjecting them to the judgement of experts (Foucault, 1977), towards "technologies 
of the self', which require the subject to take responsibility for normalising him or 
herself (Martin et al., 1988), and do not necessarily need to be individualised to the 
subject's particular needs. Unlike 'technologies of domination', 'technologies of the 
self' are more closely associated to the classicist than positivist view of human 
behaviour. They treat deviancy as the result of moral lapses rather than compulsion, 
holding faith in the view that "[t]here is a little OK person trapped inside every non- 
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OK shell" (Cohen, 1985: 153). 'Technologies of the self' therefore treat individual 
deviants as sad rather than mad (see Ainsworth, 1999), telling him or her that they 
have a problem that they need to address, but not that there is a problem with them 
that they require professional help for. This move towards treating the population as 
made up of autonomous individuals is a necessary development if people are to be 
encouraged to take more responsibility for their well-being. As a result of this "alloy 
of autonomisation and responsibilisation" (Rose, 2000: 324): 
[Strategies of control are arising that] seek to regenerate and reactivate the 
ethical values that are now believed to regulate individual conduct and help 
maintain order and obedience to law by binding individuals into shared moral 
norms and values: governing through the self-steering forces of honour and 
shame, of propriety, obligation, trust fidelity, and commitment to others [ ... I 
Individuals, families, firms, organizations, communities are urged to take 
upon themselves the responsibility for the security of their property and their 
persons, and that of their own families... [They must] actively engage in 
partnerships... to maintain order and combat threats to individual and 
collective security. (Rose, 2000: 324 and 327) 
'Technologies of the self' have two distinct poles, described by Valier (2001) as "self- 
regulatioW' and "self-fashioning". 'Self-regulation' aims to subject a person to his or 
her own judgement, through commanding them to "know yourself.. do not pretend to 
be God" (Martin et al., 1988: 18). The subject is required to face the consequences of 
his or her actions, to open their eyes and confess to others. The move towards 'self- 
regulation' has revolutionised the disciplines of psychology and psychiatry, which 
have virtually abandoned the Freudian model of rehabilitation and its emphasis on 
reaching into the subject's unconscious to help them get to the roots of their deviant 
behaviour (Cohen, 1985), in favour of the panoptical model of rehabilitation and its 
emphasis on the simpler task of teaching the subject how to control his or her deviant 
behaviour. Examples of the influence of these 'technologies of the self on criminal 
policy include the use of behavioural contracts (see e. g. Cohen, 1985; Crawford, 
2003; Garland, 1999), mentoring (see e. g. Cohen, 1985), parent training (see e. g., 
McLaughlin, 2002; Newburn, 1998) restorative justice (see e. g. Ashworth, 2002; 
Muncie, 1999) and, most famously, cognitive behavioural therapy (see e. g. Cohen, 
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1985; Sim, 2004). It has recently been reported that in the United States, for example, 
cognitive behavioural therapy is used to treat ninety-nine percent of its estimated 
twenty million psychiatry patients (see the Observer, 19 February 2006). 
'Self-fashioning', on the other hand, aims to normalise a person through manipulating 
the models of behaviour provided by his or her social and economic environment. It 
does not subject the individual to any form of external coercion whatsoever, 
commanding them "to be concerned, to take care of yourself' (Martin et al., 1988: 
18). Valier explains, "['self-fashioning] holds out models of the person to be adopted 
by willing individuals. Forms of subjectivity are not imposed upon passive subjects 
but on free subjects who participate willingly in [controlling themselves]" (2001: 
439). The absence of direct external intervention makes 'self-fashioning' the more 
efficient of the two poles of 'technologies of the self'. 'Self-regulation', like 
'technologies of domination', continues to rely on the supervision of individuals: on 
normalising people "one by one" (see Mathiesen, 1983). On this view, the 
'responsibilisation strategy' has less to do with dispersing responsibility for 
normalising others than with providing the conditions necessary for individuals to 
become responsible for normalising themselves. 'Self-fashioning' relies on the subject 
being surrounded by 'positive' influences, however, which are relatively absent in 
marginalised groups. When it comes to normalising the marginalised, then, 'self- 
regulation' retains an important role (Los, 2004). Here the emphasis of the 
'responsibilisation strategy' is on normalising the social control mechanisms of 
subjects' families and communities. Unlike 'self-fashioning, which allows the state 
to 'govern at a distance' in the sense that it governs the subject through his or her 
surroundings, in this case the state 'governs at a distance' in the sense that it governs 
the subject through informal social controls. The link between contemporary 
correctional controls and the 'turn to the local' in crime control is explored in section 
2.2.2. 
The fourth observation of changing political needs of particular relevance to the 'turn 
to the local' in crime control also follows from the first. The 'responsibilisation 
strategy' has been further accompanied by a growing emphasis on spatial controls. In 
order to encourage the public to participate in government, the state needs to ensure 
they haive safe and orderly envirorunents to operate in. Serious crime and anti-social 
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behaviour both have adverse effect on people's confidence to be involved in the 
economic and social world around them. The link between contemporary spatial 
controls and the 'turn to the local' in cnme control is explored in section 2.2.1. 
However, the last observation pertaining to changing political needs of particular 
relevance to the 'turn to the local' in crime control contradicts the first. The 
6responsibilisation strategy' is resulting in exposure to the -myth of the sovereign 
state" (Garland, 2001: 109). This has put the state on the defensive. In this sense, the 
modernist paradigm of maximum state intervention was not a failure, as it enabled the 
state to at least be seen to be governing. The state has become particularly defensive 
when it comes to crime control, as to admit that it is unable to protect the public from 
one another would be to question its very legitimacy to govern (cf. Feeley, 2003; 
Hughes, 2000). Garland sees this dilemma as the source of much contradiction in 
contemporary criminal policy: 
The emergent outcome is a series of policies that appear deeply conflicted, even schizoid, in 
their relation to one another. On the one hand, there has been an attempt to face up to the 
predicament and develop pragmatic new strategies that are adapted to it: through institutional 
reforms aimed at overcoming the limits of the criminal justice state, or else through 
accommodations that recognise these limitations and work within them. But alongside these 
adaptations to the reality principle, there is a recurring attempt to evade its terms altogether... 
This politicized reaction takes two recurring forms. Either it wilfully denies the predicament 
and reasserts the old myth of the sovereign state and its plenary power to punish. Or else it 
abandons reasoned, instrumental action and retreats into an expressive mode that we might, 
continuing the psychoanalytical metaphor, describe as acting out -a mode that is concerned 
not so much with controlling crime as with expressing the anger and outrage that crime 
provokes. (Garland, 200 1: 110) 
Garland (1996 and 200 1) demonstrates that these 'schizoid tendencies' co-exist across 
many areas of criminal policy, including the use of imprisonment and, more 
significantly for 'current purposes, 'zero tolerance' policing. Yet, as already noted, 
Garland does not regard crime prevention partnerships to be potential institutions of 
authoritarian crime control. His analysis comes under two lines of attack. The first 
centres on the prospect that the state is adapting to the deficiencies in the criminal 
justice system by reforming it rather than reducing reliance upon it. This is of 
particular relevance to the potential of legal orders to be incorporated into criminal 
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policy, and is returned to in section 2.2. The second line of attack concerns Garland's 
restricting of expressive criminal policy to the need to be seen to be in control. The 
need for the state to be seen to be governing is only the first purpose of expressive 
criminal policy. The symbolic power of penal punishment also lies in its capacity for 
guiding government, and deflecting attention away from the crimes of others and the 
state's involvement in them. The links between increasing need for expressive 
criminal policy and the 'turn to the local' in crime control are explored in section 
2.2.3. 
ZLZ Changing Economic and Social Needs 
Observations of - changing economic needs in post-industrial western societies of 
particular relevance to the 'turn to the local' in crime control focus on the effects of 
globalisation. First is the effect of economic power being concentrated in the hands of 
a diminishing number of giant corporations, which shift their capital from one place to 
another in a search for greater efficiency. On the one hand, this is resulting in less 
need for the regulation of businesses, as the regulation of businesses only serves as a 
barrier to corporate efficiency (Fraser, 2003; Tombs and Whyte, 2004). On the other 
band, it is resulting in more need for anti-social behaviour such as littering, begging 
and 'hanging out' to be regulated, as anti-social behaviour makes commercial areas 
unattractive to businesses (Tombs and Whyte, 2004). 
Second is the growing need for a flexible and entrepreneurial rather than uniform 
workforce. Industrial economies treat the work force as "cogs in the machine" 
(Foucault, 1977), while post-industrial service economies treat the work force as 
individual resources to be fostered (Dean, 1999). In the emerging service economy, 
people are more often required to do different types of work and to work different 
hours during their careers (Amin, 2005; Bauman, 2000; Fraser, 2003). As a result, the 
workforce does not need to be so rigidly trained, and more people are likely to be 
permanently excluded from employment for refusing or otherwise being unable to 
adapt to the ebbs and flows of the work market. Under these conditions, there is a 
reduced need for 'anatomo-politics' as the emphasis of the role of government in 
providing labour is being reduced towards the 'bio-political' need to ensure that the 
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population reproduces, is physically and mentally healthy, and is instilled with work 
ethic, in other words that there is a population of sufficient size and utility to feed the 
economy. Once this has been achieved, individuals are given responsibility to manage 
their own careers, and to train themselves as and when required. Finally, 
'technologies of domination' make way for 'technologies of the self', 'as 'technologies 
of domination' leave the subject with less room for manoeuvre, and are more likely to 
make them dependant on the help of others (Lemke, 2000). 
This second effect of economic change leads onto observations relating to changing 
social needs. First is the need to deflect attention away from the stresses and 
economic insecurities of the service economy. Going are the nine to five jobs for life 
and welfare from the cradle to the grave provided by industrial production and the 
welfare state, and in their place comes the forty-plus hour flexible working week, with 
reduced employment and social welfare rights. Second is the breaking up of 
geographical communities and extended families (as factories providing mass 
employment close down, and individuals and nuclear families move locality in search 
of work). The social whole is being replaced with "communities of choice" (Hirst, 
1994). This is having negative consequences for commitment to geographical identity, 
as the psychological distance between individuals and the areas they live in has 
increased. As a result, we are becoming more essentialist and socially exclusive, and 
so less tolerant of those whose activities we consider anti social (Young, 1999 and 
2002a). 
ZI. 3. 'Apparatus of Security' 
While there is much disagreement over the extent of government change and the 
reasons behind it, social scientists are in broad agreement that the last decades of the 
20th Century saw a move away from 'anatomo-politics', 'technologies of domination' 
and centralised state government towards 'bio-politics', 'technologies of the self' and 
dispersed government. The broad effect of government change on the objectives of 
crime control has been a switch in emphasis away from tackling the underlying causes 
of individuals' offending towards the simpler task of managing crime. This "new 
penology", Feeley and Simon famously observed: 
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... is concerned with the rationality not of individual behaviour, or even community 
organization, but of managerial processes. Its goal is not to eliminate crime but to make it 
tolerable through systematic coordination. (Feeley and Simon, 2003: 435436) 
It is not necessary to adjudicate between those that claim that little has changed and 
those that claim that a lot has changed, and between those that claim that change has 
more to do with political failure and those that claim that it has more to do with 
economic change. Nevertheless, the remainder of this chapter is written in light of the 
researcher's support for the emphasis that Marxism puts on the power that economic 
relations wield over government (see e. g. Pearce and Tombs, 1998). This section 
explores the broad nature of the effect of the move away from 'anatomo-politics' and 
'technologies of domination' on the targets of crime control. 
As emphasised in the work of Rose (2000) quoted at the beginning of this chapter, the 
move towards managing rather than reintegrating offenders has been accompanied by 
an intensification of the distinction between the governing of the normal and the 
deviant. The modernist emphasis on the biblical Hebrew notion of 'pastoral power', in 
which government aims to take care of each and all of us, is making way for the 
ancient Greek and Roman notion of the 'city-citizenship game', on a dichotomy of 
inclusion and exclusion (Dean, 1999; Fraser, 2003; Gordon, 1991; Rose, 2000). Anti- 
social behaviour is 'defined down' for the included, but 'defined up' for the excluded. 
The broad move of western government is, in other words, towards less intervention 
into the lives of the majority, but more intervention into the lives of the minority, or as 
Cohen (1985) puts it, towards concentrating on the hard cases and letting the soft 
cases take care of themselves. The consequence for those that the criminal justice 
system continues to focus on is a "mesh thinning" of control, involving more 
intensive supervision of both "shallow end" and "deep end" offenders (ibid). The 
switch in emphasis from eradicating to managing crime has therefore been 
accompanied by a further switch in emphasis from controlling the unproductive, anti- 
social individual to controlling the unproductive, anti-social group and category of 
person: a switch in emphasis from problem individuals to problem populations 
(O'Malley, 1992 and 2001). Hudson explains, "[t]he point is not, as in earlier, 
individually-orientated penal eras, whether this offender among others in the same 
13 
category will reoffend, but whether this offender is a member of a high-risk or a low- 
risk group" (2003: 162; cf. Bottoms, 1983; Cohen, 1985; Mathiesen, 1983). 
Finally, the consequence of the move away from 'anatomo-politics' for causal 
criminology has been the emergence of a discourse of underclass, reminiscent of the 
19'h Century concept of the feckless 'undeserving poor' incapable of accepting social 
responsibility (Walker, 1996). Murray (1996b), for example, writes of a "new rabble" 
of culturally disordered young men, brought up in single parent households without 
the discipline and role models provided by fathers needed to civilise them. As a result, 
Murray claims, whole sections of the working class are growing up without the 
respect for others needed to keep them away from crime (cf. Dennis, 1998; Murray, 
1996a and 2001). The emerging dichotomy of inclusion and exclusion is therefore 
based as much on people's social backgrounds as any hann they have caused. Certain 
categories of people are treated as totally different from the rest of us, as pathological 
anti-social 'others' (Garland, 1996). Their reputation goes before them, and even the 
most minor of anti-social behaviour is treated as an indicator of dangerousness. 
This points leads onto the issue of the effect of the move away from 'technologies of 
domination' on crime control. If offenders are treated as culturally disordered, there is 
little point trying to reintegrate them, as "[r]ehabilitating offenders, or any 
reintegration strategy can only make sense if the larger community from which 
offenders come is viewed as sharing a common normative universe with the 
communities of the middle classes" (Feeley and Simon, 2003: 444). When it comes to 
the means of controlling those that have been identified as different, then, emphasis is 
put on their similarities to the rest of us. While the problem of crime is attributed to an 
underclass of irresponsible people in need of earlier and more intensive supervision, 
the problem of crime control is focused upon a need to treat people as responsible for 
their actions, as rational actors that base their decisions on utilitarian judgement and 
are hence susceptible to being deterred by penal supei-vision. 
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ZIA Recruiting New Partners 
The influence that the 'new penology' may have on crime prevention partnerships 
formed the basis of four of the six aspects of the research question taken into the 
empirical research conducted during the course of this doctoral thesis (see section 
3.1). It is explored in more detail in section 2.2. This section deals with a second issue 
that goes to the heart of assessment of the 'turn to the local' in crime control, and. to 
the heart of the first two aspects of the research question: the question whose order 
crime prevention partnerships are likely to enforce. 
Contemporary social science makes important distinction between 'steering' (policy 
making) and 'rowing' (policy implementation). While social theorists are in broad 
agreement that 'responsibilisation strategy' is resulting in a dispersal of both the 
'steering' and 'rowing' of government, there is much dispute over the question 
whether this is resulting in a significant redistribution of power. In other words, while 
it is clear that the further away from the centre government is exercised, the more it is 
likely to be shaped by individual perceptions and indigenous culture (Edwards and 
Hughes, 2005), it is not clear that the new sites of government that are emerging are 
any more likely than the old sites of government to operate at 4arms distance' to the 
realms of existing power. 
In the case of public involvement in policy making, those who are likely to gain most 
influence over the new sites of government are the ones that are least likely to be 
critical of the existing priorities of the central state. Two points need to be 
emphasised. First of all, the ability to attain voice depends on people organising 
themselves into interest groups (Crawford, 1995). Critically, the greater the distance 
from existing power structures individuals and groups are located, the less political 
resources are available to them, and the less influence they are likely to have. In the 
case of crime prevention partnerships, the people whose voices are least likely to be 
heard (such as youths and marginalised groups) are the very people that are more 
likely to be aware of the deficiencies of the existing system of crime control. From 
their experience of being discriminated against by government as a whole, and by the 
criminal justice system in particular, youths and marginalised groups are more likely 
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to have broader visions of crime and more holistic visions of crime control. Second, 
although democratic theorists have long argued that active citizenship as a whole 
gives rise to less authoritarian government, this is ultimately dependent on the people 
involved showing a commitment to an inclusive common good. Jordan and Arnold 
(1995) warn that in the current climate of punitivism associated with the changing 
nature of the social (see section 2.1.2), active citizenship is as likely to increase as 
decrease pressure to resort to authoritarian crime control (cf. Hancock and Matthews, 
2001). This point is relevant to both marginalised and included individuals and 
groups, and to youths as well as adults. With the demise of geographical communities, 
both are more likely than they were in the past to base their interpretations of the 
problems of crime and crime control on macro ideologies than local knowledge and 
interaction with the people that live around them. 
If the experience of consulting the public by crime prevention partnerships matches 
that of the police, then increased input from the public will certainly present little 
challenge to existing power relations. Police and community consultative groups and 
police sector working groups have proven to serve little more purpose than to allow 
the police to mobilise consent (Dixon and Stanko, 1995; Kinsey et al., 1986). As a 
Metropolitan Police chief inspector, writing in the weekly police journal Police 
Review, put it: "[w]ould you screen your assembly to make sure that it contained only 
people whose opinion you need... If so, then you're probably happy with your Police 
and Community Consultation Group" (see Police Review, 3 December 1999). The 
important question for current purposes is whether, in contrast to police and 
community consultative groups and police sector working groups, local residents will 
not only gain a voice in the steering of crime prevention partnerships, but that crime 
prevention partnerships are also sufficiently localised for the decisions of those 
residents, that do get involved in the shaping of policies to be informed by their 
interpretation of the needs of the areas that they live in, and more important still, that 
crime prevention partnerships are sufficiently localised for youths and marginalised 
groups to gain voice. 
The position of practitioners is equally interesting. Like residents, practitioners 
involved in local crime prevention partnerships will inevitably base their decisions on 
their interpretation of the needs of local areas (in this case the needs of the areas that 
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they work in) as well as the needs of society as a whole. Further, compared to 
practitioners working at, for example, the Home Office or the Local Government 
Association, the views of local practitioners are more likely to be shaped by 
interactions with those that have most experience of the discriminatory and punitive 
nature of the existing criminal justice system. Not only are some local practitioners 
(for example, community police officers, probation officers, youth justice workers, 
and health and safety inspectors) in direct day to day contact with offenders, but many 
other local practitioners (including, for example, housing officers, envirom-nental 
health officers, mental health workers, and outreach youth workers) are in daily 
contact with youths and marginalised groups as a whole. However, like the potential 
influence of local residents, the strength of these observations are weakened by the 
changing nature of the social. Not only are practitioners more likely to come under 
pressure from residents to be more authoritarian than they were in the past, but they 
are more likely to take authoritarian views into their work in the first place. The 
important questions here reflect those regarding the likely input of local residents: 
whether crime prevention partnerships are sufficiently localised for the decisions of 
practitioners involved in the shaping of crime prevention policies to be informed by 
their interpretation of the needs of the areas that they work in, and most importantly, 
whether crime prevention partnerships are sufficiently localised for the voices of 
practitioners working 'on the ground' to be heard. 
ZZ The Local as a Sitefor Authoritarian Crime Control 
With these important points in mind, the remainder of this chapter returns to the 
structural pressures on the local to become a site for authoritarian crime control. As 
noted in the discussion of changing political, economic and social needs earlier to the 
chapter, at the turn of the millennium there is little doubt that western societies can no 
longer be described as disciplinary in the sense that the ten-n was used by Foucault 
(1977) to describe societies characterised by fon-ns of government that are dominating 
and individualised to the 'needs' of particular people. Contemporary western 
government, it was explained, is less concerned with normalising as with managing 
people, as regimented workers are less required, and the flip-side of the advantage 
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that 'technologies of domination' have in producing docile subjects is that subjects are 
less able to adapt to the different working conditions they are likely to encounter in 
their lives. This means less direct government intervention into the lives of the 
majority. However, it also means more intervention into the lives of the minority. 
First, the move away from the post-war social democratic promise of universal 
employment and social welfare that has accompanied the move beyond industrial 
production is resulting in less economic inclusion and support, in turn resulting in 
more resentment and with it more anti-social behaviour. Second, the economic 
insecurities and the break-up of the social whole that have accompanied economic 
change is resulting in a greater need for the state to be seen to be doing something 
about anti-social behaviour. Finally, there is a need for more coercive interventions, 
including penal interventions, as the marginalised are more defiant of efforts to 
control them as well as efforts to make them responsible for their economic and social 
welfare. Yet, unlike the past, the primary object of intervention is not to understand 
where individuals have gone wrong, but simply to hold their anti-social behaviour 
back, to supervise them, to manage them, along with others of their kind. As Cohen 
puts it in the specific context of crime control, "'[t]he game is up' for all policies 
directed to the criminal as an individual, either in terms of detection (blaming and 
punishing) or causation (finding motivational or causal chains)" (1985: 147). 
Two final points about the continuing, if not increasing need, for coercive social 
control need to be made before the relevance of law enforcement to the 'turn to the 
local' in crime control is explored in more detail. First is that the falling out of favour 
of the positivist interpretation of human behaviour has also had the effect of restoring 
faith in the coercive potential of the penal system (Garland, 2001; O'Malley, 1992). 
Juridical controls are akin to 'technologies of the self, correcting "en masse" rather 
than "retail" (Foucault, 1977), and aiming to do no more than teach "the misfortunes 
of vice" (ibid. ). Second, in the opinion of the researcher, it is the potential use of legal 
orders as tools of crime control that lies at the heart of the potential for the local to 
become a site of authoritarian crime control. Three particular factors point in this 
direction. From an empirical point of view, local authorities already resort to law in 
their role as managers of residential and commercial populations. There is nothing to 
suggest why they should choose to take a softer line to crime control. Also from an 
empirical point of view, like criminal law enforcement, legal orders are backed up 
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with penal remedies, yet they can be obtained under evidential procedures that 
traditionally fall below those required by the criminal courts; and while it is necessary 
to prove that legal orders have been broken 'beyond reasonable doubt', proving that a 
youth has, for example, 'hanged around' on the street after seven o'clock in the 
evening is far easier than proving, for example, that they have vandalised a car or 
harassed their neighbours. These two points are explored in more detail in section 
4.2.1. Finally, those that call for legal orders to be used as tools of crime control often 
argue that there is a need to criminalise behaviour that is not currently covered by 
criminal laws in order to 'nip offending in the bud'. This point is returned to at 
various points throughout the remainder of this chapter. 
Criminologists have noted a relaxing of the due process and penal equivalence models 
of justice in post-industrial western societies (e. g. Rutherford and Green, 2000; 
Hallsworth, 2002; Hancock andý Matthews, 200 1). However, as noted in section 2.1.1, 
many criminologists, including Garland (2001), note that appeals for 'zero tolerance' 
to be shown to the anti-social behaviour of the economically and socially non- 
compliant have made little headway. What this argument fails to question is whether 
it is with local authorities and not the police that the future of the 'zero tolerance' 
approach to crime control depends. Most significant of all, legal orders can be applied 
against behaviour not traditionally covered by criminal law, in other words legal 
orders allow for earlier as well as easier penal intervention. It no longer becomes 
necessary, for example, to wait for youths 'hanging out' to start vandalising property 
or harassing their neighbours. So long as their behaviour causes distress to others, 
they can be brought under immediate penal supervision. The relaxing of the due 
process and penal equivalence models of justice formed the basis of the fifth and sixth 
aspects of the research question taken into the empirical research conducted during 
the course of this doctoral thesis (see section 3.1). 
ZZ1. 'Behaviour Surveillance' 
The first means of managing people is through incapacitating them. The most obvious 
way to do this is through the criminal justice system. Hudson (2001) demonstrates 
how the emphasis on managing offenders is reflected in England and Wales in the 
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growing focus on incapacitation in sentencing, and in the restructuring of 
imprisonment and the regimes of community penalties. On the former, Hudson notes 
that under the Criminal Justice Act 1991 property crime was originally allocated to a 
"proportionality track" and violent crime to a "risk track", and that burglary was later 
added to the 'risk track' under the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997. This emphasis on 
incapacitation was strengthened under the Criminal Justice Act 2003. First, the White 
Paper that preceded it (Home Office and Lord Chancellor's Department, 2002) 
suggested that incapacitation should be taken into consideration by sentencers for 
property as well as violent offences. Second, minimum sentences were brought in for 
aggravated and second murders, and for gun possession. Finally, a new indeterminate 
sentence of imprisonment for public protection was introduced for most violent and 
sex sentences attracting a potential sentence of ten years or more. 1,900 of these 
sentences were handed out by the courts in the first twenty-one months after they 
were introduced (see the Guardian, 7 January 2007). 
Incapacitating the marginalised in prison is a modem example of "the dark side of 
bio-politics" (Dean, 1999: 139). While "bio-power" emerged in order to administer 
rather than impede life (Foucault, 1979), it has negative exclusive functions as well as 
positive inclusive one, and still relies heavily on sovereign interventions (see e. g. 
Christie, 2000; Rutherford, 1997). The growing emphasis on incapacitation in 
sentencing is further matched by modem-day prison regimes, which emphasise 
security above all other purposes. Writing of Pelican Bay prison in the United States, 
Bauman, for example, highlights the lack of emphasis put on providing for 
constructive activity: 
[VAiile] all kinds of panoptical-style houses of confinement were first and foremost factories 
of discipline - more precisely, factories of disciplined labour [ ... 
] What the Pelican Bay 
prison brings close to perfection is the technique of immobilization [ ... 
] What the sharp 
acceleration of the punishment-by-incarceration suggests... is that there are some new and 
large sections of the population targeted for one reason or another as the threat to the social 
order, and that their forcible eviction from social intercourse through imprisonment is seen as 
an effective method to neutralise the threat, or at least to calm the public anxiety which that 
threat evokes. (Bauman, 2000: 210,212 and 213 - cf. Feeley and Simon, 2003) 
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The second means of managing people, as noted in section 2.1.1, is through 
controlling the spatial environments in which they act (Cohen, 1985). Such spatial 
controls aim to restrict subjects' choices, including their opportunities to commit 
crime. The spatial control of crime is both victim and offender orientated. Victim- 
orientated controls aim to restrict access and to protect potential targets. Examples 
include the use of security guards, pin numbers, passwords, swipe cards, anti-vandal 
paint and fixed cameras. Offender-orientated spatial controls aim either to exclude 
potential offenders or keep them under surveillance. Examples here include the 
provision of traffic calming measures such as speed bumps and road narrowing, 
crowd directing measures such as fencing and the placing of amenities and youth 
leisure facilities, and most important for current purposes, coercive measures such as 
curfews and monitoring individuals through rotating cameras. 
Although criminologists acknowledge the growth of offender as well as victim 
orientated spatial controls, it is the more subtle forms that have received most 
attention. Emphasis is put on the potential that spatial controls have for making 
government more covert, in turn creating less resistance. This observation is well 
summarised by Rose: 
In disciplinary societies it was a matter of procession from one disciplinary institution to 
another... In our societies of control, it is not a question of socializing and disciplining the 
subject ab initio. It is not a question of instituting a regime in which each person is 
permanently under the alien gaze of the eye of power exercising individualizing surveillance. 
It is not a matter of apprehending and normalizing the offender ex post facto. Conduct is 
continually monitored and reshaped by logics immanent within all networks of practice. 
Surveillance is 'designed in' to the flows of everyday existence. (Rose, 2000: 325 - cf 
Shearing and Stenning, 1985) 
This, however, is a control mechanism of what Rose describes as "circuits of 
inclusion". Social control is not so subtle when surveillance is targeted at the anti- 
social behaviour of the minority. In the control mechanisms of "circuits of exclusion" 
(Rose, 2000) surveillance continues to depend on the juridical symbols of the sword 
and blood. Coercive spatial controls are of equal relevance to post-industrial 
government. This is demonstrated, for instance, in Mathiesen's (2000) account of the 
integration of registration and surveillance systems across Europe. Mathiesen 
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provides evidence of the current availability across European police forces of details 
on 700,000 people, and the use of such information for targeted surveillance. 
Although registration and surveillance systems are currently targeted primarily at the 
threat posed by illegal immigrants, and are being implemented as a result of 
globalisation rather than localisation, Mathiesen warns of their broader potential use 
against the marginalised as a whole that will be made possible through technological 
advance. His conclusion is daunting: 
The likely development towards a more or less integrated, totalising registration and 
surveillance system in Europe implies a development towards a vast "panoptical machine" 
which may be used for the surveillance of individuals as well as whole categories of people, 
and which may well become one of the most repressive political instruments of modemity. 
(Mathiesen, 2000: 188) 
The development of such a 'panoptical machine' can be observed, for instance, in the 
current proposal to introduce compulsory identity cards, backed up by a central 
computer database. The Home Office insists that they will only be used to tackle 
illegal immigration, entitlement to public services, identity fraud, organised crime and 
terrorism (Home Office, 2003b). The proposed scheme has come under much 
criticism for its potential future extension to other functions, however. Two areas of 
concern that have been highlighted are the increased power the police will likely be 
given to stop and search people (in order to confirm that they are carrying their 
identity cards), and the potential use of central computer databases that will store 
information held on individual identity cards as an aid to electronic surveillance 
systems once technological advances such as facial recognition 5ystems have been 
fully developed (see House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2004). As 
currently proposed, information will be held on people's personal details, 
photographic and biometric identification and residential status. There is little reason 
to doubt that the databases will one day carry information from police records, as is 
the case with the European-wide registration and surveillance systems examined by 
Mathiesen (2000). With the growing influences of the discourse of underclass and the 
dichotomy of inclusion and exclusion, the "panoptical machine" also appears to be an 
inevitable part of the future of social control at national as well as global levels (see 
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e. g. Campbell, 2004; Fussey, 2004; Hier, 2003; Hbrnqvist, 2004; Lyon, 2002; Marx, 
2002). 
Returning to the phenomenon of crime prevention partnerships, empirical evidence 
also exists of the potential for such a 'panoptical machine' to be developed at a local 
level. In their research on the crime prevention partnership in Merseyside, Coleman et 
al. (2002) demonstrate that private and local authority CCTV systems are becoming 
useful tools for tracking risky individuals, and notifying the police and local 
authorities when they need to intervene. Evidence of targeted surveillance at a local 
level was also uncovered during the fieldwork conducted for this doctoral thesis at 
Westminster, where the chief executive's department and housing department were 
introducing a mobile CCTV system to gather evidence for the application and 
enforcement of legal orders (see section 5.2.5). 
The theoretical potential for the local to become a site of coercive spatial control is 
brought about by a continuing need for the state to step in where the population is not 
willing or lacks the ability to exert control over its spatial environments. Issue over 
the willingness of the population to exert control over its spatial environments 
concerns continuing state provision of spatial controls where informal controls are 
absent. Despite the privatisation of much public space with the proliferation of 
shopping and leisure complexes and gated communities (Caldeira, 2000; Davis, 1992; 
Shearing and Stenning, 1983; Shearing and Wood, 2003; South, 1988), it has not been 
established that the public will ever be content to live in fear of public spaces, and for 
their lives to be restricted to shuffling from one secure enclave to another: to live, 
work and play in a "city of walls" (Caldeira, 2000). The well-off may be able to 
withdraw into highly-secure gated communities, and the majority may be able to 
avoid public places to a large extent by travelling by car and shopping and playing in 
privately owned and controlled envirom-nents, and to avoid the most dangerous places 
altogether by moving to the suburbs, but few take comfort from the prospect of public 
spaces becoming 'twilight zones'. Efforts are being made to make people take more 
responsibility for their own personal safety, and for exerting control over public 
places through the creation and equipping of, for instance, residents' associations, and 
neighbourhood and commercial watch schemes, but with the changing nature of the 
social (see section 2.1.2), these "technologies of agency" (Dean, 1999) are unlikely to 
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result in the public taking on responsibility for looking out for people they are not 
acquainted with. It is, in other words, highly doubtful that it will become possible to 
govern public spaces 'at a distance'. A police apparatus will still be required. The 
police apparatus is being increasingly dispersed, but Foucault's (1977) inspector of 
the "non-disciplinary spaces" will most likely remain directly or indirectly employed 
by the state. Encouraging the population to become involved in managing its 
geographical territories is one thing. Encouraging it to take over is quite another. As 
noted in section 2.2.1, there may be little political risk (in terms of exposure of 'the 
myth of the sovereign state') in the state withdrawing from 'bio-political' practices 
such as health and education, but the same cannot be said for personal security. 
Issue over the ability of the population to exert control over its spatial environments 
concerns continuing state efforts to maintain sovereign state control over disorderly 
areas where the informal social controls of the compliant majority are faltering. It is 
concerned with efforts being made by the state to facilitate informal social controls 
through emboldening the population. Particular note needs be taken of the influence 
of Wilson and Kelling's (1982) 'broken windows' thesis on a refocusing of criminal 
policy towards providing earlier and more consistent legal intervention into disorderly 
communities to prevent anti-social behaviour from 'spiralling out of control'. In 
particular, the 'broken windows' thesis emphasises that disorderly areas can be kept 
under control through increasing the certainty of legal intervention. Its supporters 
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refer to a need for short-term intensive clampdowns to break the will of the non- 
compliant. However, with the changing nature of the social, it is again far from clear 
that geographical communities can be sufficiently built up to exert control over their 
spatial environments. Supporters of the 'broken windows' also support a long-term 
policy of intensive authoritarian policing in the most socially disorganised areas 
locations, and are as concerned with encouraging the public to report anti-social 
behaviour to the police as encouraging the public to intervene themselves. A number 
of social scientists have emphasised the link between the 'responsibilisation strategy' 
and the recruitment of the public as the 'eyes and ears' of the state (e. g. Andrejevic, 
2005; Palmer, 2000; Wakefield, 2005; Zurawski, 2005). The 'broken windows' thesis 
is covered in more detail in section 2.3.4. 
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The continuing need for the state to supplement and facilitate the spatial controls of 
the population, both victim and offender orientated, is an important reservation that 
needs to be made to the 'responsibilisation strategy' thesis. This formed an important 
background to each of the last four aspects of the research question taken into the 
empirical research conducted during the course of this doctoral thesis (see section 
ZZZ 'Behaviour Modification' 
The third means of managing people is to teach them how to control themselves. This, 
as emphasised in section 2.1.1, is as important a part of post-industrial western 
government as the growing emphasis on spatial controls. It may be the case that 
economic and social change is resulting in more exclusion, but it is important that this 
point is not exaggerated. The extremity that the 'exclusive society' thesis may be 
taken to is epitomised by Young: 
Let us immediately clear up the notion that capitalism always needs a great degree of social 
order. This is true only of specific period: the universally orderly population of the modernist 
period was necessary only with Fordist production and ftill employment... The underclass of 
today are not needed, their labour unnecessary, the inculcation of punctuality and discipline 
irrelevant, their consumption needs useful but easily controllable. (Young, 1998b: 283-284) 
And by Lianos and Douglas: 
... who are the deviants today? They are not the moral incorrigibles of the past and they are 
known to be disadvantaged. They are not to be morally condemned but they are to be 
contained. They are not to be patronisingly 'treated' but they are to be avoided, even though 
without value judgements. They are not detestable but they are disposable. They are simply 
'dangerous', 'aggressive', 'threatening', 'dodgy'. ýLianos and Douglas, 2000: 263; cf 
Lianos, 2003) 
Such interpretations of modem-day society are useful and informative, but they 
predict too much discontinuance with the past (Matthews, 2002; O'Malley, 2001; 
Young, 2002a; Zedner, 2002). First, the growth in the number of people surplus to 
economic requirements has not proven to be as large as many anticipated. There is, on 
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the contrary, a significant need for workers in the service industry in late capitalism. 
In an alteration to the views he expressed four years earlier, Young explains: 
What is not accepted, and indeed, is little mentioned [in the social exclusion paradigm], is 
that the underclass is integrally a part of the larger economic process and, more importantly, 
that it serves the living standards and the comfort of the more favored community... The 
economically fortunate... are heavily dependent on its presence. (Young, 2002a: 470) 
Interpretations of social change should likewise not be exaggerated. Not only do the 
economically fortunate continue to be serviced by the poor in, for instance, 
restaurants, supermarkets and DIY stores, but only the most wealthy are showing 
signs of a mass exodus to housing enclaves or of, for instance, stopping attending the 
same hospitals or sending their children to the same schools. If anything, social 
classes are more integrated geographically now than they were in the past. This is 
again well captured by Young: 
There is widespread evidence that the culture of contentment... -a 'contented majority' who 
are all right thank you, doing fine, and sharing little in common or concern for the excluded 
minority - is a myth... the late modem city is one of bluffed boundaries... the very intensity 
of the forces of exclusion is a result of borders which are regularly crossed rather than 
boundaries which are hermetically sealed [ ... I It was the Fordist city of modernity which 
had 
a segregated structure, a division of labour of specialized areas, a Chicago of concentric 
rings. Now the lines blur: gentrification occurs in the concentric rings; deviance occurs in the 
suburbs. It is a world of globalization, not separation; of blurring, not strict lines of 
demarcation. It is culturally a world of hybrids, not of pedigrees; of minor, not major 
differences. The very decline in the physical community and the rise of its virtual counterpart 
means that it is impossible for an underclass to exist separately. (Young, 2002a: 467 and 475) 
The blurring of the boundary between public and private space (see section 2.1.1) is 
therefore being countered by a blurring of the boundaries between the spaces shared 
by different social classes. Exclusion may be encouraged by the former, but it is being 
discouraged by the latter. The increased sharing of space gives rise to a need for more 
civility and more community, not less. 
Correctional controls are therefore evolving with economic and social change rather 
than dissipating and dying. Marginalised groups cannot be simply "managed in place" 
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(Simon, 1988 - cited in Hudson, 2002), as their cooperation in the economy and in the 
social is still needed. Besides, spatial controls are only really effective in controlling 
opportunistic crime. As Young (2002c) points out, much conventional crime is 
exciting, and much is reactionary. As noted in section 2.1.1, where correctional 
controls do continue, emphasis is placed on the subject correcting him or herself, on 
the 19th Century classicist notion of correcting through punishment, on 'grinding 
rogues honest' (for analysis of the concept of correcting through punishment, see e. g. 
Cohen, 1985; Hudson, 1987; Ignatieff, 1978; Mathiesen, 1990; Muncie, 2002b). 
Where correctional interventions do continue to adhere to the predestined actor 
model, their relevance to contemporary government can be explained in terms of 
(16 case-management risk" (Dean, 1999): the concentrating of methods of control, old 
and new, on the most risky (cf. Ericson and Haggerty, 1999). The broad movement in 
correctional controls, however, is towards the subject not so much being taught as 
shown how to control him or herself. With its emphasis on uniformity and the 
voluntarist notion of reform, such moral (as opposed to scientific) and self (as 
opposed to externally imposed) rehabilitation is therefore more suitable to the post- 
industrial need to give individuals more responsibility for governing themselves. 
Suggestion that their mind is being shaped from the outside is to be avoided where 
possible. The expert remains in the background, and where external intervention is 
needed, emphasis is put on the subject being helped by other members of the public 
rather than the expert, preferably by people that have experienced similar behavioural 
problems in their lives. Such rehabilitation is also suitable to the post-industrial need 
to produce well-behaved people, but not to penetrate so deeply into their soul to create 
right-behaving people: "[t]he criminal is not asked to change, but to show an ability to 
maintain the overt demands of a conforming life" (Cohen, 1985: 122). 
Cohen's (1985) analysis of the growing dominance of behavioural science on criminal 
policy is therefore relevant to the direction that both correctional and spatial controls 
are taking. As a spatial control, it points to the continuing importance of techniques of 
managing anti-social behaviour that do not rely on incapacitation. As a correctional 
control, it points to the continuing importance of "technologies of the norm" (Dean, 
1999). In contemporary correctional practices, then, the roots of anti-social behaviour 
are treated as the same for everyone: not enough responsibility in the exercise of 
autonomy. 
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The rest of this section explores the relevance of law enforcement to the 'turn to the 
local' in crime control along a similar trajectory to section 2.2.1. First, like informal 
spatial controls, the use of 'technologies of agency' (in this case more specifically 
described as "technologies of solidarity" - see Dean, 1999) to promote correctional 
controls is reflected in efforts to construct communities on a geographical level. 
Second, there is likewise little evidence that the movement towards 'government at a 
distance' will result in the abandom-nent of state-provided correctional controls. 
Again, with the changing nature of the social, it is far from certain that the state can 
devolve responsibility to the population to normalise its members. Nor, in the case of 
marginalised communities, is it in the interests of the state to devolve power. An 
example of state distrust in allowing marginalised groups to correct themselves 
highlighted in section 4.4 is the training of parents that have been served with 
parenting orders. Government guidance on parenting orders (Home Office et al., 
2004) emphasises that parents need to be taught to take responsibility for the 
behaviour of their children, but makes it clear that parents need to be instructed on the 
kinds of behaviour they need to learn to enforce. 
State-provided correctional controls are therefore of equal relevance to contemporary 
government as state-provided spatial controls, and most importantly for current 
purposes, correctional controls continue to be an essential element of crime control. 
Reference should again be made to the dark side of bio politics', which is not 
restricted to its ability to exclude. Dean (1999) explains that "authoritarian 
governmentality" has always been an essential element of the 'responsibilisation 
strategy'. While some people are treated as beyond help, most are treated as capable 
of improvement, if not self improvement. The "good despot", he concludes, may 
resort to law enforcement to deal with those who refuse to take up opportunities given 
to them to do so voluntarily: 
Within liberal forms of government... there is a long history of people who, for one reason or 
another, are deemed not to possess or to display the attributes (e. g. autonomy, responsibility) 
required of the juridical and political subject of rights and who are therefore subjected to all 
sorts of disciplinary, bio-political and even sovereign interventions. (Dean, 1999: 135) 
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The continuing need for state-provided correctional controls is a further reservation 
that needs to be made to the 'responsibilisation strategy' thesis (alongside the 
continuing need for the state to supplement and facilitate the spatial controls of the 
population, explored in section 2.2.1). This formed a second background to the last 
four aspects of the research question taken into the empirical research conducted 
during the course of this doctoral thesis (see section 3.1). The growing emphasis on 
such compulsory correctional controls in post-industrial social control is reflected in 
England and Wales in the emergence of youth offending teams alongside crime 
prevention partnerships. This development is explored in section 4.4. 
ZZ3. 'Expressive Justice' 
One final aspect of post-industrial structural change of relevance to the potential for 
the local to become a site of authoritarian crime control needs to be explored. In 
section 2.1.1 it was noted that there is an increasing need for expressive criminal 
policy. It was explained that this relates first to the role that law enforcement plays in 
allowing the state be seen to be in control of its sovereign territory and population. 
This aspect of increased need for expressive criminal policy is linked to the 
withdrawal of state government from the provision of, for example, employment and 
social welfare, which has led to public demands for a strengthening of the core (bio- 
political) functions of government, including crime control (Feeley, 2003; Hughes, 
2000). Even to the extent that crime control is ultimately in the hands of the public, 
the state simply cannot afford to be seen to be withdrawing from such an essential 
aspect of government. The fundamental need for the state to provide for personal 
security has been emphasised at a number of points in this chapter. 
The second aspect of expressive criminal policy relates to the general preventative 
role of law. In modem times, law has always been used as a means of denouncing 
behaviour (Foucault, 1977). As more responsibility for government is given to the 
population in post-industrial western societies, the symbol of law is becoming more 
important still (see Foucault, 1979; Rose and Valverde, 1998). Further, as a result of 
the increased economic and social insecurities associated with economic and social 
change (see section 2.1.2), cruelty is becoming a more respectable penal value in the 
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construction of mechanical solidarity. It is, Simon (2001) stresses, becoming 
increasingly important for the state to show empathy with victims. This point is also 
emphasised by Bauman: 
To support the observance of norm, those in breach of the norm must be seen 
to be punished. Best of all, they must be seen to be excluded [ ... ] The 
tendency to resort to the dry and impersonal letter of the law instead of 
relying on person-to-person negotiation of a common modus vivendi is a 
consequence of the gradual demise of... 'the multiplicity of contact points' - 
once the foremost characteristic of city life. (Bauman 2000: 207 and 208-209) 
And by Coleman and Sim, in their discussion of the use of CCTV systems by the 
crime prevention partnership on Merseyside: 
Those at the centre, of this downward gaze can be understood as the 
contemporary equivalents of Foucault's leper whose identification and 
targeting reinforces 'the constant division between the normal and the 
abnormal'. (Coleman and Sim, 2000: 637) 
Finally, by identifying certain groups as public enemies, and criminalising and 
punishing them, the state is able to deflect attention away from the structural causes of 
economic and social problems, including serious crime and anti-social behaviour 
(Box, 1983; Hall et al., 1978; Sumner, 1990). There is, in other words, an increasing 
need for a "politics of otherness" (Scraton, 2005), as there is more to deflect attention 
away from. 
It is, as Sullivan (2001) puts it (in criticism of Garland, 1996 and 2001, cited in 
section 2.1.1), "schizophrenia as usual". While there are no structural reasons for the 
increasing need for expressive criminal policy to be realised at a local level, there is 
every possibility that this increased schizophrenia will spill over into the work of 
crime prevention partnerships. As emphasised in section 2.1.4, with the changing 
nature of the social, we are more likely than in the past to treat people we are not 
personally acquainted with as 'strangers' and 'outsiders', or in the case of those that 
commit crime or behave anti-socially, as 'enemies within'. It only takes a short glance 
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through a local newspaper to appreciate just how close to the local punitivism 
operates. 
To conclude this section, modem-day western societies are full of blurred boundaries. 
Five blurred boundaries have been focused upon in this chapter so far: between the 
state and the population, the social and the private, civil nuisance and crime, free will 
and compulsion, and due process and crime control. The first was investigated in 
order to emphasise the point that devolving is not the same thing as redistributing 
power. The other shifting boundaries were investigated in order to explore the role 
that the criminal justice system continues to play in crime control. It has been 
demonstrated that there is a growing emphasis on holding crime back rather than 
dealing with its underlying causes, precipitated by the ineptitude of the state and the 
decline of the social with the movement beyond Fordist production, but that the 
spatial controls that have proliferated as a result are based as much on supervising as 
incapacitating potential offenders, and that the need for correctional controls has not 
been dispensed with. Most important, it has been demonstrated that law enforcement 
not only has a continued role to play in facilitating and supplementing (spatial and 
social) government, but that it is becoming more rather than less important, with the 
result that it is being increasingly focused on anti-social behaviour as well as serious 
crime. Finally, it has been demonstrated that with the further trend towards dispersed 
government, there is a danger that structural pressure on the state to take a more 
authoritarian approach to crime control will be realised in part or on the whole 
through crime prevention partnerships, that the penal state may be 'rolled out' to the 
local (Tombs and Whyte, 2004) as one weapon in an increasing armoury needed to 
allow for more intensive intervention into the lives of the marginalised, to contain the 
increasing danger they pose, while simultaneously deflecting attention from troubles 
elsewhere. In order to reach these conclusions, five issues have been focused on: the 
emergenc e of behavioural science as the dominant criminology, the growing influence 
of the 'broken windows' thesis, the continuing need for the labour and civility of the 
otherwise economically and socially marginalised, the growing need for expressive 
criminal policy, and the possibility that the state is reacting to the deficiencies of the 
criminal justice system by resorting to it earlier and more consistently. 
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2.3. Keeping Order 
Having explored the potential for changes in economic and social structure to result in 
the local becoming a site of authoritarian crime control, this chapter now moves on to 
investigate the more immediate political context under which the 'turn to the local' in 
crime control is developing. This requires analysis of the recent rise of 
communitarianism, and in particular moral communitarianism, as a political force in 
the western world. 
2.3.1. Communitarianism 
The communitarian agenda emerged in response to the domination of neoliberalism at 
the end of 20th Century. In contrast to liberal thought in general, it emphasises the 
collective rather than individual character of human existence (Hughes, 1996). While 
liberalism emphasises the negative aspects of individuals being constrained by their 
communities, communitarianism emphasises the benefits that communities bring to 
their members. Etzioni explains: 
While it is possible to think abstractly about individuals apart from the community, it must be 
noted that if individuals are actually deprived of the stable and positive effective attachments 
communities best provide, they exhibit very few of the attributes commonly associated with 
the notion of the freestanding person presumed by the individualist paradigm. Such 
individuals are unable to be reasonable and reasoning members of a civil society. (Etzioni, 
1996: 25 - cf. Etzioni, 2000: 16-18) 
Liberalism therefore focuses on the rights of the individual over his or her 
geographical community, while communitarianism is equally concerned with the 
individual's obligations to his or her geographical community (Hancock and 
Matthews, 2001). Communitarianism emphasises the need to respect the right of 
others to live without fear of crime or civil nuisance (Leadbeater, 1996). 
Communitarianism therefore has broad appeal. It collects together the concerns of all 
those who reserve support for the enlightenment project and continue to attach 
importance to the need for social cohesion in order to allow geographical 
communities to live and prosper together. As such, communitarianism encompasses 
32 
critique of both the current neoliberal emphasis on free market individualism and the 
previous liberal emphasis maximum state intervention, both of which are viewed as 
dangers to organic community (Hughes, 1996). 
It is the more conservative interpretations of communitarianism that have so far 
prevailed in crime prevention partnerships. Radical interpretations of communitarian- 
ism have remained peripheral. Social democratic support for crime prevention 
partnerships is found instead in the emergence among the political left of so-called 
'third-way' politics, with its emphasis on finding a balance between social cohesion 
and individualism. The extent that 'third-way' interpretations of the need for social 
cohesion have so far triumphed over neoconservative ones in the objectives and 
targets of crime prevention partnerships in England and Wales is covered in chapters 
four and five. The purpose of the remainder of this chapter is to investigate the 
objectives of 'third-way' and neoconservative communitarianism, the methods they 
employ, and the common ground that may be found between thern. 
2.3. Z Moral Communitarianism 
While radical communitarians put equal emphasis on motivations as 'restraints in their 
analysis of the causes of crime, moral communitarians throw their support almost 
exclusively behind the latter. They warn that post-industrial social change has been 
accompanied by a faltering of the power social institutions such as the workplace, 
trade unions, the church, families and community groups previously exerted over 
individuals. Skogan explains that in the past, levels of crime remained unchanged, 
even in times of social inequality, "because the traditional agents of neighborhood 
social control were strong: families, parish churches, schools, the bonds of ethnic 
solidarity, and conservative values" (1990: 126 - cf. Dennis, 1998: 6-14). The result, 
moral communitarians say, is that people no longer have the confidence to intervene 
or stand up to crime, or even confidence in their right to do so. While 'third-way' 
communitarians retain a level support for strain theories, they share this underlying 
support for control theories with the neoconservative right. Skogan continues: 
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Since mounting disorder and crime reflect the declining strength of informal social controls in 
urban neighborhoods, efforts to reinvigorate those informal controls may succeed in reversing 
the trend. While there might be other mechanisms for doing this (for example, by attacking 
unemployment and family breakdown, and upgrading the quality of schools) organising 
communities to recapture the past has emerged as our newest hope for reshaping urban 
neighborhoods. (Skogan, 1990: 126) 
Leadbeater likewise refers to motivations for crime when he introduces the 'third- 
way' vision of communitarianism, but focuses on restraints when he discusses the 
methods of crime control that need to be deployed: 
[Communitarianism] recognises the power of both cultural and economic explanations for 
crime. But it diagnoses and responds to them in different ways by attempting to rebuild a 
layer of intermediate institutions between the individual and the state, which are capable of 
commanding authority and dispensing punishment. Society will only become more ordered if 
we create common, collective institutions capable of providing that order. (Leadbeater, 1996: 
11) 
The challenge, 'third-way' and neoconservative theorists agree, is to find ways of re- 
asserting control. It is not the need to restore control, but rather how and to what level 
it should be restored that separates 'third-way' from neoconservative communitarian- 
ism. Three points need to be emphasised. First, neoconservatives put few limits on the 
rights of geographical communities to define the limits of acceptable behaviour 
among its members (Hughes, 1996). In the spirit of Lord Devlin, Wilson, for instance, 
defines anti-social behaviour as any behaviour that disturbs public peace. He gives the 
examples of "a noisy drunk, a rowdy teenager shouting or racing his car in the middle 
of the night, a panhandler soliciting money from passersby, persons wearing eccentric 
clothes and unusual hairstyles loitering in public places" (1968: 16). What is not made 
clear in neoconservative literature is whether this allows for a geographical 
community to define behaviour that is unacceptable to society as a whole as 
acceptable to their particular locality, and what is to be done in areas where there is no 
consensus over the limits of acceptable behaviour. These issues are returned to later in 
this chapter in section 2.3.5. 
Next, in their interpretation of social control, neoconservatives are also far more 
concerned with people being liable for the hanns that they cause to their geographical 
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communities (and so liable to be disciplined by their geographical communities) than 
with the duties that geographical communities owe to their individual members (to 
give them emotional support, teach them to be altruistic, surround them with positive 
influences, provide them with activities to occupy their time, and so on). Last, and for 
current purposes most important of all, they emphasise the need for the informal 
social controls of geographical communities to be supplemented by formal social 
controls, including legal ones. Kelling, for example, writes: 
[M]ost research which sheds light on the relationship between police and citizens suggests 
their mutual dependence... Citizens need close relations with police for back-up force to 
control streets, ensure their safety, provide emergency service and assistance in the 
prevention of crime, and to restrain them when their actions verge on vigilanteism. (Kelling, 
1986: 100) 
The 'third way', on the other hand, qualifies the right of the compliant majority to set 
and enforce standards of behaviour for their neighbourhoods with the need for social 
inclusion and the celebration of difference (Hancock and Matthews, 2001). 
Furthermore, when 'third-way' communitarianism speaks of people's obligations to 
their communities, it is equally concerned with their social duties. Etzioni writes: 
We aspire to a society that is not merely civil but is good. A good society is one in which 
people treat one another as ends in themselves and not merely as instruments; as whole 
persons rather than as fragments; as members of a community, bonded by ties of affection 
and commitrnent [ ... ) When we bond with family, friends or community members we live up 
to the basic principle of the good society. The values of love, loyalty, caring and community 
all find their roots here. (Etzioni, 2000: 11 and 12 - cf. Etzioni, 1996: 25-2 8) 
Finally, the 'third way' differentiates itself from neoconservativism by stressing an 
overriding preference for informal social controls. Leadbeater, or example, writes, 
"[w]e need institutions which can command respect and authority without bearing the 
heavy hand of the state" (1996: 12 - cf. Etzioni, 1996: 12-14). 'Third-way' critique of 
law enforcement is based partly on the view that state power pales into insignificance 
alongside that of the population it is in charge of (see section 2.1.1), and partly the 
negative effect of penal punishment on individuals. Braithwaite (1989) explains that 
community institutions are more successful in ensuring compliance to their norms of 
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behaviour as they command respect through fear of chastisement rather than fear of 
punishment. He gives two examples to back up his argument. The first is a field 
experiment that showed income tax evasion to be affected more by guilty conscience 
than by fear of criminal penalties. The second is a youth survey on the fear of being 
arrested. Highest on the list was fear of chastisement from parents. Next was the 
shame of having to appear in court. 
'Third-way' communitarians therefore criticise neoconservatives for the breadth of 
their intolerance of difference, and for their overriding support for discipline and law 
enforcement. For these reasons, Etzioni (1996 and 2000), for instance, describes 
'third-way' communitarians as social conservatives, while Leadbeater (1996) refers to 
them as cultural conservatives. The 'third way' stresses that the fundamental 
difference between itself and neoconservativism is to be found in its attempt to bridge 
the gap between liberals and conservatives. While liberals emphasise the importance 
of the freestanding individual, and conservatives the importance of collective virtues, 
the 'third way' aims to establish a balance between the two. "That tired old 
ideological conflicf', Leadbeater insists, "has been replaced by a new common sense 
which combines elements of liberalism and authoritarianism, most ably captured by 
Tony Blair's slogan: 'Tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime... (1996: 3-4 - cf. 
Etzioni, 1996: 7-12). 
Yet, the important point for the purpose of this thesis is that despite these differences, 
the division between 'third-way' and neoconservative communitarianism is often 
difficult to make out, and is one that is easily bridged. Hughes (1996) has no qualms 
about including the right within the communitarian agenda, describing both sides of 
the political spectrum as moral authoritarians or conservative moral communitarians 
(cf. Garland, 2000). Despite Braithwaite, Etzioni and Leadbeater's attempts to find a 
balance between the rights of the individual and the rights of geographical 
communities, and to consider motivations as well as restraints to crime, 'third-way' 
and neoconservative interpretations of communitarianism still share plenty of 
common ground. Neither questions the benefit of the free market, both treat 
conventional crime as a serious problem, both are as concerned with anti-social 
behaviour as they are with serious crime, and neither expresses any real concern with 
non-conventional crime. Both support putting restraints on individuals as the primary 
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response to crime, reminiscing of the power that intermediary institutions held in the 
past and pointing to apparent low levels of crime and disorder in far-eastern societies 
today, where community control is said to be stronger. Finally, although both support 
infon-nal social controls as the ideal way of controlling crime, talking in terms of 
effective crime control depending on the ability of the state to facilitate geographical 
communities, both accept that it may be necessary to supplement infonnal social 
controls with formal social controls, including legal controls. And like the right, 
'third-way' communitarians put emphasis on increasing the certainty of penal 
punishment, Etzioni, for example, writing: 
A major goal for the next decade should be to significantly increase certitude... that those 
who violate the law will be caught, those caught will be convicted and those convicted will 
serve their term... Punishing those who violate the law is unavoidable in an orderly and just 
society. (Etzioni, 2000: 42) 
The difference between Dennis, Kelling and Wilson, and Braithwaite, Etzioni and 
Leadbeater is, in other words, a matter of degree rather than principle. Moral 
communitarian logic may be extended to allowing geographical communities to 
define any difference as a threat, or it may place strict limits on the types of difference 
geographical communities have to tolerate. Braithwaite, Etzioni and Leadbeater 
clearly lean towards the latter, and Dennis, Kelling and Wilson towards the former. 
Nonetheless, varying degrees of tolerance and intolerance to crime are to be found on 
both sides of the political spectrum. The same point can be made about the methods 
(as opposed to the objectives) of crime control. 
Of particular importance for the purposes of this thesis is the blurred nature of the 
boundary of 'third-way' support for law enforcement. The ease by which the line is 
crossed between 'third way' insistence that law enforcement is a matter of last resort 
and neoconservative support for quick resort to law enforcement is most apparent in 
the support that both 'third way' and neoconservative communitarians give to the 
'broken windows' thesis, with its claims that not only should anti-social behaviour be 
treated as a problem of crime in its own right, but that informal social controls are 
also most effective when they focus on anti-social behaviour, that geographical 
communities that have lost control of their environments will not re-gain the 
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confidence to effectively police their areas without an initial 'clampdown' on crime 
by the police, and that in more fragmented geographical communities the police will 
be needed as a perinanent back-up. As will be seen (in section 2.2.1), although the 
'broken windows' thesis does not necessarily require the police to clamp down on 
minor crime through law enforcement, many that describe themselves as 'third way' 
communitarians support the right in making such a call. Before exploring moral 
communitarian support for the 'broken windows' thesis', it is first useful to consider 
the broader nature of the criminologies and penologies that inform moral 
communitarian interpretations of crime control. This requires analysis of left and right 
realism. 
Z3.3. Left and Right Realism 
Right realism emerged in the United Kingdom in response to the dominance in the 
1970s of critical criminology on the left and administrative criminology on the right. 
Critical criminology and administrative criminology both argued for a reduction in the 
use of the criminal justice system (Kinsey et al., 1986; Young, 1988). Critical 
criminologists stressed that the criminal justice system focused on conventional 
crime, and so served to deflect attention from equally important social harms such as 
domestic and commercial violence (e. g. Box, 1983 - see section 2.2.3), while 
administrative criminologists insisted that most crime was opportunistic and would be 
more effectively prevented through spatial controls (e. g. Clarke, 1980). Most 
important for current purposes, both sides added that the post-war rise in crime had 
shown the criminal justice system to be an ineffective means of crime control, due to 
the destabilising and brutalising effect it had on those it punished (Young, 1998b). 
This fact, critical and administrative criminologists emphasised, called for a 
bifurcation in criminal policy between serious crime and anti-social behaviour. They 
emphasised that perpetrators of serious crime should continue to be punished, in the 
interests of just deserts and incapacitation, but minor offenders should be diverted 
away from prosecution. The effects of the common ground found between the 
criminological left and right on criminal policy in the 1970s and 1980s is explored in 
more detail in section 4.1.1. 
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Right realism emerged as a criminological force in direct response to this alliance of 
opinion. Right realists did not dispute the fact that the criminal justice system was 
incapable of rehabilitating offenders. Central to right realist thinking is the concept of 
underclass, which claims that many offenders come from communities that are 
culturally disordered and incapable or else unwilling to desist from crime (see section 
2.1.3). Instead, right realists focus on the issue of deterrence, claiming that the 
criminal justice system is less effective than it was in the past because the chances of 
offenders, and in particular minor offenders, being prosecuted and given severe 
punishments is lower (e. g. Dennis and Mallon, 1998; Murray, 1997; Wilson, 1983). 
Further, right realists claim that perpetrators of minor crime deserve to be punished, 
as many people live in constant fear of them (e. g. Wilson and Kelling, 1982). It is 
argued that minor crime is not only experienced by many on a day-to-day basis, but 
that it is also a major contributor to fear of serious crime, as it serves as a constant 
reminder of people's vulnerability to it. Indeed, the more minor the crime, the more 
common an occurrence it is said to become, and the more anxiety it is said to cause. 
Of particular significance for current purposes, right realists extend their definition of 
minor crime to include civil nuisances such as homeless people begging, youths 
'hanging around' in an intimidatory manner, neighbours playing loud music, children 
cycling past elderly people on pavements, people not cleaning up after their dogs, and 
so on. Instead of crime, right realists speak in terms of incivilities, 'quality of life' 
crimes, or (the term used in this thesis) anti-social behaviour. 
Right realism can be treated as the criminological branch of neoconservative 
communitarianism. Like neoconservative communitarianism, right realism not only 
puts equal emphasis on anti-social behaviour as serious crime, but it also emphasises 
social control over strain theories of crime, and restraining offenders through 
discipline rather than support (Muncie, 1998; Young, 1988). Left realism quickly 
surfaced to challenge these biases (see e. g. Kinsey et al., 1986; Lea: and Young, 1994; 
Matthews, 1992; Matthews and Young, 1992; Young, 1988). It mounted a similar 
attack on critical and administrative criminology, supporting the view that anti-social 
behaviour should be 'defined up' as a problem of crime (e. g. Lea and Young, 1994, 
who described crime as "the tip of the iceberg"), but like 'third-way' 
communitarianism, distinguished itself from the right by emphasising diversity rather 
than absolute values. Unlike 'third-way' communitarianism, it also put as much 
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emphasis on tackling motivations as restraints to crime, and expressed equal concern 
for non-conventional crime. The danger nonetheless remained that the path was being 
paved for the left to lose its radical edge in criminological as well as political terms. 
Left realists are wary of the theoretical overlaps between themselves and the right, 
Matthews and Young for instance writing that the two approaches, "share a concern 
with the corrosive effects which crime can have on communities... but they are 
ultimately oppositional and competing positions" (1992: 5). Nevertheless, while left 
realists identify deprivation as the fundamental cause of crime, they include order 
maintenance among their suggested remedies (e. g. Lea and Young, 1994; Young, 
1988). Moreover, although left realism stands behind an overall policy of minimal 
policing, putting emphasis on the informal social controls of geographical 
communities and on the state settling disputes through negotiation, it insists that so 
long as policing is democratic and non-discriminatory, arrest and prosecution have a 
role to play, albeit a small one. Lea and Young, for example, write, "[flhe growing 
inefficiency of the police as a crime control organisation has an effect in increasing 
crime through potential offenders realizing that the likelihood of being apprehended is 
becoming continuously lower for many types of offence... [Falling clear-up rates] has 
undoubtedly contributed to further increases in crime" (1994: xiii-xiv - cf. Kinsey et 
al., 1986; Matthews, 1992; Young, 1998a; Young and Matthews, 1992). Allied to the 
support that left realism gives to 'defining anti-social behaviour' up as a problem of 
crime, this is a dangerous path to tread. 
Z3.4. 'Nipping Offending in the Bud' 
Moral communitarianism therefore finds justification for its support for 'defining anti- 
social behaviour up' as a problem of crime from the observations of realist 
criminology that anti-social behaviour is a social problem that has a serious impact on 
people's quality of life. In section 2.3.3 it was noted that the moral communitarian 
emphasis on focusing criminal policy on anti-social behaviour is justified further with 
reference to the 'broken windows' thesis. This is the last issue that needs to be 
expanded on before this chapter can be brought to a close. 
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Wilson and Kelling's (1982) 'broken windows' thesis focuses on the problem of 
disorderly areas gradually slipping out of control and attracting serious crime as 
geographical communities loses confidence in their right and ability to control 
disorderly behaviour within their spatial environments: 
Untended property becomes fair game for people out for fun or plunder, and even for people 
who ordinarily would not dream of doing such things and who probably consider themselves 
to be law-abiding... that 'untended' behavior also leads to the breakdown of community 
controls. A stable neighborhood of families who care for their homes, mind each others 
children, and confidently frown on unwanted intruders can change in a few years, or even a 
few months, to an inhospitable and frightening jungle. A piece of property is abandoned, 
weeds grow up, a window is smashed. Adults stop scolding rowdy children; the children, 
emboldened, become more rowdy. Families move out, unmarried adults move in. Teenagers 
gather in front of the comer store. The merchant asks them to move on; they refuse. Fights 
occur. Litter accumulates. People start drinking in front of the grocery; in time, an inebriate 
slumps to the sidewalk and is allowed to sleep it off. Pedestrians are approached by 
panhandlers. (Wilson, 1983: 78-79) 
Wilson and Kelling gave the now famous example of an experiment in which a car 
was left apparently abandoned in a high-crime area of New York, and another in a 
low-crime town in California. Unlike other parked cars, parts were gradually stolen 
off the cars (though in the latter area the process started only once the researcher took 
a sledgehammer to it himself), and they were eventually vandalised. The pace of 
vandalism, Wilson and Kelling stressed, escalated as people realised that no one 
would prevent them from doing so. 
According to the 'broken windows' thesis, the spiral into decline is a four-stage 
process: anti-social behaviour causes fear of serious crime, potential controllers in the 
geographical community lose confidence, public places become deserted, and the anti 
social are further emboldened, while other unruly people and eventually serious 
criminals are attracted to the area. Each success is seen as giving encouragement to 
the anti social and criminal, with the result that, for instance, petty vandalism 
escalates onto serious criminal damage, and harassment progresses onto robbery. 
Most critical of all, once the area has begun to 'spiral into decline', the communify 
may never be able to rescue it (see, especially, Skogan, 1990). The consequence for 
crime control is that anti-social behaviour should be at the centre of criminal policy, 
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not only because it is a problem of crime in its own right, but because it acts as a 
precursor to serious crime. Critical to Wilson and Kelling's (1982) paper was the 
concern that criminology paid too little attention to the fear of being bothered by 
others. This sentiment is shared by those who have developed the 'broken windows' 
thesis since. Ross and Mirowsky, for example, write: 
Fear may lead residents to believe that other people cannot be trusted, to be suspicious, and to 
think that others are out to harm them... Fear and mistrust may increase social isolation 
because people who mistrust others are unlikely to form social ties with them, and people 
who are afraid rarely leave the house to visit with others. The likely consequences are 
anxiety, depression, and poor health on the individual level and further erosion of social 
control and neighbourhood order on the community level. (Ross and Mirowsky, 1999: 426 - 
cf Kelling and Coles, 1996: 16-22) 
Finally, as noted in section 2.3.2, the 'broken windows' thesis stresses that in areas 
that are already plagued by anti-social behaviour, and are at the 'tipping edge' of 
criminal decline, the community will not be able to regain control over its spatial 
environment without the help of the police. Considering the extent that anti-social 
behaviour is a current feature of urban environments, supporters of the 'broken 
windows' thesis consider the need to make sure geographical communities do not 
lose sovereign control of their spatial environments to be the most important aspect of 
contemporary policing. The extent that the 'third way' supports the right in calling for 
the police to support the informal social controls of communities through enforcing as 
well as negotiating order is returned to in section 2.3.5. 
Finally, and in the opinion of the author of equal relevance to the question whether the 
local has the potential, through the moral communitarian movement, of becoming a 
site of authoritarian crime control, while Wilson and Kelling (1982) were ultimately 
concerned with geographical communities exerting control over their environments, 
in the background to the work of many neoconservative communitarians that have 
written on the 'broken windows' lies a concern that anti-social behaviour needs to be 
clamped down on in order to halt- the development of 'criminal careers' (Bowling, 
1999; Grady, 1998; Innes, 1999; Palmer, 1997; Johnston, 2000; Stenson, 2002). 
Dennis, for example, writes that it has become necessary for the police to act in the 
place of geographical communities as the "belated agents of socialization" (1998: 20), 
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while Kelling refers to the success of "three-strikes and you're out" and "truth in 
sentencing" criminal justice policy in "ending the joke" in which, for instance, 
"children stealing hubcaps of cars [were allowed to progress] onto stealing the cars 
(2001: 131). Elsewhere, writing with Coles, Kelling refers to children progressing 
from begging to robbing in the absence of police intervention (Kelling and Coles, 
1996: 21). A further example is provided by Johnston (2000), who quotes a reference 
by Mallon to youths progressing from 'hanging out' to stealing cars to burgling 
homes. The final example is taken from Dennis and Mallon: 
Hanging about in a verbally abusive gang, urinating in the lift, smashing the lights on the 
footpath, spraying graffiti on a house wall, smashing a seat in the park, are the starting points 
of a criminal career... Police action at this level therefore can have the effect in some cases 
of closing the criminal-career path early. (Dennis and Mallon, 1998: 67-8) 
The 'broken windows' thesis, then, with its emphasis on "nipping offending in the 
bud" (Dennis, 1998: 3), easily extends from law enforcement having a role to play in 
holding back the criminal decline of neighbourhoods to holding back the progression 
of the 'criminal careers' of the individuals who live within them. The centre of 
concern of the former is neighbourhoods at the edge of decline (Skogan, 1990; Wilson 
and Kelling, 1982). The centre of concern for the latter is youths. As emPhasised in 
section 2.2.2, both aspects of the moral communitarian call for 'defining anti-social 
behaviour' up as a problem of crime form part of the background to structural 
pressure on the state to take a more authoritarian approach to crime control. 
2.3.5. Conclusions 
The objective of the analysis of moral communitarian. politics and realist 
criminologies in this chapter has not been to accuse the left of drifting towards the 
right (though, as demonstrated in section 4.3.2, this is an accusation that certainly 
applies to some). The object has been to emphasise the potential, though 
unintentional, role that 'third way' communitarianism. and left realism might play in 
giving legitimacy to neoconservative / right realist efforts to turn the local into a site 
of authoritarian crime control. To surnmarise: 'third-way' and neoconservative 
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interpretations of moral communitarianism both support the right of geographical 
communities to control their members, and they both identify the restoration of 
individual responsibility as one of the potential answers to the post-war 'crisis of 
aetiology' (see section 2.2.1); left and right realism both emphasise that anti-social 
behaviour should be 'defined up' as a problem of crime, and both include law 
enforcement as a legitimate means of crime control. The current author likewise 
believes that it-is sometimes necessary to hold people responsible for their actions, 
and likewise believes that some people should be held criminally responsible. What 
concerns the author is that the model of crime control supported by the 'third way' 
communitarian left may not be strong enough to prevent people being held criminally 
responsible for anti-social behaviour. There are two objectives to this concluding 
section. The first is to summarise the key differences between 'third way' and 
neoconservative interpretations of crime control. Specific attention is paid to moral 
communitarian views on the area of law enforcement focused on in this doctoral 
thesis: the use of civil and public law orders. The second objective is to surnmarise the 
weaknesses in the 'third way' vision of crime control, and to explain how these 
weaknesses relate to the questions taken into the empirical research conducted during 
the course of this doctoral thesis, first introduced in this chapter in sections 2.1.4,2.2 
and 2.2.1. 
It has been seen that dispute between 'third-way' and neoconservative interpretations 
of crime control centre over the extent that difference should be tolerated, and the 
extent to which the police should resort to penal intervention in support of informal 
social controls. In section 2.3.2 the point was made that the 'third way' accuses 
neoconservativism. of showing little interest in consulting with the marginalised on 
their standards of acceptable behaviour. 'Third-way' communitarians highlight the 
fact that it is state-defined order rather than the definitions of order of individual 
geographical communities that neoconservatives are keen to preserve (e. g. Kinsey et 
al., 1986). 
The second contest between 'third-way' and neoconservative interpretations of crime 
control focuses on how the informal social controls of geographical communities are 
to be facilitated by the state. In section 2.3.4 it was seen that in the absence of law 
enforcement, neoconservatives insist but the 'third way' questions, the compliant 
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majority have little chance of regaining the confidence to exert control over areas that 
are already in criminal decline. Neoconservatives try, though with little success, to 
play down the differences between the two sides. At first sight it would appear ironic, 
for example, that the New York Police Commissioner in the mid 1990s, William 
Bratton, with whom the tenn. 'zero-tolerance' policing has been most associated with 
by the British media, should distance himself from the term altogether, and stress the 
importance of police officers use of discretion when faced with the possibility of 
making an arrest (see Bratton, 1998), or for Kelling (2001), co-writer of the 'broken 
windows' thesis, to go to great length to distance himself from the term authoritarian. 
Moreover, Dennis (1998) contradicts the term 'zero-tolerance' policing altogether, 
writing that 'zero tolerance' is about tolerant control. The same is the case with 
Dennis and Mallon, who write that all 'zero tolerance' means is that the police 
6"retum peace to the streets' by controlling minor situations in the interests of 
'decent' and 'respectable' citizens" (1998: 65). Wilson likewise describes the police 
patrollers role as, "defined more by his responsibility for maintaining order than by 
his responsibility for enforcing the law" (Wilson, 1968: 16), while Waddington 
(1999) writes that the key to order maintenance is under-enforcement of the law, 
giving the example of how people change their driving behaviour the moment they 
see a police car. 
'Third-way' communitarians are rightly critical Of this stance, emphasising that 
neoconservative writing on community policing makes constant reference to the need 
to control anti-social behaviour through arrest and prosecution, and is not concerned 
about the discriminatory nature of order maintenance policing, or its potential for 
alienating youths and even whole geographical communities (see e. g. Herbert, 2001; 
Kinsey et al., 1986; Matthews, 1992). Dennis and Mallon (1998), for instance, cite a 
police campaign on housing estates in Hartlepool, County Durham, in which thirty- 
one letters were sent to the parents of young men, but a further twenty-eight young 
men were arrested. Despite the claims of many of its supporters, neoconservative 
interpretations of community policing fall far short of treating law enforcement as a 
last resort. 'Zero-tolerance' policing, as Innes (1999) observes, is not about policing 
with "an iron fist in a velvet glove" but policing with "an iron fist in an iron glove". 
'Third-way' communitarians moreover accuse neoconservatives of not only refusing 
to allow the marginalised to define the types of behaviour that need to be controlled in 
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their spatial environments, but also of not being interested in entrusting the 
marginalised with the control of their environments. Indeed, neoconservative 
literature makes scant reference to the need to embolden the informal social controls 
of geographical communities, and appears to be far more concerned with recruiting 
the law-abiding as the 'eyes and ears' of the state. 'Third-way' communitarians could 
not differ more in their efforts to play down the need for law enforcement. The 
fundamental role of the community police officer, Fielding (1995), for instance, 
writes, is to negotiate order. This, Fielding emphasises, can only be achieved through 
the police developing close relations with geographical communities, in order to 
develop beat-level consultation and to gain information about localised patterns of 
crime and informal social controls (cf. Pollard, 1998). 
Disagreement over how the informal social controls of geographical communities are 
to be facilitated leads onto a third, and for the purpose of this thesis most important, 
area of dispute: the promotion by the right of a relaxing of the legal emphasis on penal 
equivalence and due process. This, as has already been noted in this chapter (see 
section 2.2), formed the basis of the fifth and sixth aspects of the empirical research 
conducted during the course of this doctoral thesis (see section 3-1). The relaxing of 
the penal equivalence model of criminal justice relates to the insistence from the right 
that once preference is given to the rights of the collective over the rights of the 
individual, it becomes reasonable to punish anti-social behaviour in disproportion to 
the harm that it has caused to prevent it from escalating into serious crime. Wilson, 
for example, writes: 
Arresting a single drunk or a single vagrant who has harmed no identifiable person seems 
unjust, and in a sense it is. But failing to do anything about a score of drunks or a hundred 
vagrants may destroy an entire community. A particular rule that seems to make sense in the 
individual case makes no sense when it is made a universal rule and applied to all cases. It 
makes no sense because it fails to take account of the connection between one broken window 
and a thousand broken windows. (Wilson, 1983: 84) 
The relaxing of the due process model of criminal justice relates to procedural rules 
and evidential requirements. Matthews (1992), for instance, criticises Wilson and 
Kelling (1982) for endorsing extra-legal "kick-ass" methods, while Jesilow and 
Parsons (2000) despairingly quote a New York City community police officer 
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explaining that patrol officers have to, "have a little talk with the knuckleheads... [and 
say] [t]his is my neighbourhood. If you mess up and I see you around, I'm going to 
take care of you" (2000: 178 - cf. Kelling and Coles, 1996, who criticise judicial 
decisions restricting methods of police interrogation). Most important for current 
purposes is the support neoconservative communitarianism affords to using legal 
orders to combat crime. Kelling (1998, cited in Kelling and Bratton, 1998), for 
example, criticises the growth of tenancy rights against being evicted, while 
Silverman (1999) emphasises the role played by "nuisance abatement laws" in the 
reduction of crime and disorder in the mid to late 1990s experienced in New York. 
To conclude this chapter. In their assessment of the objectives and targets of 
government, 'third-way' and neoconservative communitarianism stand in ideological 
opposition. To borrow from Matthews and Young's (1992) analysis of the differences 
between left and right realism cited in section 2.3.3, they are ultimately competing 
stances. Yet the two sides compete over the same theoretical grounds, and the 
boundaries between them are easily blurred. Like left realism, 'third-way' 
communitarianism 'defines anti-social behaviour up' as a problem of crime, but 
unlike left realism, 'third-way' communitarianism pays little attention to non- 
conventional crime, to strain theories, to welfare interventions, or indeed to 
controlling crime through anything but disciplinary means. Three areas of potential 
overlap between 'third-way' and neoconservative communitarianism have been 
emphasised in this chapter: the balance that should be struck between the rights of 
individuals and the rights of geographical communities, between informal social 
controls and law enforcement, and between due process and crime control. 
The first area of potential overlap relates to the questions whose order the 'turn to the 
local' in crime control is in the interests of (see section 2.1.4), and whether the 'turn 
to the local' in crime control is likely to be affected by the trend towards a 'mesh 
thinning' of social control (see section 2.1.3). Concern was shown to centre over the 
tendency of those describing themselves as 'third-way' communitarians to accompany 
the right in criticising the state for giving individuals too little responsibility for the 
consequences of their anti-social behaviour, and resultant calls for anti-social 
behaviour to be 'defined up' as a problem of crime, both in its own right, and because 
it acts as an antecedent to serious crime. As a result, crime prevention partnerships are 
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likely to come under 'top down' pressure to focus their attention on conventional 
crimes and the traditional (enforcement) approach to crime control. Further, as 
emphasised in section 2.1.4, it is not at all clear that crime prevention partnerships are 
sufficiently localised to resist these pressures, in other words that their policies will be 
ultimately shaped by local residents and practitioners, and moreover that local 
residents and practitioners whose voices are heard are likely to have holistic views of 
crime and crime control. 
The second area of potential overlap concerns 'third-way' preference for informal 
social controls not ruling out the need for law enforcement. This relates to the 
question whether the 'turn to the local' in crime control is likely to be affected by the 
structural pressure on the state to further criminalise anti-social behaviour (see section 
2.2.1). Fielding (1995) explains that it is not law enforcement per se that concerns 
'third-way' proponents of community policing, but the preoccupation with law 
enforcement within much police culture (cf. Alderson, 1979; Bayley, 1994; 
Friedmann, 1992; Pollard, 1998; Schaffer, 1980; Skogan, 1990). De Lint observes, 
"[w]hile protection and security orient a great many of the practices in the community 
policing quiver, it is now commonplace to see it blithely attached to paramilitary 
policing units in aggressive order maintenance... law enforcement serves crime 
preventioW' (2003: 391 - cf. Rosenbaum, 1994, who reports concern that in practice 
corfimunity policing has often moved little beyond the use of law enforcement 
'crackdowns', and McLaughlin, 2002: 81, who quotes John Alderson, famous for 
being the primary initiator of community policing in the police force of England and 
Wales, as describing community policing as a "fusion of social policing and legal 
policing"). Continuing support from the political left for law enforcement makes their 
support for 'defining anti-social behaviour up' in the interests of the rights of 
geographical communities more dangerous still. Community policing, as Johnston 
(2000) warns, is likely to remain state-led both in terms of defining the behaviour that 
is not to be tolerated and the methods by which to control it, as geographical 
communities are simply not self-regulating. 
The last area of potential overlap concerns the potential for 'third way' acceptance of 
resort to law enforcement in the control of anti-social behaviour to include the use of 
civil and public law orders, and so likewise relates to the question whether the 'turn to 
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the local' in crime control is likely to be affected by structural pressure on the state to 
further criminalise anti-social behaviour. No references to the use of legal orders as 
tools of crime control were encountered in the 'third way' literature reviewed during 
the course of this thesis. However, much support for crime prevention partnerships 
resorting to legal orders was encountered among the public statements of 'third way' 
politicians such as Tony Blair and Jack Straw. These are covered in chapter five. 
All three of these potential overlaps (responsibility for anti-social behaviour, criminal 
responsibility for anti-social behaviour, and a presumption of criminal responsibility 
for anti-social behaviour) have been crossed by the current Labour government. 
Writing on the Government's plans for criminal policy reform in 2002/2003, for 
instance, Prime Minister Tony Blair used the need to tackle "the narrow, selfish 
individualism of the 1980s" and the belief that "the state bad an unconditional 
obligation to provide welfare and security [but] the individual owed nothing in return" 
to announce "tough new measures against those who persistently flout the law", 
including 'on-the-spot' fines, injunctions and asset confiscation alongside reference to 
a number of unspecified initiatives to encourage people to become more involved in 
voluntary work in their geographical communities (see the Observer, 10 November 
2002). As Stenson observes, "[a] running thread [of New Labour's 'third-way' law 
and order policies] is to enable the police and other governmental agencies to regain 
control over the neighbourhoods of the so-called 'socially excluded', the 'problem' 
housing estates and poor inner-city areas" (2002: 229); and as Drakeford and 
Vanstone (2000) point out, despite Blair's claims to the contrary, his vision of 
communitarianism reflects the neoconservative discourse of underclass and 
dichotomy of inclusion and exclusion. Chapters four and five assess evidence that the 
boundaries between 'third-way' and neoconservative interpretations of moral 
communitarianism are indeed being crossed in the 'turn to the local' in crime control 
in England and Wales. The two chapters present the findings of the empirical research 
conducted during the course of this doctoral thesis. Before doing so, it is necessary to 
explore the development of the research question in more detail, and to outline the 
methodologies that were used. 
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Chapter three 
Research Methodologies 
3.1. Developing the Research Question 
The researcher's inspiration for conducting research on crime prevention originally 
came from media reports during the 1997 general election campaign on the adoption 
of a 'zero tolerance' approach to community policing in the mid 1990s in New York. 
This involved the police 'clamping down' on minor crimes such as graffiti, begging, 
and drinking and urinating in public. The media reported that justification for taking 
an authoritarian policing approach came not only from the effect that such 
'incivilities' have on people's quality of life, but also the view, from the 'broken 
windows' thesis, that areas plagued by such behaviour are likely to attract more 
serious crimes such as robbery and drug dealing (see section 2.3-4). As an 
undergraduate student the researcher had written a dissertation on public order 
policing in inner cities in the 1980s. 'Zero tolerance' policing appeared to be a 
continuation of the main theme centred upon in that research: the focusing of 
proactive policing in economically deprived areas on potential perpetrators rather than 
potential opportunities for crime (see Bunyon, 1976; Hillyard and Percy-Smith, 
1988). 
Most importantly, there appeared to be every prospect that 'zero tolerance policing' 
would also become a feature of policing in England and Wales if the Labour Party, as 
expected, won the general election. Particular note was taken of the unequivocal 
support expressed for 'zero tolerance' policing by the then shadow Home Secretary, 
Jack Straw, and the shadow Prime Minister, Tony Blair. In an interview conducted by 
the homelessness magazine the Big Issue, for instance, Blair expressed support for a 
Police operation in King's Cross, London, which included arresting people for 
prostitution and begging (Operation Welwyn). He defended the operation with the 
following words: 
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If you've got an old lady on a council estate who gets her door battered down and she's 
mugged by a gang of youths, it's not enough to say "wait until there's a decent society". She 
wants something done, to be protected, and she wants those people to be caught and 
punished. That, I'm afi-aid, is just the only way the world can work... [I also agree that 
minor law breaking should be clamped down on by the police] It is important we say we 
don't tolerate the small crimes. (Tony Blair, interview published in The Big Issue, 6-12 
January 1997. Emphasis added. ) 
It appeared that Blair and Straw were not only expressing support for focusing 
criminal policy on minor as much as serious crime, in line with the observations of 
moral communitarian politics and realist criminologies (see sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3), 
but that they were also promoting a need to control minor crime through law 
enforcement alongside physical and social security, in line with neoconservative 
communitarianism and right realism. What was equally striking was their apparent 
willingness to frame their promoting of 'zero tolerance' policing within the 'broken 
windows' thesis. Straw, for example, announced that "[we need to] reclaim the streets 
from the aggressive begging of winos, addicts and squeegee merchants" (quoted in 
the Guardian, 7 January 1997), and, "[i]t is quite remarkable that it has taken this 
government seventeen years to wake up to the connection between quality of life 
incidents and big scale crime' (quoted in the Guardian, 29 May 1996). The Labour 
Party, as it turned out, had every intention to continue the Conservative legacy of law 
and order (Sim, 2000). The links between the Conservative and Labour governments 
of the 1990s and moral communitarianism are explored in section 4.3.1. 
As a result of these observations, the research conducted for this doctoral thesis 
initially focused on exploring the relationship between moral communitarianism, 
community policing and 'zero tolerance' policing. To gain a deeper understanding of 
these relationships, the reading extended onto analysis of the wider nature of 
contemporary social control. The first draft of the research question was written to 
help guide the literature review. It read: the object of the doctoral research is to 
explore the potential for the development of community policing in England and 
Wales to result in a more authoritarian approach being taken to the policing of minor 
crime. The theoretical aspects of the literature reviewed during this stage of research 
were analysed. in chapter two. To summarise the key points made. Links can be 
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identified between the emergence of moral communitarianism as a political force in 
the latter decades of the 20"' Century and broad shifts in (post-industrial) western 
government away from 'anatomo-politics', 'technologies of domination', and 
centralised government, towards 'bio-politics' (which focuses on ensuring that the 
population is economically and socially secure and active, but does not go on to 
ensure that it is imbued with particular economic or social skills), 'technologies of the 
self' (which focus on individuals taking responsibility for their own economic and 
social health), and a dispersal of government from the state to the public (with state 
governing 'at a distance'), and from national to local authorities (a 'turn to the local' 
in government). There have been two broad effects of these inter-related 
developments on contemporary crime control. The first has been a focusing of 
criminal policy on managing crime (as opposed to re-integrating offenders), through 
victim and offender orientated spatial controls, and behaviour (as opposed to welfare) 
orientated correctional controls. The second has been increased resort to law 
enforcement in the policing of those at the margins of society. This has been 
accompanied by an emerging bifurcation in traditional criminology between analysis 
of the causes of crime (with the problem of crime being attributed to an underclass of 
culturally irresponsible people in need of more intensive control) and the means of 
crime control (with the problem of crime control being focused upon a need to treat 
people as more rather than less responsible for their actions). Further, the argument 
put forward in support of resort to law is not the discredited one that punishment 
needs to be more severe to be an effective weapon of crime control, but the disputed 
one that punishment needs to be more resorted to with more certainty. 
The empirical research on contemporary policing in England and Wales involved 
analysis of the police practitioners' magazine, Police Review (back to January 1996), 
and a computer search of the Guardian newspaper (back to January 1992), using 
search words such as 'policing people', 'community policing', 'confident policing', 
'law enforcement policing', 'zero tolerance policing', 'quality of life policing', and 
'broken windows'. The first use of the term 'zero tolerance' encountered was in the 
context of Operation Welwyn (the Guardian, 17 February 1992). The law 
enforcement aspects of this operation turned out to be far more concerned with the 
Policing of class A drug dealing than with the policing of prostitution and begging. 
Other than Operation Welwyn, few references to 'zero tolerance' policing were 
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encountered in this stage of the literature review. What is more, it was apparent that 
few resources were being allocated to the development of community policing as a 
whole. These observations were confirmed in the replies to a number of letters sent to 
police organisations, universities and pressure groups (listed in appendix one) 
concerning the research topic, most notably the replies from Mollie Weatheritt at the 
Police Foundation, who wrote that she was unaware of any plans to adopt 'zero 
tolerance' policing in England and Wales (letter dated 11 March 1997), and John 
Fisher, Assistant Superintendent at the closest police station to King's Cross, Islington 
Police Station, who stressed that the label 'zero tolerance' had been misapplied to 
Operation Welwyn, as the operation had involved no more than, "concentrating our 
resources at street nuisances at target times and locations" (letter dated 25 March 
1997). The final nail in the coffin of the proposed research topic came from reading 
the Audit Commission report Streetwise. Effective Police Patrol (Audit Commission, 
1996b), which advocated a 'problem-orientated' approach to the proactive policing of 
minor crime, focusing on particular crime 'hotspots'. It appeared that for the time- 
being at least, 'zero tolerance' policing did not form part of the policing agenda. 
The researcher drew the conclusion that 'zero tolerance' policing was little more than 
punitive rhetoric, and should be dropped as a research topic altogether. Nevertheless, 
it appeared that the emphasis that New Labour politicians were putting on 
authoritarian crime control was not in itself mere rhetoric, and that the law and order 
agenda of the previous Conservative government was set to continue. In the search for 
a new research topic, for a short while the researcher turned attention to the potential 
for private security to become the 'eyes and ears' of the police. However, this change 
of direction in the research was abandoned after reviewing academic literature on 
Private security (e. g. Chatterton and Rogers, 1989; Johnston, 1992; Leishman et al., 
1996; Loader, 1997; Matthews, 1989; Savage and Charman, 1996; Scott, 1998; Sharp 
and Wilson, 2000; Shearing and Stenning, 1983 and 1985; South, 1988; Waters, 
1996), revisiting Police Review, and conducting a further computer search of the 
Guardian newspaper. The suggestion in the academic literature was that the 
phenomenon of private security was not emerging as an extension of, but rather in 
place of, state government. Further, nothing in the empirical research suggested that 
Private security was likely to take off to any significant extent beyond private and 
commercial enclaves in England and Wales, and while the Government was planning 
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to introduce a licensing scheme for private security companies, it had given no 
indication that it intended to regulate the industry beyond checking that employees 
had been trained and did not have criminal records. 
Yet, it was during this stage of reading that the researcher's attention was first drawn 
to the potential for the powers and resources of local authorities to be brought under 
the umbrella of criminal policy. Despite the lack of evidence of private security taking 
over from police patrols, a number of references were found to the recent growth of 
local authority security patrols, for example 'in house' schemes in Wandsworth, 
London (the Times, 24 August 1994), Sedgefield, County Durham (the Guardian, 6 
July 1995), and Glasgow (the Guardian, 20 April 1996), and 'contracted in' schemes 
in Islington, London (the Guardian, 6 July 1995), and North Tyneside, Tyne and Wear 
(Police Review, 9 February 1996). Ibis observation resulted in the review of 
academic literature being extended onto local authority patrols (e. g. Hofstra and 
Shapland, 1997; Morgan and Newburn, 1997), and the broader nature of cooperation 
between the police and local authorities (see chapter four). This opened up a whole 
new angle to the research. In 1991 the Home Office had produced a report on crime 
prevention (the Morgan Report) that recommended formal partnership between the 
police and local authorities be given statutory footing. Implementation of the Morgan 
Report formed part of the Labour Party's 1997 election manifesto. This was later 
realised in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. In section 4.1.2 it is seen that the 
Morgan Report made further recommendations on the types of crime control 
initiatives in which local authorities and the police should cooperate. Central to the 
vision of the report was that such cooperation was emerging as a new area of criminal 
Policy encompassing physical and social security but not law enforcement: as a multi- 
agency 'partnership approach' operating as an alternative to the traditional 
'enforcement approach' of the criminal justice system. The researcher questioned 
whether cooperation between the police and local authorities might result in the 
4 partnership approach' becoming, on the contrary, an extension of the criminal justice 
system. A number of criminologists were found to have expressed concern about local 
allthorities focusing decisions to provide physical and social security on their ability 
to reduce crime (e. g. Crawford, 1997; Rutherford, 1996), but with one exception 
(Gordon, 1986), no concern was encountered in the literature over the potential for the 
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f partnership approach' to result in local authorities being employed as the 'eyes and 
ears' of the police. 
Still, the research was to hit yet another dead end, again following the contacting of 
practitioners, academics and pressure groups for advice. First, the researcher 
approached the community safety officer in London Borough of Merton, who was a 
colleague of the researcher's Ph. D. supervisor. During interview, the community 
safety officer emphasised that few local authorities in the country had set up security 
Patrols, and that in London, Wandsworth was the only borough to have done so (field 
notes, 2 April). These findings were confirmed at a later interview with the 
community safety officer in Wandsworth (field notes, 30 April 1997), and in letters 
received from Mollie Weatheritt at the Police Foundation (letter dated 2 June 1997), 
Frank Warburton at NACRO (letter dated 2 July 1997), who was involved in research 
on cooperation between local authorities and the police, and at interview with Scott 
Ballintyne at the Institute of Public Policy Research, a non-government organisation 
with strong links to the Labour Party, who had also conducted research on crime 
prevention partnerships (field notes, 26 June 1997). A list of interviews conducted 
during the course of the doctoral research is provided in appendix one. 
The turning point in the refinement of the research question came when the 
researcher's Ph. D. supervisor suggested contacting a researcher at the Home Office 
Crime Prevention Unit who was a visiting lecturer in crime prevention at the 
University. The Home Office researcher put the author in touch with a colleague of 
hers, Sheridan Morris, who was conducting research into local authority use of civil 
law injunctions and possession orders introduced by the Housing Act 1996 in 
response to crime. He emphasised that the powers were being targeted at minor crime 
and even "civil nuisances" as well as serious crime (field notes, 15 July 1997). There 
were clear parallels between this term and terms like 'incivility' and 'quality of life 
crime' that the researcher had originally encountered in media reports on 'zero 
tolerance' policing in New York. 
An empirical focus had finally been found for the researcher's broad interest in the 
I zero tolerance' paradigm, and emerging interest in the implications of cooperation 
between the- police and local authorities. Attention was then turned to the local 
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authority practitioner journals Housing Today and the Local Government Chronicle, 
both of which were analysed back to November 1996. Two relevant articles were 
found. The first was on the use of a Housing Act injunction to prohibit a social 
housing tenant from, among other things, playing loud music, screaming, and using 
abusive language (see Housing Today, I May 1997). The second article, written by a 
firm of solicitors, outlined the legal requirements for the powers that had been 
introduced under the Housing Act (see Local Government Chronicle, November 
1996). Through a library search for books on housing management, the researcher 
also discovered an empirical academic study on the use of injunctions and possession 
orders, and also public law abatement notices, to deal with "neighbourhood disputes" 
over civil nuisances such as noise and dumped rubbish (Dignan et al., 1996). Finally, 
it was discovered from media reports that the Labour Party was proposing to 
introduce a new civil order (the community safety order) specifically designed for use 
by crime prevention partnerships. This was eventually introduced as the anti-social 
behaviour order. This research is covered in more detail in chapter four. 
As a result of these observations, the moral communitarian and crime prevention 
literature was returned to. Criticism was uncovered in the moral communitarian 
literature of the failure of criminal law to control crime (see section 2.3-5). This 
criticism took two forms, both of which questioned the emphasis that the western 
world puts on liberal democratic interpretations of the rule of law. First was the high 
threshold of evidence needed to prosecute people under criminal law. Second was the 
failure of criminal law to cover behaviour such as swearing in public, being noisy and 
intimidating neighbours. A number of references to the potential of civil and public 
law orders to make up for these purported deficiencies of the existing criminal justice 
system were also found. The use of civil and public law orders as tools of crime 
control was barely recognised in the crime prevention literature, however. References 
to the proposed anti-social behaviour order were encountered, but all of the authors 
played down its significance, and none went on to mention other civil or public law 
orders. Indeed, it was another two years before any real academic concern over the 
link between crime prevention partnerships and the use of civil and public law orders 
was uncovered (by Bumey, 1999). 
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However, the dearth of attention given to civil and public law orders in the crime 
prevention literature was as much a source of inspiration as despair for the researcher. 
To this focus, a further development in cooperation between the police and local 
government that was also being promoted in the interests of authoritarian crime 
control was shortly added to the research project: Labour Party plans to introduce a 
statutory duty for the police and local authorities to cooperate in youth offending 
teams as well as crime prevention partnerships (see sections 2.2.2 and 4.4). Youth 
offending teams were to take over responsibility from the probation service for 
supervising youth offenders given community sentences. The emphasis of these 
partnership arrangements was, like crime prevention partnerships, minor as well as 
serious crime, and law enforcement as well as physical and social security. In the 
White Paper No More Excuses (Home Office, 1997) the newly elected government 
made it clear that youth offending teams were being introduced as part of a reversal of 
the policy adopted in the 1980s of waiting for young offenders to grow out of crime. 
The new emphasis on early legal intervention was to be achieved in two ways. First, 
the police would be required to charge youths that had been arrested for a third time. 
Second, youth offending teams would be responsible for administering a further civil 
order that the Labour Party was proposing to introduce, the parenting order, which 
would be available, for example, for parents whose children had been served with 
anti-social behaviour orders. 
In light of these empirical observations, the literature review was extended onto 
analysis of contemporary developments in the control of all types of behaviour 
deemed in establishment criminology to be problems of crime, regardless of whether 
they are covered by criminal law or not. The term 'anti-social behaviour' was chosen 
to describe this grey area of crime control, for the simple reason that it is the term 
most favoured in British academic, political and popular discourse. Further, the term 
'legal orders' was chosen as a generic ten-n for civil and public law orders. The 
research question was also finalised, with the words community policing changed to 
crime prevention partnerships. It now read: the object of the doctoral research is to 
explore the potential for crime prevention partnerships in England and Wales to 
become institutions of authoritarian crime control. 
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From the ongoing review of literature on the structural background to the potential for 
the local to become a new site of authoritarian crime control, it was immediately 
Possible to identify three areas of potential weakness in the crime prevention 
paradigm that could be exploited by the neoconservative right. The first related to 
observations that the 'turn to the local' in government was in the interests of existing 
government (see section 2.1.4). As the researcher's understanding of the links 
between the changing economic and social needs of western societies and the rise of 
moral communitarian politics developed (see section 2.3.2 to 2.3.5), this observation 
was divided into two. The first concerned the emphasis that moral communitarianism. 
Puts on controlling conventional rather than non-conventional crime. If crime 
Prevention fails to look beyond the current emphasis that the criminal justice system 
Puts on conventional crime, the prospect is raised that it will also fail to escape from 
the emphasis that the criminal justice system puts on law enforcement. The second 
concerned doubt that the 'turn to the local' supported by moral communitarianism is 
sufficiently local to allow 'top down' trends to be resisted 'on the ground'. There 
were three aspects to this question: first, whether local practitioners and residents 
involved in implementing crime prevention policies are also likely to shape the 
content of the policies; second, whether crime prevention partnerships are sufficiently 
localised to make it likely that the decisions of local practitioners and residents that do 
get involved in the shaping of crime prevention policies will be informed more by 
their interpretation of the needs of the areas in which they work and live than by their 
interpretation of the needs of society as a whole; and third, whether crime prevention 
Partnerships are sufficiently localised for youths, marginalised groups and 
practitioners working 'on the ground' to gain a voice. 
The second potential weakness in the crime prevention paradigm related to 
observations that the 'turn to the local' in government is bolstering rather than 
replacing existing government; in other words that government is being expanded as 
well as dispersed, with an overall 'mesh thinning' of social control (see section 2.1.3). 
This observation was found to be reflected in the equal emphasis that moral 
cOrnmunitarianism, again 'third-way' as well as neoconservative, puts on controlling 
minor as well as serious crime, due to the relatively prolific nature of minor crime, 
and due to its acting as a precursor to serious crime. If minor crime is 'defined up' as 
a More serious problem of crime, the prospect is raised that crime prevention will not 
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only fail to operate as an alternative to criminal justice, but that it will result in more 
and not less resort to law overall. 
The third potential weakness concerned observations that as a result of trends in 
government away from 'anatomo-politics' and 'technologies of domination', anti- 
social behaviour is more likely to be regarded as a social problem that needs to be 
criminalised (see section 2.2). This observation was eventually broken down into 
three issues. The first concerned the influence of control theories on 'third-way' and 
neoconservative moral communitarianism, and specifically the emphasis control 
theory puts on holding crime back rather than dealing with motivations for crime, 
holding crime back through offender as well as victim orientated controls, and 
holding crime back through disciplining as well as supporting potential offenders. 
This time the prospect is raised that crime prevention will likewise be influenced by 
the support that control theories afford to disciplining people through law 
enforcement. The second concerned the emphasis that moral communitarianism puts 
on relaxing the penal equivalence model of justice, in order to give law enforcement a 
role in facilitating the informal social controls of geographical communities and 
allowing for the compulsory supervision of offenders. The third concerned the support 
that moral communitarian affords to a relaxing of the due process model of justice. 
These raised the further prospect that law enforcement will become an aspect of crime 
prevention due to the potential for the civil and public law powers possessed by local 
authorities to be used tools of crime control. 
3.2. Selecting the Sites for Empirical Research 
it was decided that the research question would be applied to both national crime 
prevention policies and the policies of a number of local crime prevention 
partnerships. This would allow for a vertical study of the effect of structural and 
political pressure on the local to become a site of authoritarian crime control, covering 
both the national picture and 'snapshots' of the local picture. The research on the 
national picture would involve an investigation of the history of crime prevention 
from the 1970s, culminating in the guidance produced on implementing the Crime 
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and Disorder Act 1998. The research on local crime prevention would investigate the 
policies of a number of local district council partnerships, covering residential 
populations of around 200,000. The views of practitioners and residents involved in 
shaping local policies are inevitably influenced by national policies as well as macro 
ideologies. However, as emphasised in section 2.1.4, by the fact that they are making 
decisions affecting the particular areas that they work and live in, their decisions are 
also more likely than those of practitioners and citizens involved in formulating 
national crime prevention policies to be influenced by local knowledge and local 
interactions. Moreover, there is a greater likelihood that the voices of youths and 
marginalised communities, and practitioners that work with them, can be heard. 
The empirical research on local crime prevention was divided into two stages. The 
first was a study of crime prevention documents produced by partnerships between 
the mid 1990s (when the empirical research began) and April 1999, the deadline for 
local authorities and the police to implement the Crime and Disorder Act. The second 
stage would involve a comparative case study of two local partnerships, one that 
displayed signs of the weaknesses of the model of crime prevention adopted in moral 
communitarian thinking, and the other not. The fieldwork would serve two purposes. 
First, it would allow the researcher to paint a more detailed illustration of the potential 
future of the 'turn to the local' in crime control, depending on whether it moves in a 
more authoritarian or humanitarian direction. Second, it would serve as an aid to 
interpreting the data obtained from other partnerships, as it would allow the researcher 
to gain a deeper understanding of the nature of inter-agency cooperation in crime 
control and the culture of the different organisations involved. As a result of the latter 
aspect of the fieldwork, the researcher identified a number of instances where sections 
of individual documents could not be taken as representing the views of those for 
whom the documents were officially produced. Examples are given in section 3.3.3 
and in chapter five. 
It was decided that both stages would be restricted to local authorities falling within 
the boundaries of the Metropolitan Police. This decision was related to available 
resources. It was also decided that it would not be necessary to choose between 
London boroughs for the first stage of empirical research on local crime prevention. 
Even if documents were acquired from each of the thirty-three boroughs, it would be 
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feasible to study them all. Further, by seeking documents from each of the boroughs, 
the researcher should be left with a wider selection of potential partnerships for 
fieldwork to choose from. 
In January 1998 letters were sent to the community safety officers of the other thirty- 
one local authorities in London (in addition to Merton and Wandsworth), requesting 
information on existing cooperation between the local authority and the police in 
crime prevention, and proposing an interview to discuss the possibility of fieldwork 
being carried out within their borough. Twenty-two replied, seven of which resulted 
in interview, during which the community safety officers were informed that the 
object of the proposed fieldwork was to study the balance that the partnerships were 
likely to strike between law enforcement, physical and social security. Of the seven in 
which interviews were conducted (at Corporation of London, Croydon, Hammersmith 
and Fulham, Harrow, Sutton, Tower Hamlets and Westminster), only four had 
existing crime prevention policies. The policies of two of the partnerships (Sutton and 
Tower Hamlets) only mentioned law enforcement in the specific contexts of 
prostitution or racial harassment in their crime prevention strategies. The policies of 
the other two (Croydon and Harrow) did not mention law enforcement at all. More 
important still, each presented a holistic vision of crime control, focusing, for 
example, on welfare as much as behaviour orientated correctional controls, and on 
victim rather than offender orientated spatial controls. The researcher went to the 
interviews hoping that at least one of the community safety officers at the remaining 
three partnerships would indicate that the partnership envisaged it would promote law 
enforcement as a means of controlling anti-social behaviour in its crime prevention 
strategy produced in implementing the Crime and Disorder Act. While the object of 
the intended fieldwork, and moreover the research question as a whole, was to 
examine potential as well as existing resort to authoritarian crime control, the concern 
was that it would be difficult to make an accurate judgement of this from single 
interviews. 
Of the seven community safety officers interviewed, those at Sutton, Corporation of 
London, Croydon, Hammersmith and Fulham, Harrow and Tower Hamlets all played 
down resort to law enforcement in the control of anti-social behaviour (field notes, 29 
April, 5 May, 2 June, 17 June, 9 February and 8 March 1998). Four (at Corporation of 
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London, Croydon, Hammersmith and Fulham, Harrow and Tower Hamlets) agreed in 
principle that interviews could be conducted within their partnerships. At 
Westminster, however, the community safety officer made it clear that the partnership 
expected law enforcement to play a significant role (field notes, 24 June 1998). In 
addition to offering access to the partnership as a whole, the community safety officer 
also offered the opportunity to observe the progress of three localised pilot crime 
prevention initiatives that had just commenced, covering Westbourne Police Sector, 
Paddington, Lisson Green Estate, St. John's Wood, and Churchill Gardens Estate, 
Pimlico. It was envisaged by Westminster that these would provide templates for the 
subsequent preparation of crime prevention strategies covering each of the fifteen 
police sectors and four other housing estates in the borough, in addition to the 
borough strategy required under the Crime and Disorder Act. In return for access to 
the partnership, the community safety officer requested that two policy-related reports 
be provided to the chief executive's department on the observations made of the pilot 
projects. 
As a result of the interview at Westminster, the decision was taken to abandon the 
original plan to conduct fieldwork on a second district council level partnership. This 
decision was taken for two reasons. First was the opportunity that had arisen to extend 
the vertical study of the effect of economic, social and political pressure on the local 
to become a site of authoritarian crime control onto partnerships operating in the most 
local of communities. It struck the researcher that there was likely to be a wealth of 
difference in the likelihood of a crime prevention partnership operating 'at a distance' 
to structural power relations if it were operating on a police sector, covering a 
population of around 20,000, or a housing estate, covering a population of under 
5,000, rather than at district council level. The practitioners and residents involved on 
the police sector and estate projects would have 'top down' pressure put on them from 
macro ideologies, national crime prevention policies, and the borough-wide policy. 
However, at the same time their interpretation of the needs of the areas that they live 
and work in would be influenced by knowledge and interactions closer 'to the 
ground'. Moreover, there was a greater chance that youths and marginalised 
communities would gain a voice, and that the practitioners involved would actually 
work 'on the ground'. Further, it seemed likely that such highly localised partnerships 
would be a feature of crime prevention in areas other than Westminster. Through the 
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ongoing literature review, the researcher had learnt that the Morgan Report had been 
influenced as much by estates partnerships run by NACRO and the Department of 
Environment as by district council partnerships, and had recommended crime 
prevention partnerships be established at council ward as well as district council level 
(see section 4.1). It was decided that a vertical fieldwork study within one partnership 
would provide more interesting data than the original plan for a horizontal study of 
two partnerships at district council level, and it was not feasible in ten-ns of the time 
and resources allowed to do both. 
Second and foremost was the depth of formal access to the partnership that was 
offered at Westminster. The community safety officer at Westminster was 
enthusiastic about the fieldwork proposal. Moreover, it appeared that as a result of the 
policy-related reports the researcher would write for the chief executive's department, 
the partnership as a whole would be willing participants in the research, and that 
access would be gained to all the key players. The chairs of four groups that had been 
set up to run the pilot projects, and produce the crime prevention strategies (the 
steering groups) were to be informed that the researcher would be attending meetings 
on the invitation of the chief executive's department, and the members of the groups 
informed that the researcher would approach them for interview. Three of the groups, 
made up of local practitioners and residents, had been set up on site, and the fourth 
group, made up of heads of local authority departments and senior police officers and 
responsible for overseeing implementation of the Crime and Disorder Act in the 
borough as a whole, had been set up at the town hall. Two weeks later the depth of 
access that had been offered was confirmed at the first policy meeting attended at the 
town hall, where the researcher presented a formal fieldwork proposal. Following the 
meeting, the researcher was invited for a meeting with the representative from the 
chief executive's department, who gave the researcher the names, work addresses and 
phone numbers of the members of the group, and also of the group set up on the 
police sector, which she co-chaired. The researcher was informed that the coordinator 
of the estate projects would do the same. 
In comparison, none of the crime prevention officers interviewed at the other 
boroughs had offered to actively support the fieldwork, and none had indicated how 
the fieldwork might benefit them. Not only was there a far greater guarantee that the 
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researcher would be able to make efficient use of research time at Westminster, but if 
the original plan to study a second partnership bad continued to be pursued, the 
researcher would have run the risk of not being able to obtain the data needed to make 
a comparative study possible. Indeed, as a result of the extent of formal access that 
had been acquired so early on in the empirical research, Westminster would still have 
been chosen as a case study for fieldwork even if the opportunity had not arisen to do 
a vertical study, and moreover even if Westminster had not been an authoritarian 
partnership. If the former had been the case, the researcher would have used the 
access to the key players at the top of the partnership to conduct a more detailed study 
of the crime prevention work of, for example, housing, environmental health and 
social service departments. In the latter case, the researcher would not have been able 
to use the data on the borough-wide partnership to provide an in-depth illustration of 
an authoritarian partnership, but the primary purpose of the fieldwork, to examine the 
effects of economic, social and political trends on crime prevention policies, would 
still have remained. 
3.3. The Empirical Research Methods 
3.3.1. Critical Theory 
The remainder of this chapter deals with the methods that were used during the 
empirical research. Before the rationale behind the choice of individual methods of 
data collection and analysis are presented, it is important to explore the underlying 
critical approach that was taken by the researcher. This will set the context for much 
of the discussion that follows. 
The introduction to this thesis concluded with the point that it is not possible to be 
truly objective when researching crime control. Following Green (1993) and Power 
(2003), the empirical research conducted during the course of this doctoral thesis was 
approached with the view that every researcher has ideological as well as emotional 
baggage, and that all criminologists should accept that their research is a political 
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exercise. No pretence was made that the objective of the research was to uncover 
value free knowledge. As Becker argued nearly forty years ago: 
To have values or not to have values: the question is always with us This dilemma, 
which seems so painful to many, actually does not exist... for it to exist, one would have to 
assume, as some apparently do, that it is indeed possible to do research that is 
uncontaminated by personal and political sympathies... the question is not whether we 
should take sides, since we inevitably will, but rather whose side we are on. (Becker, 1967: 
239) 
Starting with the conviction that bias is endemic in criminological research, the 
researcher had no reservations about being on the side of those with the least political, 
social and economic power in society, the "subordinate parties" in the "hierarchy of 
credibility" that Becker explained feel the full brunt of the biases of crime control, yet 
have little influence over it. Indeed, one of the defining characteristics of the critical 
social researcher is his or her insistence on taking a stand for the subordinate: to 
challenge established knowledge and try to influence it, to change the world, not just 
describe it. As Taylor et al. stress, "[fladical theory cannot rest content with the 
description of existing social relations, directed at the establishment of a new 
intellectual consensus within a radical intelligentsia. It has to develop methodologies 
for the realisation of the societies its own critique would necessitate... " (1975: 24; c. f. 
Green, 1993; Hudson, 2000; Power, 2003; Scraton, 2005; Tombs and Whyte, 2003). 
Moreover, critical research allows the researcher to anticipate reaching conclusions 
that reflect the standpoint taken into the research project (Jupp et al., 2000). The 
problem for the critical researcher, as Hudson (2000) emphasises, is how to prevent 
his or her political stance negatively influencing their research. Indeed, it is important 
that all criminologists reflect on their ideological baggage (Green, 1993). Such 
greflexive consideration' becomes paramount when a consciously partisan approach is 
taken, however, as the researcher starts with the assumption that crime control policy 
and practice is unjust and repressive (Hudson, 2000; Scraton and Chadwick, 2006; 
Tombs and Whyte, 2003). 
However, the critical stance taken by the researcher did not mean it was assumed that 
evidence of the potential for the local to become a site of authoritarian crime control 
would be found. As a 'second phase' critical criminologist looking for escape. from 
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the dichotomy between structure and agency (following e. g. Scraton and Chadwick, 
1991), the researcher was open to the possibility that crime prevention partnerships 
will, on the contrary, become institutions of egalitarian criminal policy. As 
emphasised in section 2.2.2, there is a danger of exaggerating the 'exclusive society' 
thesis. While the primary driving force behind the 'turn to the local' in government as 
a whole and crime control in particular may be the 'invisible hand' of free-market 
capitalism, the growing influence of economic conservatism is not resulting in a 
dramatic reduction in the need for social inclusion. Besides, free-market capitalism 
has not so far achieved the depth of hegemony that many in the 1980s predicted that it 
would (O'Malley, 2001; Pearce and Tombs, 1996; Young, 2002a). Moreover, as 
emphasised in section 2.1.4, the 'turn to the local' has the potential to open up 
political space where this hegemony is at its most vulnerable. Counter-hegemony is to 
be found primarily in the lower echelons of society, including the lower echelons of 
state institutions (Sim, 2003). The object of critical research is to assess the extent that 
individual and collective decisions are shaped by the structural and political contexts 
within which they are made (Scraton and Chadwick, 1991). What this does not mean, 
however, is that critical researchers do not appreciate the potential strength of 
resistance 'on the ground'. 
Yet the researcher's instinct was to remain pessimistic that crime prevention 
partnerships would develop in relative seclusion from the exclusionary tendencies of 
contemporary political, economic and social change. This critical stance is reflected 
throughout the empirical research conducted for this thesis, from the choice of 
research topic and question to the choice of research data and the methodologies 
employed. The first two of these have already been covered in this chapter. It has 
been seen that the researcher's inspiration for the research topic originally came from 
little more than a suspicion that the 'zero tolerance' paradigm would have a 
significant effect the 'turn to the local' in crime control, and that the research topic 
was persevered with despite the sparse reference to the potential. for crime prevention 
partnerships to resort to law enforcement among criminologists. It has also been seen 
that, despite Westminster ultimately being selected for fieldwork on the basis of 
formal and wide-ranging access, the researcher went to the interview with the 
community safety officer hoping to find that the partnership had an authoritarian 
vision of crime control. It was emphasised that Westminster would still have been 
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selected for fieldwork if the community safety officer had played down resort to law 
enforcement. However, the researcher's enthusiasm for the fieldwork would have 
been very much reduced. 
The effect that the critical stance taken by the researcher had on the choice of research 
data and the methodologies is covered in the next two sections. One final point needs 
to be dealt with here. This concerns the agreement to write policy-related reports for 
the chief executive's department at Westminster in return for access to the 
partnership. 
It has already been seen that this was a decision that had to be taken to guarantee the 
access offered at Westminster. Nevertheless, two ethical issues were raised that it was 
necessary to reflect on, both of which concerned the potential use that the partnership 
could make of the policy-related reports. The first directly concerned the critical 
stance taken by the researcher. To borrow a metaphor from Clarke (1985), the 
researcher's instinct was to 'linger on the sidelines' as a critical commentator until it 
is clear what game is being played. There certainly didn't appear to be much hope that 
the incoming Labour government would kick the issue of authoritarian crime control 
to the borders of political discourse on crime prevention; and while it was possible 
that political space was being carved out for a different game to be played at a local 
level, until such space was discovered, the danger remained that any policy-related 
research undertaken might be used to legitimise and even support an intensification of 
social control over the subordinate. As a critical researcher, the author would have felt 
safer to remain an outsider for the time being, and avoid entering debate with criminal 
policy makers. 
The demand for feedback from gatekeepers is a common dilemma faced by critical 
researchers (Sim, 2003). Indeed, it is an issue that is growing, as government 
definitions of 'relevant' social research are increasingly shaped by a demand for 'what 
works' policy (Hillyard et al., 2004). Government departments are also increasingly 
seeking to legitimise policy through external auditing (Coleman, 2003). As Sim 
(2000) emphasises, while social scientists as a whole have a general ethical duty to 
honour research bargains made with gatekeepers (contained, for example, in the 
British Society of Criminology Code of Research Ethics - see British Society of 
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Criminology, 1999), critical social scientists have a specific duty to 'the other'. 
Fortunately, in this case it was possible to conduct the policy-related research with 
little compromise to the critical stance taken by the researcher. The chief executive's 
department asked the researcher to focus on three issues: the success of the pilot 
projects in locating local issues and concerns of practitioners and different sections of 
the community; whether the areas chosen for the projects were of an appropriate size; 
and progress made in cooperation and information sharing between practitioners. 
These questions were sufficiently broad to allow the agreement made with the chief 
executive's department to be honoured with minimal risk that the information 
provided could be used to inform or legitimise injustice or repression. To address the 
first question, the research focused on whether the crime audits had looked beyond 
conventional, crime, and whether the particular concerns of youths, women and 
minority ethnic groups had been addressed through consultation. The main 
recommendations made at the end of the final report to the policy unit were, "crime 
audits should include information from all relevant agencies", "public perceptions of 
crime and disorder should be sought through interviews with groups identified as 
being unlikely to turn up to consultation events", and "focus group sessions should be 
set up with sections of the community not involved in the project working groups to 
discuss and give approval to a draft action plan". To address the second and third 
questions, the research focused on the relative strengths of the findings on the pilot 
projects on the estates, which, as emphasised in section 3.2, were the most likely to 
result in holistic crime prevention initiatives. The main recommendation made here 
was, "the borough-wide strategy should be based on police sectors, but within them 
separate projects run on housing estates or other areas that have clearly marked 
boundaries and residents' groups and agency workers specifically attached to the 
area" (Darke, 1999a: 10). 
The second ethical issue was one that applies to all social research. It concerned the 
potential negative impact that the policy-related reports might have on individual 
research participants. This first surfaced when the chief executive's department later 
asked for the names of those that had agreed to be interviewed. This potential issue of 
confidentiality was resolved by seeking the consent of the interviewees. In the event, 
all but two agreed. Their names were omitted from the reports. 
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3.3.2. Selecting th e Data for An alysis 
Two issues need to be dealt with regarding the choice of individual research methods. 
The first concerns the types of data sought to address the research question. The 
research on national crime prevention policies focused on policy and research 
documents. Of these, the most important were documents on crime prevention 
produced by organisations that have been directly involved in coordinating crime 
prevention partnerships since the 1970s, that is the police, the Home Office Crime 
prevention Unit, Crime Concern, NACRO and the Department of Environment (see 
chapter four). However, to fully explore the research question, the research extended 
to the crime prevention documents of other national organisations likely to have some 
influence over the policies formed by local crime prevention partnerships and the day 
to day decisions of practitioners working 'on the ground', either as a result of their 
status as institutions of central government (for example, the Association of 
Metropolitan Authorities and the National Housing Federation), or else their status as 
umbrella institutions for local organisations involved in crime prevention partnerships 
(for example, the Audit Commission, the Law Commission, and Her Majesty's 
Inspec torate of the Constabulary). Excluded from the research were the crime 
prevention documents of national organisations whose work is solely welfare or 
security orientated. These would have provided interesting data on social and 
situational crime prevention initiatives. However, the purpose of the research was not 
to dispute the continuing relevance of social and situational crime prevention, but to 
uncover data on the potential for crime prevention partnerships to resort to law as 
well. 
The research on national crime prevention documents was supplemented with analysis 
of three leading journals for practitioners in the police, local government and housing 
departments - Police Review, Housing Today, the Local Government Chronicle, and 
the Guardian newspaper - analysis which continued until the empirical research was 
written up in March 2000, and as noted in section 3.1, started with editions of the 
journals published in January 1996 (Police Review) and November 1996 (Housing 
Today and the Local Government Chronicle). The choice of the first two of these 
journals was likewise influenced by the critical stance of the researcher. The 
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researcher believed that they were the practitioner journals that were most likely to 
report on crime prevention partnerships resorting to law. 
The first phase of the research on crime prevention in London focused on policy 
documents. The only exceptions to this were the interviews conducted with 
community safety officers on their pre Crime and Disorder Act strategies (see section 
3.2). Information was sought from the partnerships on their auditing of crime and 
consultation with the public as well as their crime prevention strategies. Crime audits 
were sought in pursuit of the first and third aspects of the research question, 
concerning the balance that the partnerships would strike between conventional and 
non-conventional crime and the emphasis that they would put on anti-social 
behaviour. Consultation documents were sought in pursuit of the second aspect of the 
research question, and more specifically the question whether the voices of youths 
and marginalised groups are being heard. Finally, the crime prevention strategy 
documents were sought in pursuit of the remaining aspects of the research, concerning 
the question whether anti-social behaviour is being presented not only as a problem of 
crime, but as a problem that should be responded to through law enforcement as well 
as physical and social security. 
The second phase of empirical research, the fieldwork in Westminster, involved 
observations of meetings and interviews as well as documentary research. Starting 
with the documentary research, information was sought from all the organisations 
represented on the groups set up to produce the borough-wide, police sector and estate 
crime prevention policies. The only time during the research that the author became 
aware of an organisation not included in these groups having an influence over the 
policies produced was when a complaint was made by a member of the steering group 
on the police sector to the Westminster Racial Equality Forum. This resulted in racial 
harassment being added to the targets of the final draft of the strategy (see section 
5.3.1). 
Documents were eventually acquired from the local authority chief executive, 
housing, environment health and social services departments, from the local youth 
offending team, health authority, divisional police forces and police and community 
consultative groups, and from the police sector working group in Westbourne. This 
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included documents relating to the broader nature of their work as well as documents 
specifically relating to crime prevention, such as the most recent annual departmental 
reviews and policy-related reports made to departmental committees during the period 
that the fieldwork was conducted. The documents were acquired through various 
means. Most local authority documents were acquired through attending departmental 
committee meetings, though a number were acquired as a result of interviews, for 
example housing department policy documents on the use of civil and public law 
orders as tools of crime control, copies of standard tenancy agreements, and chief 
executive department documents on the use of CCTV to gather evidence for criminal 
and civil law proceedings, or through regular email and telephone contact that the 
researcher maintained with the coordinators of the police sector and estate projects, 
for example correspondence between the coordinators and steering group members, 
and the minutes of steering group meetings. Youth offending team and health 
authority documents were all acquired from interviewees. The police sector working 
group documents were acquired through attending two meetings. Some of the police 
and community consultative group documents were also acquired through attending 
meetings, but the majority were acquired through emailing the group secretaries, who 
agreed to include the researcher on mailing lists for the distribution of the minutes of 
meetings, and correspondence between the group and, for instance, local councillors 
and police commanders. The mailing lists were also used by the police and 
community consultative group secretaries to distribute policy documents of the local 
police divisions. 
In addition to acquiring documents, twenty-four meetings and public events were 
observed in Westminster (listed in appendix one). These included meetings of the 
steering groups, departmental committees, police and community consultative groups, 
police sector working group, and public consultation events officially held as part of 
the development of the crime prevention strategies on the police sector and estate 
projects. They also included observation of consultation between youth offending 
team practitioners and youths at a youth conference, and a meeting of a working 
group set up to organise the conference. The researcher was able to observe eleven of 
the steering group meetings and three of the public consultation events. The other 
meetings and the youth conference were chosen for observation due to the 
organisations involved having representatives on the steering groups. Access to the 
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meetings and public events was on the whole gained either (in the case of the steering 
group meetings) from the researchers relationship with the chief executive's 
department, or as a result of the meetings being open to the public. The exceptions 
were the sector working group meetings, which were attended on the invitation of the 
police sector inspector, who co-chaired the group, and the meeting of the group set up 
to organise the youth conference. The first opportunity arose as a result of attending 
the steering group meetings on the police sector, which the sector inspector was also 
involved in. The second arose through an interview with a practitioner at the youth 
offending team. Finally, as the observational research did not move beyond meetings 
and events with fixed timetables, the participants were fully aware when contact with 
them would commence and finish. Therefore no 'exit strategy' was needed. 
Next, thirty-eight practitioners or residents were interviewed during the fieldwork in 
Westminster, twenty-one face to face, and seventeen by post. All but one of the 
interviewees was involved on the steering groups, the only exception being a drugs 
action team coordinator, whose details were obtained following an earlier interview 
with a representative from the health authority on the steering group that met on the 
police sector. As noted in section 3.2, the researcher was given the names and contact 
details of the members of the steering groups at the town hall and on the police sector 
at the beginning of the research. The membership details of the steering groups on the 
estate projects were provided later on. In section 3.2 it was also noted that the steering 
group at the town hall, which was set up to oversee implementation of the Crime and 
Disorder Act in the borough as a whole, was made up of heads of local authority 
departments and senior police officers, and the steering groups on the police sector 
and estates were made up of local practitioners and local residents. No reasons arose 
during the fieldwork to cast any doubt on the conclusion that these groups contained 
representatives from all the key players in the partnership. Further detail on the make 
up of the steering groups is given in sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2. 
The face-to-face interviews were conducted at times and places suitable to the 
interviewees. This decision was made for two reasons. First, from an ethical point of 
view, there was no reason to inconvenience the research participants. Second, due to 
the critical nature of the research, the researcher sought to make the interviews as 
relaxed and informal as possible. This point is returned to in the next section of this 
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chapter. The decision to 'go out' to the interviews required the researcher to be 
flexible. With the exception of the auditor for the estate projects, who was 
interviewed on his way home by train, the interviews with practitioners took place in 
their offices. However, two residents were interviewed at their homes, one in a hotel 
lounge following a sector working group meeting in the hotel, one in his workplace, 
one in the public gallery of an office at Westminster City Hall, prior to a departmental 
meeting, and four in the offices of residents' associations. 
The final method of data collection used during the fieldwork in Westminster was a 
victimisation and opinion survey (Darke, 1999b), which the researcher was invited to 
write for use by the youth offending team at the youth conference. The completed 
forms were returned to the researcher for analysis at the end of the conference, and a 
statistical breakdown of the results was later provided to the youth offending team. 
For the purposes of the doctoral research, the results of the second part of the survey 
were used as an aid to analysing consultation on the borough-wide crime prevention 
strategy, which had not extended to youth (see section 5.2.6). 
3.3.3. Doing the Research 
The other issue that needs to be dealt with regarding the choice of individual research 
methods concerns the way in which the empirical research was conducted. The first 
point that needs to be discussed is the emphasis that was put on qualitative method. 
Qualitative methods were appropriate to the research due to the subjective nature of 
the issues that were addressed. While the powers that were being studied (for 
exainple, injunctions and possession orders) were objectively measurable and 
quantifiable, analysis of the use of these powers (as tools of crime control, and more 
specifically tools of conventional crime control) was not. Further, as the object of the 
research was to assess potential as well current crime prevention activity, it had been 
necessary to devise a research question that covered a broad range of subjective issues 
identified in the literature review as relevant to the question whether crime prevention 
partnerships might come to see themselves as institutions of authoritarian crime 
control. These issues, as seen in chapter two and summarised in section 3.2, 
concerned: continuing structural and political pressure on governments to focus crime 
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control on conventional crime; increasing structural and political pressure to treat 
anti-social behaviour as a problem of crime, control anti-social behaviour through 
disciplinary interventions, relax the penal equivalence and due process models of 
justice, and control anti-social behaviour through the informal social control 
mechanisms of geographical communities; and the likelihood of this 'turn to the local' 
in crime control being resisted 'on the ground. The likely influences of these on the 
shaping of national and local crime prevention policies could only be effectively 
measured if the researcher gained a deep understanding of the organisations being 
studied. I 
Moreover, qualitative methods were particularly appropriate in the case of interviews 
due to the critical nature of the research question. It was important for the interviews 
to be informal to reduce the risk of participants becoming guarded, either in defence 
of the partnership they were involved in, or due to suspicion of the motives of the 
researcher. One means that was used to reduce this risk that has already been 
mentioned in this chapter was to allow the research participants to choose the time 
and venue for interviews (see section 3.3.2). Other means used were to try to establish 
a rapport with the research participants by being friendly and expressing interest in 
the views they expressed, and to be creative in the way that questions were put to the 
research participants. The need to build up rapport with research participants was 
made more important still by suspicion of the researcher's motives for conducting 
policy-related research for the chief executive's department alongside the doctoral 
research. This point is explored in the last section of this chapter. 
The semi-structured nature of the research question was outlined in section 3.2 of this 
chapter. The six aspects of the research question were used to guide the recording of 
data in the meetings and public consultation events observed and the interviews 
conducted, and to guide the reading of the contents of documents. Starting with the 
observational research, to address the first aspect of the research question, notes were 
taken on the broad balance struck in discussions between conventional and non- 
conventional crime. To address the second aspect of the research question (concerning 
the empowering of local practitioners and residents), notes were taken on: the types of 
work that the practitioners were involved in; the apparent age groups and ethnic 
backgrounds of residents; the views expressed on existing crime prevention policies 
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and initiatives; the views expressed on the influence participants expected to have on 
the policies being formed; and the attitudes expressed towards offenders, in particular 
whether offenders were regarded as 'outsiders'. Finally, while notes were taken on the 
views that were expressed on, for example, serious crime and welfare-orientated 
responses to crime, the researcher focused on the personal views that participants 
expressed on anti-social behaviour (the third aspect of the research question), 
disciplinary interventions such as the monitoring of potential offenders by the police, 
CCTV, neighbourhood watch groups and residents' associations (the fourth aspect of 
the research question), and above all legal interventions (the fifth and sixth aspects of 
the research question). 
The notes taken on documents and interviews essentially addressed the same issues. 
In the case of documents, however, the first aspect of the research question could not 
be fully explored. While it was often possible to find data on the social make-up of 
residents involved in consultation or the types of practitioners or residents on steering 
groups, the research uncovered little data on the views that were expressed. The only 
notable exceptions to this were a document on focus group consultations obtained 
from the partnership at Kensington and Chelsea in the second survey of crime 
prevention in London (see section 5.2.6), and a report by the chief executive's 
department at Westminster on the views expressed by participants at a consultation 
event on the police sector project (see section 5.3.1). Nor did the documentary 
research allow for conclusions to be made on the influence that consultations or 
particular steering groups had on the shaping of policies. 
Finally, the only departure from the use of qualitative research was the youth survey 
conducted on behalf of the youth offending team. The section of the youth survey that 
was later analysed for the researcher's own purposes consisted of closed questions 
that required the respondent to answer 'a lot', 'quite a lot', 'a bit' or 'not at all'. The 
two questions that resulted in useful data being obtained were "would you feel safer if 
more people were arrested" and "would you feel safer if there were more for young 
people to do" (see section 5.2.6). 
One other point needs to be covered regarding the means by which the research was 
conducted. This concerns checks that were made of the credibility and accuracy of 
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data. In the case of the research on national crime prevention policy, this task was 
aided by the availability of multiple documentation produced by individual 
institutions, which could be cross-referenced with each other. In the second survey on 
crime prevention in London, separate documents were obtained from most boroughs 
on the auditing of crime, consultation with the public, and the crime prevention 
strategies that were later produced. While these three types of document officially 
dealt with different matters, a number of issues of relevance to the research question 
were often repeated in each. This was particularly useful for the assessment of the 
types of interventions focused on by partnerships, which tended to be covered in both 
the audits and crime prevention strategies. In the case of the fieldwork in 
Westminster, the task of assessing the validity of data was assisted further by data 
being accumulated through observational and interview as well as documentary 
research, which allowed for a degree of triangulation of data. 
The credibility of data was only questionable on two occasions during the empirical 
research. Both instances arose during the fieldwork on the estate projects in 
Westminster. The first related to opinions expressed in crime audits conducted on 
Churchill Gardens and Lisson Green estates by the Safe Neighborhoods Unit on 
behalf of the housing department. Both audits gave summaries of the perceptions that 
the auditor had encountered among local practitioners and residents on the extent that 
anti-social behaviour was a problem on the estates and the appropriate means of 
dealing with anti-social behaviour. These contradicted the views expressed by those 
the researcher later interviewed or observed at consultation events. The question was 
raised as to whether the auditor was influenced by his perception of what the housing 
department wanted to hear. The second concerned a report written by the coordinator 
of the police sector project on consultation with local residents. In contrast to the 
researcher's own observations of the consultation and the views she expressed during 
interview, the project coordinator described the event as attracting a wide range of 
people. Included in the report was a picture of the researcher, who was the youngest 
participant at the event, taking notes from a board where participants in the 
consultation had posted views. These issues are explored in more detail in sections 
5.3.1 and 5.3.2. 
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However, numerous issues concerning the potential unrepresentativeness of data arose 
during the research. During the fieldwork in Westminster, for example, questions 
arose over the views expressed by a housing practitioner during interview on the use 
of injunctions and the incoming anti-social behaviour order by the department in 
response to anti-social behaviour. The opinions she expressed were contradicted by 
the views of other interviewees in the department, and moreover by policy documents 
she had written for housing officers dealing with complaints of anti-social behaviour. 
Like the auditor on the estate projects, the question was again raised as to whether the 
views expressed were influenced by the research participant's perception of what her 
audience (in this case the researcher) wanted to hear. A further example that arose 
during the research in Westminster concerned the emphasis put on the use of 
injunctions and possession orders to deal with anti-social behaviour on social housing 
estates in the borough-wide crime prevention strategy and a number of chief executive 
department documents in Westminster. These were again contradicted by the views 
expressed in interviews and in documents produced by the housing department. These 
issue are explored in more detail in section 5.2.5. 
An issue of the potential unrepresentativeness of data that regularly arose in the 
research on crime prevention in London was the tendency of partnerships to quote 
existing central government policy as their own. Examples included: reducing truancy 
and exclusions from school (Department of the Environment objectives); introducing 
appropriate adults schemes to police stations (Metropolitan Police Service objectives); 
introducing alcohol and drug arrest referral schemes (Home Office objectives); setting 
up police community safety units to. deal with homophobic violence, racially 
motivated crime and domestic violence (Metropolitan Police Service objectives); 
increasing detection rates for burglary, robbery and drug possession (Metropolitan 
Police Service objectives); and rehabilitating offenders (Probation Service objectives). 
The mere quoting of central government policy, without explanation of its purpose or 
its relative importance to other objectives, could not on its own be treated as evidence 
that the partnerships intended to follow it. To make matters worse, the original 
sources of these policies was not always acknowledged. Particular difficulty was 
encountered in assessing the partnerships' approaches to the establishing of youth 
offending teams, where much of the content was 'lifted' from Home Office 
documents, in particular Home Office (1997c). Examples here included the 
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introduction of final warnings for youth offenders, the targeting and fast tracking of 
persistent youth offenders through the criminal justice system, and the establishment 
of youth offending teams. 
Other examples where cross-referencing led to the representativeness of parts of the 
documents of London boroughs being questioned by the researcher include a virtual 
absence of reference to anti-social behaviour in the documents of the majority of 
crime prevention partnerships studied in the first survey (see section 5.1) and an 
absence of reference to informal social controls in the second survey (see section 
5.2.2). Finally, in the case of the research on national crime prevention policy the 
most commonly example of potential misrepresentation that was encountered 
concerned punitive views that were expressed in a number of documents and public 
statements in the mid 1990s (see especially sections 4.2.1 and 4.3.1). 
3.3.4. Recording the Data 
The final point that needs to be dealt with in this chapter is the decision that was made 
to rely on hand-written notes for the recording of the observational and interview 
research. These records were collated in a folder alongside records of the letters sent 
and received from police organisations, universities and pressure groups while the 
research question was being developed (see section 11), and records of meetings and 
progress reports made to the researcher's Ph. D. supervisor. The decision not to 
audiotape the observational research was a wholly practical one. As the researcher 
simply observed the meetings and consultation events (see section 3.3.3), it was 
possible to manually record each of the points that participants made. The decision 
not to audiotape interviews was also practical. During the observational and 
documentary fieldwork, it became apparent that there was a danger that the depth of 
access to the partnership the community safety officer had offered (see section 3.2) 
would not materialise. Moreover, it appeared that this danger was in part related to the 
decision that had been taken to write policy-related reports for the chief executive's 
department. A number of factors pointed in this direction. First, the researcher sensed 
an element of hostility among residents that attended the steering group on the police 
sector towards the officer from the chief executive's department, who, as already 
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noted in section 3.2, co-chaired the group. For example, complaints were made at 
each of the meetings observed that, unlike the local police sector working group (of 
which the majority of residents that attended steering group meetings were members 
of - see section 5.3.1), meetings were scheduled during office hours, requiring 
residents to take time off work to be able to attend. Further, despite her role as project 
coordinator (see section 3.2), the officer from the chief executive's department played 
only a small part in discussion at the three meetings. The meetings were effectively 
chaired by the sector inspector. The impression given was that the officer from the 
chief executive's department was an outside intruding on established relations 
between residents and practitioners working in the area. 
Next, the researcher became aware that a number of the organisations and 
departments involved in the partnership did not share the same vision of crime 
prevention as the chief executive's department. For example, local practitioners that 
attended the consultation event on the police sector project did not demonstrate any 
interest in responding to anti-social behaviour through law enforcement, criminal, 
civil or public (see section 5.3.1). Analysis of housing department documents likewise 
uncovered little enthusiasm for taking an authoritarian approach to crime control. 
Last, and more important still, the researcher began to suspect that there might be 
animosity between the housing department and the chief executive's department. This 
suspicion was raised by observations at the meetings of the steering group set up to 
oversee implementation of the Crime and Disorder Act in the borough as a whole. 
Discussion at the four meetings centred almost exclusively on the development of the 
police sector strategy. Moreover, the schedules for the meetings were produced under 
the heading "Wcstbourne Police Sector Community Safety Plan", and had fixed eight- 
point agendas, the seventh of which was given the title "Report from Lisson Green 
and Churchill Gardens". The suspicion that this raised of strained relations between 
the two departments was strengthened by the fact that the steering group was not only 
coordinated by, but met in, the chief executive's department, and by the fact that the 
coordinator of the estate projects failed to attend two of the meetings, and that the 
director of the housing department did not attend any. 
There was therefore a danger that the researcher's attachment to the chief executive's 
department would not only make it more difficult to gain access to interviews, but that 
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the interviewees would be suspicious of the motives behind the fieldwork. is 
concern was heightened further by the apparent reluctance of the coordinator of the 
estate projects to cooperate fully in the research. For example, despite several 
reminders, he only invited the researcher to one steering group meeting, and did not 
provide a full list of the names and addresses of those that were involved on the 
steering groups to approach for interview during the first six months of the fieldwork, 
by which time there was just one month left before the researcher's access to the 
partnership would formally end (see section 5.3.2). On the other hand, the fact that 
there was an unsettled culture within the partnership was in itself of likely benefit to 
the research. As Power (2003) emphasises, the ability to play on competing 
institutional discourses is one of the strongest tools available to critical researchers. 
The researcher was therefore in an extraordinary fieldwork situation, which called for 
exceptional measures to be used to make the research as confidential and informal as 
possible. This was not immediately appreciated, however. At first the decision was 
taken to audiotape the interviews, but to emphasise to the research participants that no 
comments would be attributed to individuals and, as explained in section 3.3.1, that 
the interviewee's name could be omitted from the report to the chief executive's 
department altogether. However, at the first interview, with a representative from the 
local police and community consultative group on the police sector steering group, the 
request for permission to record was turned down. The interviewee was highly critical 
of the project as a whole and the chief executive's department in particular: 
The police and community consultative group got pissed off with the project. We didn't like 
[the project leader from the chief executive's department], but we did like [the police sector 
inspector), who was enthusiastic... The project was airy-fairy, but some good came out of 
it... The police and local authority are continuing to work together, but different local 
authority departments are still not!... The project was just another PR exercise. Did it really 
deliver thegoods?... As for the working group [set up to help steer the project on site], it was 
a case of "preaching to the converted7. I doubt many fresh ideas came out of the group. 
(Field notes, 13 January 1999) 
The interview lasted over an hour and was highly infort-native. In light of this, the 
decision was made not to audiotape the remaining interviews. In the event, this was 
the correct decision to take. A number of the other interviewees involved in the police 
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sector project were likewise openly critical of the failure of the partnership to take 
account of the views of minority ethnic groups, one going so far as to accuse other 
members of the steering group of racism. Moreover, several interviewees accused the 
chief executive's department of being punitive. These interviews are highlighted in 
section 5.3.1. The suspicion that animosity existed between the chief executive's 
department and the housing department was also confirmed during interviews with 
the coordinators of the pilot projects. The coordinator of the police sector project 
criticised the housing department for spending E6000 on an outside auditor for the 
estate projects (field notes, 18 January 1999). She asked for analysis of costs to be 
included in the report on the pilot projects, and later emailed to the researcher a 
detailed breakdown of costs incurred during the police sector project (at E3,678), plus 
the number of hours she had spent coordinating it. The coordinator of the estate 
projects was clearly angered by this request, and criticised the chief executive's 
department for not including the hours spent conducting the audit (field notes, 27 
January 1999). 
The decision not to audiotape interviews therefore served to increase the quality of 
data uncovered during the fieldwork, and it did so for two reasons. First was the 
exceptional circumstance that the researcher had unwittingly entered through the 
research bargain made with the gatekeepers to the partnership. Equally important, the 
animosity between the chief executive's department and other local authority 
departments and local organisations involved in the partnership was in itself more of 
an opportunity than a hindrance to the research. It served to encourage the research 
participants, as Tombs (2000) puts it, to "blow the whistle' on their institution. This 
was an equally exceptional situation that the researcher would have been in a weaker 
position to take advantage of if the interviews had been recorded. 
The findings of the empirical research conducted during the course of this doctoral 
thesis are examined in the following two chapters. Chapter four presents the research 
that was conducted on national crime prevention policies, while chapter five presents 
the research conducted in Westminster and on other London boroughs. 
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Chapter four 
Policing in Partnership 
In chapter two the proliferation of crime prevention partnerships was explored in the 
context of academic commentary on the emergence of a new (post-industrial) 
paradigm of social control that prioritises 'bio-political' over 'anatomo-political' 
government, 'self government' over 'external government', dispersed over state 
government and local over national government, and separates control of the majority 
from control of minority, advocating less control of the former, and more control of 
the latter. The emphasis of the emerging paradigm of social control was found to be 
on managing rather than changing people, through 'behaviour surveillance' and 
behaviour modification' (Cohen, 1985). It was explained that the growing emphasis 
on 'behaviour surveillance' is evident in the proliferation of physical security, and 
encompasses exclusionary as well as inclusive controls, while the growing emphasis 
on behaviour modification' is evident in the narrowing of the focus of social work 
towards making people aware of the consequences of their actions for themselves and 
for others, and teaching them how to control themselves. 
Yet, it was also emphasised that while there is broad agreement over the changing 
nature of crime control, there is less agreement over the nature of increased 
cooperation between the police and local authorities. Many criminologists stress that 
crime prevention partnerships are developing in response to the move towards less 
control of the majority and not the move towards more control of the marginalised. 
Furthermore, many criminologists treat growing resort to authoritarian crime control 
as a relic of past failure to tackle the problem. of crime. Those holding the 'reins of 
power' are said to have recognised that penal institutions are particularly inefficient 
sites of social control, with the result that crime prevention and punishment are 
becoming separate areas of crime control. As a result of this "crisis of penality" 
(Young, 1998b), the criminal justice system is said to be focusing on incapacitating 
perpetrators of serious crime. Crime prevention, on the other hand, is seen as 
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emerging as an alternative means of crime control that does not rely on law 
enforcement. 
It was argued that this interpretation of the 'turn to the local' in crime control does not 
take sufficient account of the possibility that more control equates to earlier as well as 
more intensive control, and encompasses behaviour previously considered anti social 
and a symptom of certain groups being out of control, but nevertheless beyond the 
reach of the criminal justice system. Nor does it take sufficient account of the 
possibility that the response to the failure of the criminal justice system to control 
crime has been to reform rather than reduce reliance on it. On this view, the prospect 
is raised that crime prevention partnerships may develop as much in response to the 
national trend towards more control of the minority as the national trend towards less 
control of the majority, and that the dispersal of crime control beyond central 
government may result in both the legal powers of local government and the role that 
local government plays in providing physical and social security being incorporated 
into criminal policy. 
In section 3.2 it was explained that in order to explore this alternative interpretation of 
crime prevention, the empirical research was designed to address whether the 
weaknesses in the model of crime control adopted in (moral communitarian) political 
literature on the need for a 'turn to the local' in crime control is reflected in national 
and local crime prevention policies. Six weaknesses identified from the literature 
review that could be exploited by those with authoritarian visions of crime control 
were explored. These related to: the emphasis that moral communitarianism puts on 
controlling conventional rather than non-conventional crime, controlling anti-social 
behaviour as well as serious crime (to 'define anti-social behaviour' up as a problem 
of crime), disciplining offenders as well as supporting offenders and dealing with 
their motivations for crime (to manage crime), managing crime through law 
enforcement as well as physical and social security (to relax the penal equivalence 
model of justice), and enforcing civil and public as well as criminal laws (to relax the 
due process model of justice), and to doubt that crime prevention partnerships are 
sufficiently localised to allow these 'top down' trends to be resisted 'on the ground'. 
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This chapter applies the research question to crime prevention policy in England and 
Wales as a whole. The task was to investigate the extent that crime prevention 
partnerships emerged in the 1960s and have proliferated since the 1990s as an 
alternative to the 'enforcement approach' of the criminal justice system. This, as 
explained in sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3, was done through a qualitative review of policy 
documents and reports produced by state institutions and non-government 
organisations directly or indirectly involved in crime prevention. The history of the 
formalisation of cooperation between the police and other institutions, state or 
otherwise, in crime prevention initiatives is charted in this chapter in three distinct 
stages: from the late 1960s to the late 1980s, when crime prevention partnerships were 
primarily police led, the period from the. publication of the Morgan Report in 1991, 
when local authorities became the dominant partners, and the period surrounding 
implementation of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, when it is argued that the 
neglected feature of crime prevention research, resort to legal orders by local 
authorities as tools of crime control, and more specifically tools of authoritarian crime 
control, came to the fore. The chapter concludes with analysis of parallel 
developments in the youth justice system of England and Wales. In section 2.2.1 it 
was noted that developments in youth justice are at the centre of the movement in 
post-industrial western societies towards earlier and more intensive intervention into 
the lives of marginalised groups, and that in England and Wales such developments 
have been largely inseparable from crime prevention partnerships since the Crime and 
Disorder Act. As will be seen, contemporary developments in youth justice are not 
premised in a need to improve the social welfare of youth offenders, but rather in a 
"language of punishmenf' (Hill and Wright, 2003). 
4.1. The 'Partnership Approach, to Crime Control 
4.1.1. Minor Crinte 
The first move towards formalisation of cooperation between the police and local 
authorities in crime control came with the emergence of crime prevention as a 
specialism within the police force in the 1960s. Crime prevention has always been 
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recognised as a specific aim of policing separate from their role as gatekeepers of the 
criminal justice system, and was stated to be the primary duty of police officers in the 
first instructions provided to the Metropolitan Police Service in 1829 (Gilling, 2000). 
This underlying vision of policing was based upon the deterrent effect of officers 
patrolling the streets on foot. By the 1960s, however, foot patrols had come to be 
regarded as inefficient means of crime control, and had become a relatively minor part 
of policing. The notion that crime prevention was the responsibility of each officer 
was abandoned, and the role of the police in crime prevention switched away from 
patrols towards physical security (Weatheritt, 1986). Specialised crime prevention 
departments and crime prevention officers were introduced to advise the public on 
how to avoid becoming victims of crime. It was recognised that local authorities were 
indirectly involved in providing physical security through their roles as managers of, 
for instance, public housing and street lighting (Smith and Laycock, 1985). Multi- 
agency crime prevention panels were established to encourage them to coordinate 
these activities with the police. 
These moves were endorsed in 1965 by the Home Office Cornish Committee on the 
Prevention and Detection of Crime (Weatheritt, 1986). Two years later the Home 
office set up the Standing Committee on Crime Prevention, which met twice a year. 
Few police resources were allocated to crime prevention departments, however, with 
the result that crime prevention panels remained largely inactive, and less than one in 
a hundred police officers were employed as crime prevention officers (Smith and 
Laycock, 1985). In 1976 the Home Office made clear its intention to reinvigorate 
moves towards the new vision of multi-agency crime prevention in its Review of 
Criminal Justice Policy: 
In view of the limitations in the capacity of the agencies of the criminal justice system to 
reduce the incidence of crime, the scope for reducing crime through policies which go 
beyond the boundaries of the criminal justice system merit particular attention. In recognition 
of this, work is already in hand exploring how the Home Office could more readily involve 
other Government Departments, local authorities, and agencies outside government in the 
crime prevention field... Work on the broader aspects of crime prevention should be pressed 
forward as speedily as possible. (Home Office, 1977: 9-10 - quoted in Gilling, 2000: 128) 
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True to its word, crime prevention came to the fore of Home Office policy in the 
1980s. Real policy change was to come in 1983, when the Home Office Crime 
Prevention Unit was established. The following year the Crime Prevention Unit 
produced the first circular on crime prevention partnerships (see Jones et al., 1994), 
and in 1985 the term crime prevention appeared in the annual report of the Home 
Office for the first time (see Koch, 1998). In 1986 the Crime Prevention Unit 
established the Five Towns Initiative, which ran for eighteen months, followed by the 
Safer Cities Programme, which ran from 1988 to 1998. Both projects provided 
resources, coordination and training for local crime prevention initiatives (Tilley, 
1992 and 2002). In 1988 the Home Office also set up and financed the organisation 
Crime Concern, with the brief to promote best practice in crime prevention (Koch, 
1998). The following year the Home Office annual report included reference to 
specific crime prevention initiatives by the police for the first time. Reference to the 
contribution other government institutions to crime prevention appeared from 1991. 
The Association of Chief Police Officers responded to developments in the Home 
office with the setting up of the Sub-Committee on Crime Prevention in 1986 (ibid. ). 
By the end of the 1980s, then, the police and Home Office were committed to 
developing a non-legal 'partnership approach' to crime control. Although the new 
emphasis on physical security was applicable to a broad range of crimes, the seeds 
were being laid for a bifurcation between the policing of serious and minor crime. 
This was recognised in the White Paper Crime, Justice and Protecting the Public: 
The ultimate aim of the Government is to reduce crime, particularly crimes committed by 
young people, before they embark on a career of criminality [ ... I Punishment has a major 
part to play in reducing crime, but its role must not be overstated. If crimes are not reported 
or detected, those who commit them cannot be brought to justice... Even when crimes are 
reported, it is not easy for the police to find offenders, especially vandals. The police give 
priority to detecting the most serious crimes, since the public needs protecting from those 
who commit them. (Home Office, 1990: paras. 1.7 and 1.8) 
The effectiveness of criminal law enforcement -had, 
in other words, come into 
question in light of evidence that relatively few crimes resulted in the perpetrator 
being caught. 
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Finally, it is important to note that the bifurcation between the control of serious and 
minor crime that emerged in the 1980s was as applicable to punishment as it was to 
law enforcement. The ability of punishment to control crime had also come under 
attack, and just deserts and incapacitation were elevated to the centre of sentencing 
(Hudson, 2001). Sentencing was the primary concern of the White Paper Crime, 
Justice and Protecting the Public and the Criminal Justice Act 1991 that followed it. 
Rehabilitation was not to be a consideration in the decision to imprison (Home Office, 
1990: para. 3.2), and was to be only a secondary consideration in deciding on the 
severity of community sentences (para. 4.5), while individual deterrence was no 
longer to be a consideration in sentencing at all (para. 2.8). Although just deserts 
might have been utilised to 'define minor crime up', two of the main objectives 
emphasis ed in the White Paper were to downgrade minor crime, and to ensure that 
custody and punishment in the community were not prioritised over other less severe 
sentences. Regarding the first of these objectives, point was made of the need to 
achieve clearer distinction between the sentencing of violent and non-violent 
offenders, with more use of imprisonment for the former (para. 3.8), and less for the 
latter (para. 4.1). On the second objective, it was stressed that custodial and 
community sentences should both only be used as a last resort (paras. 3.6 and 4.1). 
Furthermore, extended sentences were to be abolished for persistent offenders of 
minor crime, but were to be encouraged in cases of serious violent and sexual crime 
(paras. 2.15 and 3.12-13). 
At no point did any of the policy or research documents analysed during this stage of 
empirical research look beyond conventional crime. Nor did any of the documents 
promote a need for a broad approach to consultation. These points aside, it is possible 
to conclude that during this period- crime prevention showed little potential of 
becoming an extension of the 'enforcement approach' of the existing criminal justice 
system. The driving force behin d the emergence of a 'partnership approach' to crime 
control in 1970s and 1980s was clearly a loss of faith in ability of the criminal justice 
system to control crime. The police were failing in their role as the gatekeepers of the 
criminal justice system, and the probation and prison services were failing to deter or 
rehabilitate the few offenders that the police caught. In both cases, the answer was to 
concentrate resources on serious crime and hand over responsibility for the control of 
minor crime to others. 
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4.1. Z Minor Crinte and Civil Nuisance 
Crime prevention spread little beyond the police in the 1980s, however. The failure to 
get local authorities on board was largely due to the overwhelming focus put by the 
police on removing opportunities for crime (Walklate, 2001). Indeed, this bias 
continued into the 1990s (Koch, 1998). The Home office was equally guilty. The Sub 
Committee on Crime Prevention, for example, was divided into four discussion 
groups, entitled Designing out Crime, Tracking Vehicles, Intruder Alarm Response, 
and Liaison with Manufacturers, none of which addressed underlying causes of crime. 
Further, the Home Office researchers that had been at the forefront of promoting the 
new non-legal approach to crime control (e. g. Clarke, 1980; Gladstone, 1980; Hough 
et al., 1980; Smith and Laycock, 1985) were as much concerned with warning against 
the relevance of dispositional theories of crime as with warning against the limitations 
of the criminal justice system. This bias was reflected in the first central government 
guidance issued to crime prevention partnerships. "Whilst there is a need to address 
the social factors associated with criminal behaviour, and policies are continually 
being devised to tackle this aspect of the problem, " it was stated, "these are essentially 
long term measures. For the short term, the best way forward is to reduce through 
management, design, or changes in the environment, the opportunities that exist for 
crime to occur" (quoted in Jones et al., 1994: 97). This overwhelming emphasis on 
opportunity reduction was later reflected in the Safer Cities Programme (King, 1989). 
On the rare occasion that the Safer Cities Programme looked beyond reducing 
opportunities for crime in the 1980s, emphasis was put on providing potential 
offenders with alternatives to crime such as leisure facilities. Though offender rather 
than victim orientated, these initiatives continued to be spatial controls, albeit with an 
emphasis on keeping potential offenders away from temptation rather than keeping 
them under surveillance. It was social "crime prevention A la Thatcher" (ibid.; cf. 
Muncie et al., 1995). 
Local authorities are heavily involved in managing residential and commercial 
populations. Nevertheless, it was inevitable that the police would dominate any multi- 
agency crime prevention initiatives they become involved in until crime prevention 
moved beyond its narrow focus on physical security and included social services such 
as housing, education, youth work and family support (Jones et al., 1994). Local 
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authorities would have to wait until the mid 1990s before they would become equal 
partners with the police (covered in section 4.2). What was not mentioned in any'of 
the Home Office research or policy documents analysed in section 4.1.1, however, 
was that precedent for a broader approach to cooperation between the police and local 
authorities had already been set in the 1980s in crime prevention initiatives on council 
estates. Most significant were the Priority Estate Project, run by the Department of the 
Environment, and the Safe Neighbourhoods Unit, run by NACRO, both of which 
were set up in 1979. Six government and non-government organisation reports on 
these estate projects were reviewed for this thesis, three published by NACRO (Bright 
and Petterson, 1984; NACRO, 1989; Safe Neighbourhoods Unit, 1990), two by the 
Department of the Environment (Department of the Environment, 1993; Power, 
1984), and one Cabinet Office report of a multi-agency seminar on the projects (Heal 
and Burrows, 1982). 
Unlike the Home Office initiatives, the estate projects were clearly informed by 
communitarian, and in particular moral communitarian politics. A number of factors 
point in this direction. Of most significance, the documents gave equal weight to the 
involvement of local authority departments as the police, encouraged public 
involvement in crime prevention, and in the case of the NACRO projects, encouraged 
public involvement in the decision making process through questionnaire surveys and 
focus-group meetings. As emphasised in section 2.3.1, the dispersal of government 
beyond central state bureaucracies is at the centre of the communitarian vision of 
social control. This underlying concern that crime prevention partnerships should 
include collective local action from both government and non-govemment 
organisations and from the public was made clearest by NACRO, which chose to drop 
the term crime prevention in favour for a new term, community safety (Gilling and 
Barton, 1997). Second, the documents promoted the communitarian emphasis on the 
right of collectives to intervene into a wider range of minor crime than that 
traditionally covered by criminal law. Equal emphasis was put on the negative effect 
that civil nuisances such as noise, dumping rubbish and threatening behaviour have on 
a person's quality of life. 
These were the only aspects of the estate projects to appeal equally to egalitarian as 
moral communitarian visions of social control, however. Two of the documents 
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(Bright and Petterson, 1984; NACRO, 1989) put emphasis on the need to combat 
domestic crime and racial harassment, and NACRO made efforts to consult widely 
through residents' associations, door to-door questionnaires and focus-group meetings 
with youth, women and minority ethnic groups (though not those that had experience 
of the weight of the law). However, the overwhelming emphasis of both the NACRO 
and Department of the Environment projects was on 'problem families' and youths 
'hanging out'. Just as important, none of the reports referred to the need to combat 
white-collar crime. At no point was any real faith shown in the right of those living on 
particular estates to set standards of acceptable behaviour that differed from that of 
the country as a whole. 
Second, while the initiatives advocated went beyond the narrow focus of the Home 
Office on opportunity reduction, they did not amount to a holistic approach to crime 
prevention. In true moral communitarian fashion, the initiatives were formed around 
the image of offenders being disorderly and out of control rather than pushed into 
crime. As Bottoms and Wiles (1988), Bright (1997) and Rock (1988) stress, the 
projects were largely informed by Newman's (1972) 'defensible space' theory and its 
emphasis on holding potential criminals back by keeping areas under surveillance. 
This was to be achieved through creating a well managed and attractive setting, which 
it was hoped would give residents a sens e of pride in their estate, encouraging them to 
look out for one another and intervene when they witnessed crime. Furthermore, far 
less appeal was made to the need for individuals to be supported by their communities 
than to them having obligations to their communities. Last, where social welfare was 
mentioned, it was in the context of providing conditions for the policing of the estates 
by neighbourhood watch and tenants' associations. Even when the term regeneration 
was used, it was the need to control anti-social behaviour in order to make the estates 
more attractive to commerce that prevailed. Tax incentives were not offered to 
businesses, nor was training offered to the unemployed. Work was to be attracted into 
the area as a result of crime reduction. Only when the area had been 'rescued' would 
regeneration be possible. Like the Home Office initiatives, the estate projects were 
ultimately based on spatial control and the classicist interpretation of the problem of 
crime control: that the response to crime should focus on making crime more difficult 
to commit and more difficult to get away with. Community safety, in other words, 
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meant short rather than long term personal security. As Gilling and Barton (1997) put 
it, the term community safety could easily have been changed to community control. 
Finally, as Rock (1988) notes, the estate projects were also informed by Wilson and 
Kelling's (1982) 'broken windows' thesis and its emphasis on unchecked anti-social 
behaviour providing a breeding ground for serious crime (see section 2.3.4). Anti- 
social behaviour was treated as a problem both its own right and as a problem that 
escalated into serious crime. This was explicit in one of the documents analysed: 
Thinking about crime prevention has undergone significant changes in recent years: two 
concepts in particular warrant warning here. The first has been increased thinking about what 
has been labelled the 'situational' approach to crime prevention: measures that can be taken to 
reduce opportunities for crimes to be committed, by the management, design, or manipulation 
of the immediate environment in which they frequently occur. The second concept - less 
systematically researched, but judged by the response of those at the seminar at least, with 
intrinsic appeal - is the theory that as neighbourhoods decline, those living there become less 
willing to control the uncivil and anti-social activities of others, and that in time this breeds an 
atmosphere where crime is acceptable. This idea of areas undergoing 'cycles of decay' is 
significantly different from the more longstanding, traditional view that poverty, poor 
education and living standards lead to criminality. (Heal and Burrows, 1982: 33) 
However, support for the 'broken windows' thesis was not matched by the emphasis 
that its original authors put on resorting to law in support of the informal social 
controls of geographical communities. In contrast, the communitarian vision of 
NACRO and the Department of the Envirom-nent appeared to be an egalitarian one of 
non-authoritarian crime control. Law enforcement was not mentioned in the 
Department of the Environment report (Power, 1984). Although law enforcement 
received occasional mention in two of the NACRO reports (Bright and Petterson, 
1984; NACRO, 1989), it was not highlighted. Indeed, the examples of law 
enforcement were invariably given in the context of the use of targeted surveillance to 
tackle serious crime. The only clear exception was racial harassment, where criminal 
law enforcement and evictions were promoted due to the exceptional need to gain the 
confidence of minority ethnic groups. Bright and Petterson (1984) reported that 
residents and practitioners suggested eviction might be used more widely to deal with 
persistent anti-social behaviour, but stressed that the views were not necessarily 
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shared by themselves. They warned of the homelessness that evictions created, and 
suggested that social landlords would need to show residents that they were 
addressing anti-social behaviour through other means. The fact that local residents 
and practitioners might be ready to resort to authoritarian crime control in the 
immediate areas where they lived and worked was a warning that needed to be 
heeded, however. As emphasised in section 2.1.4, the more localised crime prevention 
partnerships are situated, the more likely they are to become sites for the realisation of 
just and inclusive criminal policy. Yet, it remains imperative that efforts are made to 
ensure that even the most localised of crime prevention partnerships are informed by a 
broad range of local voices. 
To conclude this section, the consensus of academic opinion that crime prevention 
partnerships emerged in the 1980s in response to the failings of the criminal justice 
system to control crime appeared to apply equally to the estate projects. NACRO did 
not go so far as the Department of the Environment or the Home Office as to treat 
crime prevention and punishment as separate areas of crime control altogether, but 
appeared to be in no doubt as to the need to treat law enforcement as a measure of 
absolute last resort, explaining, "the machinery of criminal justice... exists mainly to 
process crime after it has taken place. It has little effect on preventing crime... " 
(NACRO, 1989: 3). However, the question whether the 'turn to the local' in crime 
control should be viewed in a positive light, as a potential victory for the egalitarian 
political left, still hung in the balance. The estate projects left political space for crime 
prevention to become, on the contrary, an extension of the criminal justice system. 
Weakness was apparent in the approach taken by the Home Office in the 1980s, 
which it has been seen was restricted to conventional crime and was self-consciously 
anti welfare. Yet, the approach taken by NACRO and the Department of the 
Environment was weaker still, despite occasional effort to look beyond conventional 
crime and to consult widely. As has been seen, the relative weakness of the estate 
projects stemmed from the inclusion of offender as well as victim orientated spatial 
controls, and 'defining anti-social behaviour up' as a problem of crime, whether 
covered by criminal law or not, as a problem in its own right and due to a need to 
6nip' more serious crime 'in the bud'. Most crucial of all, the model of crime control 
adopted in the estate projects depended on residents being willing and able to police 
themselves. As emphasised in section 2.2.1, it is far from clear that collective self- 
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policing is a realistic prospect in post-industrial western societies. When anti-social 
behaviour is 'defined up' as a problem of crime but measures are not available to deal 
with its underlying causes, pressure to turn to law is bound to increase, both in 
support of the informal social controls of geographical communities and as a 
compliment to them. 
4. L 3. The Morgan Report 
In 1990 new central government guidance was issued to crime prevention 
partnerships that, unlike its predecessor, made no reference to crime prevention 
theory. It was accompanied by a booklet of good practice that did not discriminate 
between victim and offender orientated initiatives. In light of the guidance, the Home 
Office set up a working group (the Morgan working group) to review the state of 
existing cooperation between the police and local authority departments, and to advise 
on the future of crime prevention partnerships (Home Office, 199 1). Despite the work 
of the Home Office Crime Prevention Unit, Association of Metropolitan Authorities 
(1990) had criticised local authorities for lacking crime prevention strategies (cf. 
Association of District Councils, 1990). The Association of Metropolitan Authorities 
highlighted a questionnaire survey by the Safe Neighbourhoods Unit, completed by 
io5 local authorities in 1990, which revealed that only nineteen local authorities had 
policies'on crime prevention. 
The Morgan working group was set up with equal representation from NACRO and 
local authorities as the Home Office Crime Prevention Unit and the police. The report 
that followed (the Morgan Report) emphasised that crime prevention partnerships did 
not need to be steered by the police, and recommended that partnerships should be 
divided along local authority boundaries, with council ward strategies produced 
within overarching district council and metropolitan borough ones. The police, it was 
sustained: 
... cannot 
be held solely responsib le for community safety or for tackling crime or fear of 
crime in their force area in isolation: the factors which lead to offending or which offer the 
opportunity for crime are not within their direct control As the provider of a range of 
services which directly impact upon the causes of crime (such as education, housing and 
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recreation) the local authority is the natural focus for coordinating, in collaboration with the 
police, the broad range of activities directed at improving community safety. (Home Office, 
199 1: paras. 3.13 and 4.25) 
This message was reinforced when it was explained why the term community safety 
had been chosen in preference to crime prevention: 
The term 'crime prevention' is often too narrowly interpreted and this reinforces the view 
that it is solely the responsibility of the police. On the other hand, the term 'community 
safety', is open to wider interpretation and could encourage greater participation from all 
sections of the community in the fight against crime. (Home Office, 199 1: para. 3.6) 
It was concluded that the police and local authorities should be given a joint statutory 
duty to work in partnership with other government and non-government institutions. 
When the recommendations of the report were eventually implemented under the 
Crime and Disorder Act (covered in section 4.3.2), this statutory duty was extended to 
the probation service and health authorities. 
Like the crime prevention documents analysed of the Home Office, NACRO and 
Department of the Environment, the Morgan working group only departed from the 
issue of conventional crime at the end of the report, where crime against women, 
children, the elderly and minority ethnic groups were listed as specific areas of 
concern; and like the Home Office and Department of the Environment, no 
recommendations were made on the issue of consultation, and no mention was made 
of the right of different areas to set standards of acceptable behaviour that varied from 
that of the country as a whole. However, despite these shared weaknesses, the view 
that crime prevention partnerships had emerged as an alternative to the 'enforcement 
approach' of the criminal justice ýsystem likewise shone through the vision of crime 
control adopted by the Morgan working group. This was set out in the first chapter of 
the report. Emphasis was put on the accelerated rise in recorded crime in the 1980s, 
and the fact that only 4 percent of offences recorded by the British Crime Survey 
resulted in the perpetrator being cautioned by the police or convicted in the courts. 
"Against this background", it was continued, "crime prevention is a vital component 
of any comprehensive attempt to tackle crime alongside existing measures to 
apprehend and deal with identified offenders" (Home Office, 1991: para. 1.6). 
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Indeed, the report shared less of the weakness inherent in the approach taken by the 
estate projects, as it did not promote its support for focusing crime control on anti- 
social behaviour within the 'broken windows' thesis. Anti-social behaviour was 
treated as a problem in its own right, but not one that escalated into serious crime. 
Nor, in contrast to the crime prevention documents of NACRO analysed, was the 
vision of non-authoritarian crime control departed from at any point in the document. 
Nevertheless, one equally important area of weakness was repeated. Like the estate 
project documents, the report did not offer a holistic approach to crime prevention. 
While the report did not go into any detail on the types of crime prevention initiatives 
the Morgan working group envisaged, a portfolio of potential crime prevention 
initiatives was listed in the conclusion, under the headings Tackling the Causes of 
Crime, Reducing the Opportunities for Crimes to be Committed, Helping Victims of 
Crime, and Reducing the Fear of Crime. Only the first of these offered any prospect 
of a welfare approach to crime control; and of the nine activities listed under Tackling 
the Causes of Crime, only three (Alcohol and Drug Misuse Prevention Schemes; 
Employment and Training Programmes; Debt Counselling) were specifically aimed at 
improving the social welfare of potential offenders. Each of the others (Family 
Support Initiatives; Youth Programmes; Community Development and 
Neighbourhood Initiatives; Pre-School Programmes; Education and School Based 
Programmes; Work with Offenders and their Families) were just as likely to be picked 
up by those that were more interested in developing methods of holding potential 
offenders back than dealing with the reasons they are motivated to offend in the first 
place. 
4.2. The Vision Begins to Evaporate 
Crime prevention partnerships began to proliferate in the next few years after the 
Morgan Report was published. By the time the Labour Party came to power in 1997, 
promising to implement the report (covered in section 4.3.1), a survey of local 
authorities (Local Government Management Board, 1996) had found almost two- 
thirds to have crime prevention policies, in stark contrast to the findings of 
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Association of Metropolitan Authorities (1990) just six years earlier (see section 
4.1.3). Of the twenty-two partnerships that replied to the first postal survey of London 
boroughs conducted during the course of this doctoral thesis, nine sent documents or 
letters outlining existing strategies (see section 5.1 ). 
In the first major post-Morgan study of crime prevention partnerships specific to 
social housing estates (Department of the Environment, 1993), the view that 'the 
partnership approach' was a non-legal approach to crime control appeared to be alive 
and well. The report stood out for its depth of reference to spatial crime prevention 
theories, including Newman's (1972) 'defensible space' theory and Wilson and 
Kelling's (1982) 'broken windows' thesis. Crime prevention theory was applied to 
sixty-three pages of analysis of estate projects. The document indicated no change 
from the vision of crime prevention adopted by the Department of the Environment 
ten years earlier (see section 4.1.2). It did not at any stage comment on legal 
intervention. The danger of 'the partnership approach' developing as part of, and not 
an alternative, to the 'enforcement approach' of the criminal justice system appeared 
to be weaker still at the Home Office. The first major post-Morgan Home Office 
study of crime prevention, Sutton's (1996) study of the Safer Cities Programme, 
likewise did not comment on legal intervention. Sutton showed that the Home Office 
preference for victim-orientated controls was redressed in the early 1990s, with the 
amount of money going towards offender-orientated schemes rising from fourteen 
percent of the total funding in 1989/90 to thirty percent by 1992/93. Like Department 
of the Environment (1993), the focus of the initiatives highlighted in the report was 
the spatial control of anti-social behaviour, but unlike Department of the Environment 
(1993), Sutton did not fi-ame his analysis of offender-orientated spatial' control within 
the 'broken windows' thesis. 
However, signs of the 'partnership approach' being exploited by the moral 
communitarian right were apparent in the fir 
, 
st major post-Morgan local authority 
study of crime prevention (Association of Metropolitan Government, 1993). Like the 
Morgan Report and the Home Office, NACRO and Department of Environment crime 
prevention documents analysed, much was made of the reliance of the 'enforcement 
approach' on the public reporting crime, the rise of crime in the post-war period 
despite increasing numbers of people being sentenced, and high levels of recidivism 
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among those who served prison sentences. Unlike the reports by the Home Office, 
NACRO and the Department of Environment, however, crime prevention partnerships 
were treated as having emerged to control anti-social behaviour alongside and not in 
place of the criminal justice system: 
Community safety has evolved over the last decade as a development of the longer 
established 'enforcement approach' which relies on the police and criminal justice system 
alone to apprehend and punish offenders and deter further offending. Although it 
encompasses a situational approach based on physical crime prevention measures (the 'locks 
and bolts' approach), the broader based community safety approach also addresses 
underlying personal and social behaviour patterns that may lead to criminal activity [ ... ] The 
limitations of a sole reliance on the enforcement approach has led practitioners over the last 
decade to develop a broader-based approach which seeks to extend the concept of crime 
prevention into the community through social development. The move by police forces to a 
broader based method of working in support of a multi-agency approach... involves 
reallocating the role of the police service within the context of a community partnership 
which involves many participants and agencies aimed at tackling a wide range of social 
problems, of which the prevention and detection of crime is but one. Naturally, the 
enforcement role of the criminal justice system continues to be important, especially in the 
context of serious crime and persistent offending, but the multi-agency approach embraces 
6policing' within a framework aimed particularly at reducing opportunities for, and the social 
conditions conductive to, criminal activity. (Association of Metropolitan Government, 1993: 
7,10 and 11) 
The document gave a fifty-page outline of the work of existing crime prevention 
initiatives. A number of references were made to the use of CCTV in collecting 
evidence for criminal proceedings. Of particular significance was a section outlining 
the operation aimed at combating prostitution and drug dealing in King's Cross, 
London (highlighted in section 3.1 of this thesis). Further, the Association of 
Metropolitan Government's support for the operation was framed within the 'broken 
windows' thesis: 
The drug and vice activities adversely affected the local residents, business users and 
commuters in a number of ways. Incidents of street crime increased. Offences of theft, 
assault and the like became commonplace. This in turn caused an increase in the fear of 
crime. Women were in fear of assault or bring propositioned by kerb-crawling when merely 
walking along the street. There was also a sharp increase. in the number of perceived drugs- 
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pushers or users loitering in the area. The local streets, residential estates and businesses 
became littered with hazardous debris such as used syringes and condoms, and similar 
equipment. There was evidence of young local residents having to become 'streetwise' at a 
very early age. In summary the area had taken on a very seedy and even dangerous image. 
(Association of Metropolitan Authorities, 1993: 53) 
As far as the current author is aware, Association of Metropolitan Authorities (1993) 
is the earliest government report on crime prevention to have made reference to legal 
intervention beyond the specific context of racial harassment. Whether its authors' 
decision to promote an authoritarian approach to crime control was influenced by the 
punitive political climate in the aftermath of the abduction and murder of the Toddler 
Jamie Bulger (covered in section 4.3.1) is not clear. However, as demonstrated in the 
following section, signs that increasing local authority involvement in crime 
prevention might result in the local becoming a site of authoritarian crime control 
began to gain pace in the following few years. 
4. Z1. Civil and Public Law Orders as Tools of Crime Control 
Local authorities began to set up inter-departmental "enforcement" or "anti-social 
behaviour" teams in the mid 1990s, with the purpose of developing legal orders as 
tools of crime control (Allen and Springings, 2001; Atkinson and Flint, 2004; Burney, 
1999 and 2005; Cowan et al., 2001; Morris, 1996 and 1997; Papps, 1998). The change 
in local authority attitude was dramatically reflected in Association of District 
Councils (1994), which focused on the role of housing departments in crime control. 
Legal orders were promoted as the primary respons e to anti-social behaviour. Physical 
security was also promoted, but in contrast to the documents analysed of the estate 
projects of NACRO and the Department of the Environment (see section 4.1.2), the 
Association of District Councils expressed no faith in the ability of the public to 
control their spatial envirom-nents. The view that crime prevention partnerships were 
developing to make up for rather than support the informal social controls of 
geographical communities was repeated when the document turned to the issue of 
mediation. The document was sceptical about the advantages of mediation, reporting 
that residents tend to prefer housing officers to take over responsibility for action due 
to fear of reprisal, and promoting its use "in resolving conflict where more formal 
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enforcement type approaches have failed" (1994: 63). The emphasis that the 
Association of District Councils put on controlling anti-social behaviour through legal 
orders was repeated in a checklist provided for housing officers dealing with 
complaints of noise: 
If the case is a first instance of noise nuisance, involve environmental health and request that 
they serve an abatement notice. If the case is more serious, perhaps after an abatement notice 
has failed to resolve the matter, consider whether finther action is needed e. g. service of a 
notice seeking possession/obtaining an injunction. Gather evidence in the form of witness 
statements from those living nearby, or who are affected by the problem, and other agencies 
e. g. the police... If case appears 'two-sided', consider mediation and conciliatory action... 
Involve legal services at an early stage... (Association of District Councils, 1994: 90. 
Abatement notices are covered below) 
Like the Association of Metropolitan Government report of the previous year, the 
Association of District Councils report must be read in light of the particular punitive 
political climate of the time. What is clear, however, is that the vision of crime 
prevention that the Morgan working group based its report on started to be abandoned 
in the mid 1990s, when local authorities began to take the mantle of responsibility for 
crime prevention partnerships over from the police. Environmental health officers 
have long used legal orders to manage commercial areas (Jones and Newbum, 1998). 
Environmental health officers and housing officers have likewise long used legal 
orders to manage residential areas (Bumey, 1999). In the 1990s, however, as Bumey 
(1999) demonstrates, local authorities began to view their use of legal orders in terms 
of crime control as well as commercial and housing management. This was 
particularly the case in their management of residential areas. As the social housing 
stock decreased in the 1980s and 1990s, a concentration of social disadvantage and 
old and young (with their incompatible lifestyles) was left on the remaining council 
estates. The difficult tenant, Bumey emphasises, came to be viewed as the anti-social 
tenant, and the natural response of social landlords was to turn to legal orders largely 
because they are already used to using them for matters such as recovering rent- 
arrears. At the same time, alternative non-legal measures to deal with anti-social 
behaviour faltered with cuts in, for example, caretakers, youth clubs, youth services 
and family support. 
99 
The two most widely publicised local authority legal orders powers that local 
authorities began to turn to in the 1990s were injunctions and possession orders, both 
of which were strengthened under the Housing Act 1996. Injunctions are backed up 
by a potential two-year prison sentence in breach proceedings. A new injunction was 
made available to local authorities under the Housing Act where council tenants had 
experienced violence or the threat of violence to prohibit people from, "engaging in or 
threatening to engage in conduct causing, or likely to cause, a nuisance or 
annoyance... using or threatening to use residential premises for immoral or illegal 
purposes; or... entering residential premises or being found in the locality of any such 
premises" (DETR, 1997: para. 4). Although the power to evict is not backed up with 
penal remedies, it is arguably equally coercive. First, not only do possession orders 
result in people losing their homes, but under the Housing Act a person who has been 
evicted may be refused alternative accommodation, as having made him or her self 
"intentionally homeless". Second, local authorities were also given the power to put 
new tenants on a probationary period, after which their tenancy could be 
automatically discontinued if any clauses were broken. Third, the Act required local 
authorities to set up local housing registers, and offer permanent housing only to those 
registered on them. Shelter (1998) explains that the purpose of this requirement was 
largely to encourage the disqualification of those suspected of crime. They uncovered 
around 800 such disqualifications among forty-four local authorities in the following 
two years, and quoted guidance by the Department of Trade and Industry and the 
Department of Health recommending that the housing registers be used to disqualify 
those suspected of non-criminal nuisance as well. Finally, the Housing Act allowed 
for injunctions to be served on people that had breached the conditions of their 
tenancy, requiring them not to do so again. The intention that social landlords should 
use their new powers in the name of crime control was summarised by Lord Woolf, 
who writing while the Housing Bill was going through Parliament, commended the 
changes as, "[flenants who consider themselves as innocent victims are sometimes 
forced to move out, and this exacerbates the problems because an estate can quickly 
become a ghetto" (Woolf, 1996: 207). Woolf was clearly adhering to the moral 
communitarian emphasis on 'defining anti-social behaviour up' as a problem of 
crime, both in its own right, and due to a need to 'nip' more serious crime 'in the 
bud'. 
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Burney (1999) was not the only criminologist to recognise the growing use of 
injunctions and evictions as tools of crime control in the mid 1990s. Papps (1998), for 
example, gave the example of Newport County Borough Council, which set up an 
Anti-Social Behaviour Sub-Committee in 1993. Serious crime and anti-social 
behaviour were stipulated against in tenancy agreements. Tenants were encouraged to 
report incidences of serious crime or anti-social behaviour to the partnership, and any 
tenants that attracted the attention of the police were sent letters by the police and the 
housing department warning them that they were in danger of being evicted. When 
notices to seek possession were served, injunctions were usually sought alongside. In 
the following year the initiative was widened to include an estate ranger scheme to 
allow for more immediate response to complaints. 
Another example was the work of Morris (1996 and 1997), the Home Office 
researcher interviewed while the research question was being developed (see section 
3.1). Morris was conducting research into the use of legal orders as tools of crime 
control by two local authorities. The first publication covered an operation on 
Kingsmead Estate, Hackney, London, in 1993. Possession orders were served by the 
council on a family whose children had been accused of burgling and robbing local 
homes, and the children were served with injunctions banning them from returning to 
the estate (cf NACRO, 1996). The second focused on Gateshead, County Durham. 
Incidents of anti-social behaviour and serious crime involving council tenants that the 
police attended were reported to the housing department for eviction proceedings to 
be considered. Like the example focused on by Papps (1998), both the police and 
housing department gave notice to those concerned that they might have breached 
their tenancy agreement, and were in danger of losing their homes. 
The extent that injunctions and evictions began to be used as tools of crime control in 
the mid 1990s was demonstrated in a survey of 294 local authorities by Association of 
County Councils et al. (1996), a survey of 147 housing authorities conducted by 
NACRO (1997), and a survey of fifty-seven local authorities by Dignan et al. (1996). 
In each survey around fifty percent of authorities were shown to have policies for 
dealing with serious crime and anti-social behaviour, with around eighty percent using 
evictions, and sixty percent injunctions. A later survey of 140 local authorities and 
124 housing authorities by Nixon et al. (1999) found that just under two percent of 
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local authority recorded complaints of serious crime or anti-social behaviour led to 
notices to seek possession (an average of 1.3 notices a year per 1000 tenancies), 
twenty percent of which were eventually taken to court. Housing authorities were 
more active, with 4.5% of complaints leading to notices to seek possession (an 
average of 1.5 per 1000 tenancies), and fifty percent continued. In contrast to 
Association of County Councils et al. (1996) and NACRO (1997), however, less than 
half of local authorities and almost no housing authorities were found to use 
injunctions as tools of crime control. Indeed, only III cases of injunction were 
reported in total. 
Of the two, then, the power to evict was found to be the most commonly used legal 
power to be used as a tool of crime control by social landlords. The prominent 
position given by social landlords to evictions extended to the use of introductory 
tenancies. Nixon et al. (1999) and the Chartered Institute of Housing (cited in Inside 
Housing, 7 July 2000) found that, like evictions, tenancies were being discontinued 
mostly in response to rent arrears. Nonetheless, one in five were being discontinued 
for serious crime or anti-social behaviour. 
Two issues remain to be dealt with in this section. The first is the extent the evidence 
that legal orders were being resorted to as weapons of crime control in the mid 1990s 
related to their use to control anti-social behaviour rather than serious crime. This was 
possible to measure in the case of Burney (1999), Morris (1996 and 1997) and Papps 
(1998), though not in the case of Association of County Councils et al. (1996), 
NACRO (1997) or Dignan et al. (1996), which did not distinguish between the two. 
Further evidence was to found in the housing practitioners journal Housing Today 
(see sections 3.1 and 3.3.2). Of the twenty-two reports that were found on the use of 
evictions, injunctions or anti-social behaviour orders (covered in section 4.3.2) as 
tools of crime control in Housing Today between November 1996 and March 2000, 
sixteen concerned low level crimes or civil nuisances. The following were typical 
examples: 
A temporary injunction has been granted against a homeowner banning him from harassing 
and abusing neighbours, playing amplified music and shouting, screaming and making a 
general nuisance of himself. (Paraphrased from Housing Today, I May 1997) 
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A possession order and injunction has been served against a man who used foul and racial 
language against his neighbours. (Paraphrased from Housing Today, 3 September 1998) 
An eighteen-year-old youth has been served with an Anti-Social Behaviour Order banning him 
from threatening, harassing or abusing his neighbours and visitors to his estate, throwing 
stones, spitting and causing damage to council property. (Paraphrased from Housing Today, 4 
November 1999) 
A tenant has been served with an Anti-Social Behaviour Order prohibiting him from appearing 
undressed in the view of his neighbours, or shouting, swearing, using threatening behaviour or 
carrying a knife. (Paraphrased from Housing Today, 6 January 2000) 
Evidence that local authorities were turning to legal powers in the mid 1990s was also 
to be found in the growing use of abatement notices by environmental health 
departments, available, for example, under the Noise Act 1996. Dignan et al. (1996) 
reported abatement notices being served for five percent of complaints of residential 
disorder, 7.5% of which resulting in breach proceedings. It has already been noted 
that abatement notices are also available to environmental health officers to control 
commercial activities. Such abatement notices are again available, under the 
Environmental Protection Act 1990, and also under the Town and. Country Planning 
Act 1990. Association of District Councils (1994) supported the use of abatement 
notices in the context of anti-social behaviour in both residential and commercial 
areas. In commercial areas it was recommended that abatement notices be targeted at 
activities such as fly tipping, windscreen washing, fly posting, and street trading. 
While civil orders can only be obtained through the courts, and can only be served if 
the alleged behaviour is proven on a "balance of probabilities" (or in the case of anti- 
social behaviour orders, covered in section 4.3.2, "beyond reasonable doubt"), the 
power to serve abatement notices is a public law power that can only be challenged 
through judicial review. Yet, breach of an abatement notice may result in criminal 
prosecution. In the case of abatement notices issued under the Noise Act, perpetrators 
are liable to a E2,500 fine. Under the Noise Act, officers also have the power to issue 
f 100 fixed penalty notices. I 
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The last issue that needs to be dealt with is the failure of the research to uncover 
evidence that injunctions and evictions were being extensively resorted to in the mid 
to late 1990s, though to reiterate, it was their future rather than present use that the 
research was designed to measure. While none of the figures quoted by Association of 
County Councils et al. (1996), NACRO (1997) or Dignan et al. (1996) were 
particularly high, therý was plenty of evidence in the mid 1990s of the potential for 
legal orders to be increasingly used as tools of crime control in the future. The first 
pieces of evidence are provided when comparison is made with figures from the early 
1990s, and when figures are provided for different social landlords. Burney (1999), 
for instance, quotes a study of twenty social landlords that uncovered the use of 170 
injunctions during 1996/7. The previous year the same landlords had issued twenty- 
five percent less (129 in total). In her own study of Manchester City Council, Bumey 
discovered that 164 Housing Act injunctions and thirty-two possession orders had 
been obtained in 1998, compared to seventy-seven injunctions and fifteen possession 
orders in 1997, and only , seven injunctions and one possession order in 1992. 
Furthermore, Nixon et al. (1999) found that eighty percent of social landlords directed 
legal orders at serious crime or anti-social behaviour more often than five years 
earlier, that seventy-four percent had revised their tenancy agreements since the 
Housing Act, and that there had been a rise of 127 percent in the number of 
possession orders for serious crime or anti-social behaviour from 1996/7 to 1997/8. 
Nixon et al. also showed that the area most active in the use of evictions had issued 
160 notices to seek possession for serious crime or anti-social behaviour in 1997/8. 
Burney and Nixon et al. both stressed that their studies had been conducted just two 
years after the Housing Act, and that social landlords were likely to become 
increasingly active over the next few years. 
4.3. Partners in Enforcement 
This chapter now moves on to examine the extent to which the threat of the local 
becoming a site of earlier and more intensive intervention into the lives of the 
marginalised was amplified with implementation of the Morgan Report. It serves as a 
continuation of the historical analysis of crime prevention partnerships and the 
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question whether the proliferation of crime prevention partnerships should be viewed 
in a positive light, as a potential victory for the egalitarian political left, or whether 
there is a significant risk that it might result in a reversal of the bifurcation of crime 
control between serious crime and anti-social behaviour, and in the 'enforcement 
approach' spreading beyond the existing boundaries of the criminal justice system. 
The section starts off by exploring the broad support afforded to neoconservative 
interpretations of moral communitarianism by the current Labour government, before 
moving on to investigate the implications of implementation of the Morgan Report. 
4.3.1. 'Getting Back to Basics' 
The threat to the bifurcation of crime control posed by moral communitarianism 
became abundantly apparent in the mid 1990s. In the aftermath of the abduction, 
torture and murder of the toddler Jamie Bulger, the Conservative government latched 
onto neoconservative support for the coercive potential of law enforcement (Jordan, 
1996). The neoconservative interpretation of moral communitarianism was 
epitomised by the Prime Minister of the time, John Major, who at the Conservative 
Party conference in October 1993 announced, "[i]t is time to get back to basics, to 
self-discipline and respect for the law" (quoted in Dunbar and Langdon, 1998: 115). 
When minimum prison sentences were introduced for certain repeat offences under 
the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997, for example, the White Paper that preceded it 
described their purpose as being "so that offenders know what to expect when they 
are caught" (Home Office, 1996: 3). The White Paper went on to claim that, despite 
the increase in the length of these prison sentences, the deterrent effect of the reforms 
would result in a twenty-two percent reduction in imprisonment overall. 
In section 4.2 it was stressed that the particular punitive climate of the time made it 
particularly difficult to establish the representativeness of government statements on 
crime control. The Conservative government at the time clearly stands accused of 
6pandering to the right' (Dunbar and Langdon, 1998). Of more significance was the 
reaction of the Labour Party, whose statements on crime control at the time were 
equally punitive. Instead of criticising the Government's turnaround in criminal 
policy, the Labour Party likewise began to express support for the coercive potential 
105 
of the criminal justice system (Jordan, 1996; Muncie, 1999; Newburn, 1998; 
Rutherford, 2000; Scraton, 2004; Sim, 2000). Most influential were Tony Blair, 
appointed shadow Home Secretary in 1992 and elected Party leader in 1994, and Jack 
Straw, who took over Blair's position as shadow Home Secretary in 1994. 
The punitive nature of Blair and Straw's statements on crime control was 
demonstrated in the introduction to chapter three. However, as emphasised in section 
3.1, unlike the Conservative Party at the time, the Labour Party's endorsement of 
authoritarian crime control should not be dismissed as rhetoric. First, after suffering a 
fourth consecutive defeat at the general election in 1992, abandonment of the 
influence of the egalitarian left was treated as paramount to the future of the Labour 
Party (Brownlee, 1998; Dunbar and Langdon, 1998; Palmer, 1997; Rutherford, 2000). 
Second, the goal of the emerging 'New Labour' Party was not limited to claiming the 
centre ground of politics. It was of a radical turnaround in the political foundations of 
the Labour Party that would take it away from its social democratic origins, and lead 
it to adopt moral communitarianism. as its underlying ideology (Etzioni, 1997). Blair 
and Straw had not been politicians in the 1960s, when the egalitarian left bad risen to 
prominence in the party. Blair, for example, made it clear that he saw the 1960s as a 
time when personal responsibility was lost and the difference between right and 
wrong was blurred (Rutherford, 2000). Within a year of Blair taking office as the 
leader of the Labour Party, moral communitarianism. had been cemented into the 
Labour Party's constitution. The previous Clause 4, which had read, "[t]o secure for 
all the workers by hand or by brain the full fruits of their industry and the most 
equitable distribution thereof that may be possible upon the basis of the common 
ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange, and the best 
obtainable system of popular administration and control of each industry of service" 
was replace by a new one that read: 
The Labour Party is a democratic socialist party. It believes that by the strength of our 
common endeavour we achieve more than we achieve alone, so as to create for each of us the 
means to realise our true potential and for all of us a community in which power, wealth and 
opportunity are in the hands of the many, not the few. Where the rights we enjoy reflect the 
duties we owe. And where we live together, freely, in a spirit of solidarity, tolerance and 
respect. (labour. org. uk/aboutlabour) 
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Moreover, as highlighted in section 3.1, Blair and Straw's interpretation of moral 
communitarianism. differed little to those that described themselves as 
neoconservative communitarians (Faulkner, 2000; Rutherford, 2000). Appeal to the 
'third-way' communitarian emphasis on the rights of individuals to collective support 
alongside the rights of the collective majority to a civil environment, and on the 
informal social controls of geographical communities, was drowned out by the 
neoconservative emphasis on being intolerant of any behaviour considered to be anti- 
social and a symptom of a lack of control, and quick resort to legal intervention. 
Shortly after being appointed Shadow Home Secretary, for instance, Blair wrote, 
11[i]t's a bargain - we give opportunity, we demand responsibility. There is no excuse 
for crime. None' (the Sun, 3 March 1993, quoted in Rutherford, 2000: 36). When 
asked which criminologists that had most influenced him, Jack Straw did not list a 
single person from the critical left (Rutherford, 2000). 
The influence of the neoconservative approach to crime control on the Labour Party 
was patently laid out in proposals to introduce a community safety order, which 
unlike the injunctions that were to be introduced under the Housing Act 1996, would 
be available to protect homeowners (Home Office, 1997a; Hunter and Bretherton, 
1998). The advantage that legal orders had over criminal prosecution was explained in 
the following terms: 
Every citizen, every family has. the right to a quiet life -a right to go about their lawful 
business without harassmentý interference or criminal behaviour by their neighbours. But 
across Britain there are thousands of people whose lives are made a misery by the people 
next door, down the street or on the floor above or below. Their behaviour may not just be 
unneighbourly but intolerable and outrageous. A gang of youths, a criminal family, a group 
intent on racial harassmentý or a lone drug user may act so selfishly as effectively to tcrrorise 
a neighbourhood. Law-abiding residents may be the victims of burglaries, thefts from and of 
vehicles, and intimidation in the form of threats, abuse, assaults, loud music or the use of 
aggressive dogs. The neighbours may often be at their wits' end, and so often are the police. 
To get the cases to court hard information within the rules of criminal evidence is required. 
But witnesses - other neighbours - are often intimidated into silence, and even when the 
cases get to court, the charges and the punishment rarely fit the crime [ ... ] 'Me proposals in 
this paper are tough and are designed to be. But, in our judgement, they are proportionate... 
(Labour Party, 1995: 1 and 2) 
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The boundary between neoconservative support for quick resort to law to retain 
sovereign control over disorderly areas and 'third-way' insistence that law be used 
only as a last resort had clearly been crossed. In expressing overwhelming support for 
the right of geographical communities not to tolerate civil nuisances as well as crime, 
and in proposing law enforcement to combat it, the Labour Party had also clearly 
breached the three areas of potential overlap between 'third-way' and neoconservative 
interpretations of communitarianism identified in section 2.3.5, concerning the 
balance between the rights of the individual and the rights of the community, formal 
and informal social controls, and due process and crime control. First, the proposed 
power was designed to make individuals responsible for their anti-social behaviour, 
with no corresponding obligation placed on the communities to provide individuals 
with the social stability that they need to prevent them from acting anti-socially in the 
first place. Second, the proposed power was designed to make individuals criminally 
responsible for their anti-social behaviour, and moreover not only as a result of anti- 
social behaviour being a'problern in its own right, but also due to anti-social 
behaviour being a precursor to serious crime. The paper concluded that anti-social 
behaviour "can only get worse if those perpetrating such behaviour feel immune from 
the full vigour of the law" (1995: 8). Finally, the proposed orders would be available 
both as alternatives to criminal prosecution and where the behaviour was not 
prohibited under criminal law (1995: 9). Further, not only would it not be necessary 
for the behaviour complained of to be proven beyond reasonable doubt when the 
order was applied for, but unlike the Housing Act injunction it would not be necessary 
for the action to be brought by someone who had been a victim of it, allowing the 
police and local authorities to bring action as professional witnesses (Home Office, 
1997a; Hunter and Bretherton, 1998). 
Any illusion that the Labour Party was merely playing to the particularly punitive 
climate of the mid 1990s was quickly dispelled when the party won the general 
election of 1997. In his first major speech as Prime Minister, Blair repeated the 
party's pledge to moral communitarianism: "[t]he basis of this modem civic society is 
an ethic of mutual responsibility or duty. It is something for something. A society 
where we play by the rules. You only take out if you put in. That's the bargain" 
(quoted in Drakeford and Vanstone, 2000: 376). Blair and Straw's neoconservative 
interpretation of the problem of crime control was also reiterated, Blair for instance 
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writing that the criminal justice system is, "critical to the third way. It was essential 
for Labour to break free from the view that social considerations weakened personal 
responsibility for crime and disorder. Hence my call for a government that was 'tough 
on crime and tough on the causes of crime'. New Labour is adopting this approach in 
govermnent - electronic tagging of criminals and tough new laws against racial 
harassment; a E250 million crime prevention programme while imposing new 
sanctions on disorderly conduct! '(quoted in Rutherford, 2000: 37). 
With the change of government, cracks also began to appear in the insistence of the 
Home Office that legal intervention should be focused on serious crime, and that the 
4partnership approach' was essentially a non-legal approach to crime control. The 
work of Sheradon Morris on the relevance of legal orders to crime control has already 
been noted (see section 4.2.1). The broader nature of this potential switch in Home 
office policy on crime control was also reflected in papers on policing (Jordan, 1998) 
and Ihe criminal justice system (Moxon, 1998). While criticising community policing 
as a whole for failing in its aim to involve the public in controlling their own 
environments, Jordan (1998) gave support to 'zero-tolerance' policing as a short-term 
means of dealing with anti-social behaviour. Prior to discussing sentencing, Moxon 
(1998) looked at the role of the police as the gatekeepers of the criminal justice 
system and the deterrent potential of police warnings and cautions. The author was 
most explicit on the issue of informal warnings, and made indirect reference to the 
'broken windows' thesis: 
[Informal warnings) are the lowest level of police action, and are sometimes used where the 
need for any police intervention is borderline. They have assumed more prominence recently, 
as incidents which the police might previously have overlooked may now result in low-level 
action as part of a 'zero tolerance' strategy... In the zero tolerance context informal warnings 
are one strand in a wider strategy which is designed to demonstrate to would-be offenders 
that even low-level misbehaviour will not be tolerated, thereby preventing escalation into 
more serious crime. (Moxon, 1998: 86) 
The final nail in the coffin of the, by then, twenty-year-old established Home Office 
policy that crime prevention partnerships had emerged in response to a failure of the 
criminal justice system to control crime came with a paper on the contribution of the 
police to crime prevention partnerships (Hough and Tilley, 1998). The paper was 
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significant in a number of ways. Not only did it refer to law in the context of anti- 
social behaviour as well as serious crime, but it also included the use of legal orders 
alongside criminal law enforcement, and like Jordan (1998) referred to the term 'zero- 
tolerance' policing. Moreover, while the paper started off by questioning the ability of 
the criminal justice system to deter crime and explicitly recognised crime prevention 
as a distinct area of criminal policy separate to criminal justice, it nevertheless went 
on to promote "enforcemenf' as a third category of crime prevention alongside social 
and situational crime prevention. It was explained, "[t]here is evidence in support of 
the view that the policing of disorder can be. part and parcel of the prevention of 
crime" (1998: 3). The authors had produced the paper in conjunction with a report by 
Her Majesty's Inspectorate of the Constabulary (HMIC, 1997), which likewise 
promoted the term 'zero-tolerance' policing, but quoted examples of intelligence-led 
policing of serious crime in support. The authors of the Home Office paper also 
focused heavily on serious crime in the examples they gave. Notwithstanding this, the 
very fact that the Home Office had made reference to crime prevention partnerships 
controlling anti-social behaviour through law lay in direct contrast to the vision of 
crime prevention that the Morgan working group had been informed by (see section 
4.1.3). 
4.3. Z 'Sidestepping Morgan' 
In the short-term, however, it was far from clear that these developments in crime 
prevention thinking at the Home Office would be reflected in the approach that the 
Labour government would take to implementing the Morgan Report. While the 
Government made no attempt to rule law enforcement out of the equation, it did not 
actively promote it either. In September 1997, for example, the Home Office ran a 
workshop entitled What Works in Community Safety. The report on the workshop 
(Home Office, 1997e) remained silent on the direction that the Government envisaged 
that crime prevention partnerships should take. References were made to the subject 
matters dealt with in the workshop, none of which included legal intervention, but no 
analysis was made of the successes or failures of the workshop. Similar silence was to 
be found in a consultation document produced on the proposed Crime and Disorder 
Bill in the same month as the workshop (Home Office, 1997b), which focused on the 
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technicalities of inter-agency cooperation. No literature was uncovered during the 
course of this doctoral thesis that treated the new government's failure to set the 
parameters of crime prevention as a cause for concern. Indeed, the editors of a 
consortium of articles written by academics and pressure group leaders published 
shortly after the Crime and Disorder Bill was presented to Parliament went so far as to 
congratulate the Government on its proposals to finally implement the Morgan Report 
(Marlow and Pitts, 1998). Only three of the twenty articles contained in the collection 
made any reference to the 'enforcement approach" to crime control, none of which did 
so in order to express concern that legal intervention might have a serious role to play 
in crime prevention partnerships. The first of these articles, written by NACRO's 
representative on the Morgan working group covered in section 4.1.2 (Edwards, 
1998), mentioned the use of criminal lawenforcement and legal orders in order to 
stress how the 'enforcement approach' differed from the 'partnership approach'. The 
second of the articles, written by an academic who had conducted research into the 
Priority Estates Project of the Department of the Environment covered in section 4.1.2 
(Hope, 1998) focused on the proposed community safety order, but expressed 
confidence that it would be used as an absolute measure of last resort. The last article, 
written by one of the supporters of the 'crisis of sovereignty' thesis covered in section 
2.1 .1 (Young, 1998c), 
focused on 'zero tolerance' criminal law enforcement, but 
made no reference to crime prevention partnerships at all. 
This silence did not continue once the Crime and Disorder Act had been passed. 
Three documents were of particular relevance. The first (Home Office, 1999) 
provided guidance to crime prevention partnerships on implementation of the Act. 
Like Home Office (1997b), it focused on the technicalities of inter-agency 
cooperation. It went into far more detail, however, and gave numerous examples of 
such cooperation, including information exchange for criminal law enforcement and 
the serving and enforcement of legal orders (paras. 5.9 and 5.10). In the introduction 
to the document the Home Office stressed that it was not up to the Government to 
dictate how partnerships interpreted the term crime prevention, explaining, "[w]ithin 
reason, nothing is ruled out and nothing is ruled in" (para. 1.43). Nevertheless, the 
Home Office immediately went on to stress the availability of extended prison 
sentences for racially motivated crime (para. 1.44) and a need for measures to be 
taken to protect witnesses to crime so as to encourage the public to report instances of 
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anti-social behaviour (para. 1.45). These measures included anti-social behaviour 
orders and Housing Act injunctions. 
The other two documents went further still. The first (Home Office, 1998a) provided 
guidance on the use of the new anti-social behaviour order. Two aspects of the 
document stood out. First was the overwhelming emphasis put on minor crime and 
civil nuisances in the examples given of conduct the orders would be suitable for: 
where there is persistent unruly behaviour by a small group of individuals on a housing estate or 
other local area, who may dominate others and use minor damage to property and fear of 
retaliation, possibly at unsociable hours,, as a means of intimidating other people; 
where there are families whose anti-social behaviour, when challenged, leads to verbal abuse, 
vandalism, threats and graffiti, sometimes using children as the vehicle for action against 
neighbouring families; 
where there is persistent abusive behaviour towards elderly people or towards mentally ill or 
disabled people causing them fear and distress; 
where there is serious and persistent bullying of children on an organised basis in public 
recreation grounds or on the way to school or within the school grounds if normal school 
disciplinary procedures do not stop the behaviour; 
where there is persistent racial harassment or homophobic behaviour; 
where there is persistent anti-social behaviour as a result of drugs or alcohol misuse. (Home 
Office, 1998a: para. 3.19) 
Second, the order was not described as a measure of last resort. In contrast to the 
previous proposal for the a community safety order, and in contrast to draft guidance 
that had been produced just a few months earlier (Home office, 1998c), the anti-social 
behaviour order was promoted as a "vital measure" in the Government's vision of 
crime prevention, due to the need to prevent anti-social behaviour escalating into 
serious crime (para. 2.6). It was stressed that in many cases anti-social behaviour 
orders should be a measure of first resort (ibid. ). 
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The second document to exhibit signs of the influence of the neoconservative 
interpretation of crime control was a manual produced for controlling crime in 
residential areas (Crime Concern, 1998). The role that legal intervention should play 
in the work of crime prevention partnerships was explored in detail. Eight pages were 
devoted to the issue, under the heading Restoring Law and Order. In the introduction 
to the section, it was explained: 
Occasionally, levels of crime and disorder are so high that regeneration is not possible until 
the situation has been brought back under control... Even where law and order have 
completely broken down in a neighbourhood, it is crucial for the police to work with 
landlords and community organisations to tackle problems such as persistent offending, anti- 
social residents and witness intimidation. (Crime Concern, 199 8: 44) 
The manual recommended the use of both legal orders and criminal law enforcement, 
and recommended criminal law enforcement as a means of tackling both minor and 
serious crime. On the role of criminal law enforcement, it was explained: 
If crime gets out of control, then vigorous police enforcement measures may be called for to 
Greclaim the streets', restore public confidence and protect people's lives and property. High 
profile police patrols should target problem locations in sufficient strength to deter criminal 
activity. (Crime Concern, 1998: 45) 
Injunctions were recommended, "where residents are feeling seriously intimidated... 
[and] to curb the activities of tenants who breach the terms and conditions of their 
tenancy" (1998: 47). Reference was made to the use of evictions and injunctions by 
London Borough of Hackney (see section 4.2.1). Anti-social behaviour orders were 
recommended where the behaviour complained of had been committed against an 
owner-occupier, in which case it has already been noted (in section 4.3.1), Housing 
Act injunctions were not available. 
Once order had been restored to the area, the manual suggested that the emphasis on 
criminal law enforcement should lessen. However, it should not be dropped 
altogether: 
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Law enforcement... is a first stage tactic to stabilise a neighbourhood and create an ordered 
environment in which more preventative work is likely to succeed. In the longer-term, the 
police may wish to develop a 'problem-orientated' approach to policing high crime 
neighbourhoods. This will involve not just apprehending offenders, but developing a clear 
understanding of the root problems facing a neighbourhood and acting jointly with residents 
and other agencies to tackle them. (Crime Concern, 1998: 50) 
Like the documents analysed on the estate projects of NACRO and the Department of 
the Environment (see section 4.1.2), primary emphasis was put on the informal social 
controls of geogaphical communities: 
Residents play an important part in 'setting the tone' of a neighbourhood. Where crime and 
disorder are rife, law-abiding citizens may lose confidence and retreat to their homes. Yet 
ultimately, anti-social behaviour cannot be 'policed out' by the authorities acting alone and 
will depend on the collective expression of opinion about the standards of behaviour 
acceptable to the majority of residents. As the problems of the estate are tackled and brought 
under control, it is essential to find ways of drawing in and involving residents in setting and 
. upholding new standards. 
(Crime Concern, 1998: 62) 
Nevertheless, in contrast to the estate projects, it was assumed that law would 
continue to play an active part in support. It was explained, "[e]nforcement through 
informal local networks can sometimes be as successful as legal action... [However, 
when] all else fails, legal action should be pursued determinedly" (Crime Concern, 
1998: 63). 
To conclude this section, the driving force behind the emergence of crime prevention 
partnerships in 1970s and 1980s may have been loss of faith in the criminal justice 
system, but by the late 1990s the danger that crime prevention would become an 
extension of the criminal justice system was apparent in central gpvemment crime 
prevention policy. Crime prevention was clearly being promoted as a means of earlier 
and more intensive intervention into the lives of the marginalised. Not only did law, 
and in particular legal orders, lie at the centre of the Government's approach, but the 
target was almost exclusively conventional crime. No references were encountered to 
the right of different communities to set different boundaries between acceptable and 
non-acceptable behaviour, and while crime prevention partnerships were required to 
consult groups representing the particular concerns of women, youths and minority 
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ethnic groups in writing (listed in appendix two), no mention was made of consulting 
groups representing those that have been at the receiving end of authoritarian crime 
control. There was also plenty to suggest that earlier resort to law lay at the heart of 
the Labour government's vision of crime control. Even if it is possible to dismiss 
Blair and Straw's public statements on anti-social behaviour as punitive rhetoric, the 
same cannot be said of the government policy and research documents that 
surrounded implementation of the Morgan Report. No contradictions were found 
across any of the documents that suggested this might be the case. 
4.4. Youth Justice 
This chapter concludes with analysis of the influence of neoconservative 
communitarianism on youth justice. So far the chapter has focused on the effects of 
structural and political pressure for early (spatial) intervention into the 'criminal 
decline' of disorderly areas. In section 2.2.2 it was noted that parallel pressures to 
intervene earlier into the 'criminal careers' of disorderly people is reflected in a recent 
restoration of faith in the ability of the criminal justice system to correct the behaviour 
of youth offenders, by confronting them with the consequences of their actions and 
teaching them how to control themselves. The story of increasing resort to 
authoritarian crime control is not complete without reference to this development. Nor 
is the 'turn to the locaP in crime control. It is no coincidence that crime prevention 
partnerships are proliferating in the western world at the same time as youth justice 
systems are being overhauled, or that in England and Wales both developments have 
been given recent statutory recognition, under the Crime and Disorder Act. Youth 
justice was included in the crime prevention strategies of all the crime prevention 
partnerships studied during the first stage of fieldwork research conducted for this 
doctoral thesis (see section 5.2.4). 
The first central government document analysed to demonstrate influence of moral 
communitarian support for earlier intervention into 'criminal careers' was the White 
Paper Crime, Justice and Protecting the Public (Home Office, 1990). While the White 
Paper was concerned with promoting just deserts and incapacitation to the heart of 
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sentencing, at the expense of rehabilitation (see section 4.1.1), it did not rule out a 
need for correctional controls altogether. Rather, it shifted the focus of correction 
away from dealing with underlying causes of crime towards the moral communitarian 
emphasis on holding crime back. In its promotion of community penalties, for 
example, the White Paper stated, "[flmprisonment makes it more difficult for 
offenders to compensate their victims and allows them to evade their responsibilities" 
(para. 1.12), while, "community sentences might prevent re-offending and allow for 
reintegration of the offender into the community" (para. 7.3). Elsewhere the White 
Paper spoke of community sentences allowing for "reparation to the victim" and 
"reform of the offender" (para. 2.9). Reparation would be given to the community 
through the offender doing unpaid work, and reform through a strengthening of the 
offender's links to the community (paras. 4.4 and 7.12). - Community sentences would 
not follow the old paradigm of rehabilitation that "imposed controls on them" (para. 
2.6), but would aim to show the offender the errors of their ways, and teach him or her 
"self discipline and motivation7' (ibid. ). It was explained: 
Many offenders have little understanding of the effect of their actions on others. 
Compensation and community service can bring home to offenders the effect of their 
behaviour on other people. The probation service tries to make offenders face up to what they 
have done, to give them a greater sense of responsibility and help them resist pressures from 
others to take part in crime. (Home Office, 1990a: para. 2.6) 
The moral communitarian emphasis on responsibility and 'self-regulation' was 
repeated in the context of youth crime. Here emphasis was put on the importance of 
parental responsibility: 
Crime prevention begins at home ... parents can, and should, help them to develop as 
responsible, law-abiding citizens [ ... ] When effective family control is lacking, children are 
more likely to grow up without self-discipline and a concern for others. They are more likely 
to commit crimes. Loving authority is crucial in a child's development [ ... ] The strength of 
parents' influence varies with their children's age... What is needed are arrangements which 
allow parents' diminishing responsibility for their children's behaviour as they grow older to 
be balanced by placing increasing responsibility on the young people themselves. (Home 
Office, 1990a: paras. 8.1-8.3) 
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The White Paper went on to recommend that courts should be more stringent in 
ordering parents to pay fines, compensation orders and court costs on behalf of their 
convicted children in order to "bring home to them the reality of the consequences of 
their children's behaviour and the implications for their own actions" (para. 8.8). 
Finally, it was announced that judges would be expected to increase the use of their 
power to bind parents over to prevent their children from re-offending (para. 8.9). 
I 
The emphasis put on criminalising the parents of youth offenders stood in contrast to 
the rest of the White Paper. As noted in section 4.1.1, the underlying rationale behind 
the White Paper was to reduce reliance on law enforcement and punishment in crime 
control. However, this policy of later legal intervention into 'criminal careers' came 
under increasing attack in the mid 1990s. The two most significant government 
publications on youth crime of the period were the Home Office study Young People 
and Crime (Graham and Bowling, 1995) and the Audit Commission report Misspent 
Youth (Audit Commission, 1996a). In typical moral communitarian fashion, both 
publications ignored any link between deprivation and crime, treating them instead as 
two symptoms of inadequate socialisation. In the light of an extensive self-report 
survey, the Home Office study for instance, boldly asserted that any relationship 
between social class and offending di§appeared once the influence of parenting and 
education were accounted for. Families, schools and communities, both publications 
emphasised, were potent forms of social control that should be harnessed to the 
criminal justice system. The Audit Commission report went on to discuss the role of 
youth services, housing departments and post-school employment training schemes. 
Only when the subject of substance abuse was raised did the report drop its insistence 
that the problem of crime was a problem of disorder. It was concluded: 
Understanding right and wrong is a major determinant of behaviour. When asked why they 
don't steal, most young people said 'because it is wrong'. Learning to be responsible is an 
important part of growing up and ceasing to be engaged in antisocial behaviour... Preventing 
youth crime is the responsibility of a wide range of agencies and. individuals. Parents have the 
first and most important role in ensuring that their children grow up to respect authority and 
to be concerned about the wellbeing of others. Pubic agencies... can help them in this task 
[ ... ] The criminal justice system and other support services should be component parts of a 
system for enforcing authority and providing positive opportunities. In this way, the cycle of 
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antisocial behaviour can be broken and young people helped to achieve their potential and 
play a full part in society. (Audit Commission, 1996a: paras. 148 and 150) 
The Labour government continued this moral communitarian approach to youth 
justice. Like its proposals on crime prevention partnerships, the Labour Party's vision 
of youth justice was clearly stronger informed by neoconservative than 'third-way' 
interpretations of moral communitarianisip (Muncie, 2002a; Newburn, 1998; Piper, 
1999; Pitts, 2001). Shortly after the general election of 1997, the Home Office 
announced sweeping reforms to the youth justice system in the White Paper No More 
Excuses (Home Office, 1997c). In the introduction to the White Paper, Home 
Secretary Jack Straw gave unequivocal support for the need for earlier legal 
intervention to make offenders face up to their social responsibility not to interfere 
with the rights of others before they get set in their ways: 
Today's young offenders can too easily become tomorrow's hardened criminals. As a society 
we do ourselves no favours by failing to break the link between juvenile crime and disorder 
and the serial burglar of the future. For too long we have assumed that that young offenders 
will grow out of their offending if left to themselves... An excuse culture has developed 
within the youth justice system. It excuses themselves for their inefficiency, and too often 
excuses the young offenders before it, implying that they cannot help their behaviour because 
of their social circumstances. Rarely arc they confronted with their behaviour and helped to 
take more personal responsibility for their actions. The system allows them to go on 
wrecking their own lives as well as disrupting their families and communities... All those 
working in the youth justice system will have a principal aim - to prevent offending... 
[through] nipping offending in the bud, to prevent crime from becoming a way of life for so 
many young people. (Home Office, 1997c: 2-3) 
The findings of Graham and Bowling (1995) and Audit Commission (1996a) were 
given substantial coverage. "A life of crime", the White Paper started in distinctive 
moral communitarian manner, denies youths "the opportunity to develop into fully 
contributing members of society" (Home Office, 1997c: 3). Emphasis was likewise 
put on a need to control the behaviour of offenders rather than provide for their social 
welfare. "Concerns about the welfare of the young person", the White Paper claimed, 
"have too often been seen as in conflict with the aims of protecting the public, 
punishing offenders and preventing offending" (para. 2.1). "The Government", it 
continued, "does not accept that there is any conflict between protecting the welfare 
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of a young offender and preventing that child from offending again. Preventing 
offending promotes the welfare of the individual young offender and protects the 
public" (para. 2.2). 
Intervention was required from as early as possible in people's 'criminal careers' "to 
halt their offending before it escalates" (para. 1.13). Youth crime would be tackled 
through the setting up of multi-agency youth offending teams. The objective of the 
teams would be to prevent offending through: "the swift administration of justice ; 
confronting young offenders with the consequences of their offending ... ; encouraging 
reparation ... ; reinforcing the responsibilities of parents; and helping young offenders 
to tackle problem's associated with their offending and to develop a sense of personal 
responsibility" (para. 2.9). The significance of the reference to helping young 
offenders to tackle problems associated with their offending should again be 
accentuated. The White Paper did refer to a number of positivist-based welfare and 
treatment programmes, but its essential vision was undoubtedly a moral 
communitarian and moreover a neoconservative one of correcting people through 
making them responsible, morally and legally, for the consequences of their 
behaviour. The White Paper's overriding preference for correcting anti-social 
behaviour through focusing on the foreground aspects of crime was explained in the 
following punitive terms: 
To respond effectively to youth crime, we must stop making excuses for children who offend. 
of course there are social, economic and family factors which affect the likelihood and the 
nature of youth crime. But understanding this helps us to comprehend, not to condone, youth 
crime. As they develop, children must bear an increasing responsibility for their actions, just 
as the responsibility of parents gradually declines but does not disappear - as their children 
approach adulthood. (Home Office, 1997c: para. 4.1) 
"Swift administration of justice" applied both to plans for quicker processing of 
persistent youth offenders through the criminal justice system (para. 7.17) and to 
plans to introduce a reprimand and final warning scheme, the latter of which would 
result in a statutory duty for the police to refer offenders to youth offending teams the 
second time they were arrested and to charge them upon their third arrest (para. 5.12). 
These plans, as Brownlee puts it, presented, "clear evidence of a shift away from 
Labour's earlier ideological commitment to non-stigmatizing, non-punitive responses 
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to offending behaviour towards an approach more firmly rooted in notions of 
deterrence through punishment" (1998: 315). The objective of quicker processing of 
persistent youth offenders was laid out in the introduction to the White Paper: 
"[d]elays in the youth justice system can frustrate and anger victims and give young 
offenders the impression they can offend with impunity" (1997: 4). The objective of 
the proposed reprimand and final warning scheme was explained in a consultation 
document that preceded the White Paper (Home Office, 1997d) in almost identical 
wording. 
"Confronting the offenders with the consequences of their offending" and "helping 
youth offenders develop a sense of personal responsibility" would be achieved 
through: giving youth courts the power to allow the names of convicted young 
offenders to be released to the public (para. 4.2); abolishing the legal presumption that 
10-13 year-olds do not have the necessary understanding of the consequences of their 
actions to be held criminally liable (para. 4.5); mentoring (para. 8.14); the 
introduction of anti-social behaviour, sex offender and child safety orders (para. 4.11); 
the introduction of curfew schemes for under 10s; and restorative justice schemes, in 
which offenders would be subject to group conference meetings with their victim and 
volunteers from their local community, and be expected to give reparation to the 
victim such as an apology, monetary compensation, and repair of any physical 
damage they had caused (para. 4.13). Restorative justice would be facilitated through: 
the final warning scheme; the introduction of a new reparation order (para. 4.14) and 
an action plan order (para. 4.16); and the inclusion of reparation as a requirement of 
existing supervision orders (para. 4.15). 
The final strand of the strategy, parental responsibility, would be reinforced through 
the introduction of a parenting order "designed to help and support parents to control 
the behaviour of their children" (I 997c, para. 4.11). The White Paper quoted research 
that claimed training parents in how to negotiate with their children through "sticking 
to clear rules and rewarding good behaviour" would halve the offending rate of youth 
offenders (para. 4.8). Parenting orders would be made available when a parent had 
been convicted of failing to get one of their children to school or when one of their 
children had been made the subject of an anti-social behaviour order, sex offender 
order, or child safety order (para. 4.11). 
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The proposals were all implemented in the Crime and Disorder Act and (in the case of 
the reprimand and final warning scheme) the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1999. The police, local authorities, probation service and health authorities were 
given a statutory duty to set up youth offending teams alongside crime prevention 
partnerships. The most striking feature of the reform of the youth justice system was 
the unequivocal support that it gave to early intervention, into 'criminal careers'. It 
was, however, its relationship to 'the turn to the local' in crime control that made the 
reforms of particular relevance to this thesis. Developments in the youth justice 
system of England and Wales, like developments in crime prevention partnerships, 
are progressing as a result of partnership between the police and other government 
and non-govenunent organisations. The emergence of crime prevention partnerships 
to deal with the spatial management of crime has, in other words, been just the first 
strand of the dispersing of responsibility for crime control from the state. The second 
strand has been partnership in correcting the behaviour of youths that have been 
arrested for minor crime. The links between the two strategies were fori-nally 
recognised in guidance provided on the Crime and Disorder Act. The Home Office 
guidance produced on implementation of the Morgan Report (see section 4.3.2), for 
instance, recommended that those setting up crime prevention partnerships should 
include youth offending teams among their partners (Home Office, 1999: paras. 1.24 
and 1.35), though this message was not repeated in guidance produced by the Local 
Government Association (NACRO and Local Government Association, 1999). The 
relationship between youth offending teams and crime prevention partnerships was 
also recognised in No More Excuses (Home Office, 1997c: para. 8.8), the consultation 
document that proceeded it (Home Office, 1997d: 3), guidance later produced for the 
setting up of youth offending teams (Home Office, 1998b: paras. 16-25), and in the 
central government guidance on the policing of anti-social behaviour discussed in the 
section 4.3.2 (Crime Concern, 1998: 11). Cooperation between crime prevention 
partnerships and youth offending teams was moreover required when parenting orders 
are served alongside anti-social behaviour orders (Home Office, 1998b: para. 4.11; 
and later, Home Office, 2003a: 22-24). 
The relationship between developments in youth justice and the 'turn to the local', as 
noted in section 2.2.2, is to be found primarily in the growing use in western youth 
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justice systems of mentoring, parent training and restorative justice, which in theory at 
least, rely on offenders correcting themselves, with the aid of acquaintances rather 
than professionals. Mentoring received scant attention in No More Excuses, which is 
not surprising considering the relative unobtrusiveness of its methodology in 
comparison to parent training and restorative justice, and the underlying punitive 
nature of the White Paper. Parent training and restorative justice, on the other hand, 
were emphasised throughout. Here the neoconservative interpretation to the dispersal 
of crime control to the public was clear to see. First and foremost, parent training and 
restorative justice were promoted in highly punitive language (cf. Hill and Wright, 
2003). Indeed, when the parenting order was originally proposed (in Labour Party, 
1996a) the neoconservative language of 'tough love' behaviour control was already 
clear (McLaughlin, 2002; Newburn, 1998). Restorative justice, on the other hand, had 
been introduced to the criminal justice system of England and Wales in 1995 as an 
alternative to, prosecution by the police (Dignan, 1999; Muncie, 1999). However, 
now, just a year later, it was being proposed that restorative justice be used within a 
system designed to make sure that offenders would be prosecuted rather than 
cautioned. 
Second, no faith was shown in the right of families to set standards of acceptable 
behaviour. The state was to retain full control of the direction that correctional 
practices should take. No mention was made of local populations being consulted on 
the issue. Guidance later'produced on parenting orders (Home Office, 2000), for 
example, was explicit on the need for state experts to define the types of behaviour a 
parent might be required to enforce, and included a list of examples of the types of 
behaviour youth offending team officers might choose from (para. 5,. 7 - cf. Home 
Office et al., 2004: para. 2.9). Parents, in other words, were to be trained to enforce 
state-defined standards of order. 
Finally, little faith was shown in the ability of communities to enforce the standards 
set eitlier. The need for state intervention was primarily premised in a need to enlist 
the population in aiding the state, and not visa versa. In the case of restorative justice, 
emphasis was put on the participation of the victim and wider local community, but 
not associates of the offender. 
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4.5. Implications 
When it came to the control of conventional crime, early legal intervention was not a 
questionable objective in the political discourse and policy guidance surrounding 
implementation o*f the Crime and Disorder Act in England and Wales. As Drakeford 
and Vanstone put it, "[t]he cheats and frauds of the benefits system, the neighbours- 
from-hell... and the persistent burglars and muggers... represent the point at which 
the administration has shown itself willing to employ directly criminal justice 
sanctions to deal with the social problems which [the undeserving poor] bring in their 
wake" (2000: 377). In this chapter it has been seen that on the balance between the 
rights of individuals and minorities and the rights of the collective majority, and 
between formal and informal social controls, on the whole national crime prevention 
policy sat on the neoconservative side of the moral communitarian fence, emphasising 
not only responsibility, but criminal, responsibility for anti-social behaviour, and 
moreover edging closer and closer towards a presumption of criminal responsibility 
for anti-social behaviour (see section 2.3.5). Emphasis was put on social liability 
'rather than social duty, on responsibility for supporting the state in the control of anti- 
social behaviour, and on removing the legal obstacles that stand in the way of the 
effective control of anti-social behaviour. Government policy on the 'turn to the local' 
in crime control demonstrated stacks of prospect for a 'widening of the net' of social 
control against the marginalised, and was premised on a vision of crime control in 
which the criminal justice system played a major role. 
It has been seen that it is as much with the depth of change to the youth justice system 
of England and Wales as with implementation of the Morgan Report that any pretence 
in national crime prevention policy that the 'turn to the local' remained a non-legal 
approach to crime control was lost. While crime prevention partnerships allowed for 
earlier and more intensive intervention into the lives of the marginalised as a whole, 
reform to the youth justice system allowed for earlier and more intensive intervention 
into the lives of individual offenders. Anti-social behaviour was presented as an 
indicator of the start of both the 'criminal decline' of areas and the 'criminal careers' 
of the people that frequent or reside within them. As emphasised throughout chapter 
two, despite the broad movement towards 'governing at a distance' in post-industrial 
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western societies, there is growing political, economic and social need for law 
enforcement, both in the interests of retaining sovereign control over territory, and as 
means of deterring and denouncing crime. These observations are returned to in 
section 6.2. 
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Chapter five 
Policing Anti-Social Behaviour in London 
This chapter presents the findings of the second phase of empirical research 
conducted during the course of this thesis. It assesses a total of twenty-six crime 
prevention policies, twenty-three covering London boroughs, and three more localised 
crime prevention policies within the borough strategy in City of Westminster. Like 
the empirical research on national crime prevention policies (analysed in chapter 
four), the object of the research on local policies was to explore the potential for crime 
prevention partnerships in England and Wales to become institutions of authoritarian 
crime control. This was likewise addressed through investigating whether structural 
and political pressure on the local to become a site of earlier and more intensive 
intervention into the lives of the marginalised is reflected in crime prevention policies. 
The research question addressed during empirical research was examined in section 
3.2. It was explained that the research was designed to address whether the 
weaknesses in the model of crime control adopted in moral communitarian literature 
on crime control are reflected in national and local crime prevention policies. Six 
weaknesses were identified from the literature review. To repeat the summary of the 
research question given in the introduction to chapter four, these related to the 
emphasis that moral communitarianism puts on controlling conventional rather than 
non-conventional crime, controlling anti-social behaviour as well as serious crime, 
managing offenders as well as supporting offenders and dealing with their 
motivations for crime, managing crime back through law enforcement as well as 
physical and social security, and enforcing civil and public as well as criminal laws; 
and doubt that crime prevention partnerships are sufficiently localised to allow 'top 
down' pressures to be resisted 'on the ground'. 
In chapter four it was seen that the potential for the local to become a site of 
authoritarian crime control came to the fore in guidance produced by the Government 
on implementing the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. As explained in section 3.2, the 
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object of extending the empirical research from national crime prevention policies to 
local crime prevention policies was to allow for a vertical study of the effect of 
structural and political trends in crime control on crime prevention. The point was 
made that while those forming policies for local partnerships are likely to be 
influenced by national crime prevention policies as well as macro ideologies, at the 
same time they make decisions affecting the particular areas they work and live in, 
and so are likely to be influenced by their interpretation of local needs as well as the 
needs of society as a whole. Furthermore, in comparison to national crime prevention 
policy making, there is a greater chance that the voices of youths, marginalised 
communities, and practitioners that work 'on the ground' and interact with local 
youths and marginalised communities on a day to day basis will be heard. 
The empirical research on local crime prevention policy was conducted in three 
stages. These are outlined in sections 3.2 and 3.3.2. To summarise the key points that 
were made about the methods used to obtain empirical data. The first and latter stages 
of research, conducted in January 1998 and April 1999, involved postal surveys of 
London boroughs. Information was requested on formal cooperation between local 
authority departments and the police in crime prevention in their borough, and any 
related crime audits and documents on consultation with the public. The documents 
that were received as a result of the surveys of London boroughs are listed in 
appendix one. In the first survey, documents were acquired from nine authorities. A 
further thirteen boroughs indicated that they did not have crime prevention policies. 
Twelve local authorities did not reply. All of the nine authorities that were involved in 
crime prevention partnerships included copies of their crime prevention policies. Five 
boroughs also provided crime audits. Five boroughs also provided information on 
public consultation, though insufficient data was provided on the types of 
organisations or individuals that had been consulted to allow for any meaningful 
conclusions to be made. The documents that were received during this survey are 
analysed in section 5.1. In the second survey, documents were received from twenty- 
one of the thirty-three London boroughs. All but three included copies of crime audits 
and public consultation documents as well as their crime prevention policies. These 
documents are analysed in section 5.2. As will be seen, the quantity of documents 
received during the second survey allowed for detailed analysis of all aspects of the 
research question. Not only was it possible to draw conclusions on the approach to 
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crime prevention taken by twenty-one partnerships, but these partnerships covered 
local authority areas with a wide range of political and socio-demographic features. 
For example, thirteen of the partnerships were in boroughs controlled by the Labour 
Party, six controlled by the Conservative Party, and one by the Liberal Democrat 
Party. Population figures recorded in the 1991 census ranged from 154,000 
(Kensington and Chelsea) to 331,000 (Croydon), while minority ethnic populations 
ranged from five percent (Bromley) to forty-five percent (Brent), and levels of 
unemployment ranged from six percent (Bexley) to twenty percent (Hackney). 
Finally, crime figures recorded by the Metropolitan Police in 1995/6 ranged from 75 
per 100,000 residents (Barnet) to 3 84 (Westminster). 
The second stage of the research, conducted between July 1998 and April 1999, 
involved fieldwork in Westminster. The fieldwork focused on: collecting crime 
prevention documents from organisations represented on groups (the steering groups) 
formulating policies for the partnership's borough strategy and for three pilot projects 
covering a police sector and two housing estates; observations of steering group 
meetings, public consultation events, and meetings of individual organisations 
represented on the groups; and interviews with individual practitioners and residents 
that had attended meetings. The object of analysing the borough crime prevention 
strategy was two-fold: to provide a detailed illustration of what the future of the 'turn 
to the local' in crime control might entail if it moves in an authoritarian direction, and 
to serve as an aid to interpreting the data obtained from other partnerships in London, 
and during fieldwork on the three pilot projects in Westminster. 
5.1. Crime Prevention in the Mid 1990s 
The first point that needs to be made concerning the first survey of crime prevention 
partnerships in London is that the majority of the documents expressed holistic 
visions of crime control. Four partnerships (Brent; Croydon; Haringey; Harrow) made 
no reference whatsoever to criminal law enforcement or legal orders, while two other 
partnerships mentioned them only in the context of prostitution (Tower Hamlets) or 
racial harassment (Sutton; Tower Hamlets). Moreover, the documents of these six 
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boroughs were broadly humanitarian in emphasis. In their discussion of youth crime, 
for example, focus was put as much on children's vulnerability as potential victims as 
on their vulnerability to becoming involved in crime, and as much emphasis was put 
on correctional controls as spatial controls, including welfare-orientated correctional 
controls such as education and training. Of the six partnerships, three provided 
definitions of the parameters of 'community safety, none of which referred to law 
enforcement: 
Community safety incorporates physical measures to reduce the opportunity to commit 
crime, and social measures to reduce the causes of crime. (Haringey) 
We use the term "community safety" as being concerned with: addressing the causes of crime 
and criminal behaviour, understanding and reducing the fear of crime; improving physical 
security and reducing the opportunities for crime; supporting victims of crime; working with 
perpetrators of crime to prevent further crimes. (Croydon) 
The strategic group will develop strategies aimed at providing a balanced portfolio of 
community safety initiatives, some short-term, some long-term, including both social and 
situational measures... (Harrow) 
one surprising finding was that five of these six partnerships (Croydon; Haringey; 
Harrow; Sutton; Tower Hamlets) focused almost exclusively on serious crime. Terms 
such as anti-social behaviour, disorder, nuisance, incivility and 'quality of life crimes' 
were not mentioned, and while the term harassment was encountered in several of the 
documents, it was not used outside the context of racially motivated crime. One of the 
partnerships (Sutton) used the term 'zero tolerance', but in the context of domestic 
violence rather than anti-social behaviour. This use of the term 'zero tolerance' 
reflected its original use by local authorities in Scotland in the early 1990s (see e. g. 
the Guardian, 25 October 1994). 
The apparent rejection by these partnerships of the moral communitarian emphasis on 
, defining anti-social behaviour up' as a problem of crime was reflected in an absence 
of reference to the 'third-way' emphasis on the informal social controls of 
geographical communities. This was also the case with the sixth of the partnerships 
not to advocate law enforcement (Brent). Most interesting of all, the partnership did 
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so despite implicit reference to the purported link between anti-social behaviour and 
serious crime. It was explained that it was important to focus on anti-social behaviour 
in order to maintain "an attractive and orderly environment", as: 
... the physical appearance of a neighbourhood can affect the 
behaviour of people in that 
neighbourhood e. g. if an area is covered in graffiti, abandoned cars, fly posters and rubbish, 
then this will encourage further deterioration of the area and create a climate of neglect and 
fear among residents. 
However, despite referring to the fear of crime, the partnership went on to restrict its 
analysis of the means of achieving an attractive and orderly environment to physical 
security, including rapid clean-up of graffiti, removal of abandoned cars, and repair of 
damaged property by housing and environmental health departments, and 
66neighbourhood pride clean ups" by the public. The partnership's interpretation of the 
'broken windows' thesis was, in other words, limited to its most basic point: that 
poorly maintained physical environments send out the message that an area is not 
worth caring for. This interpretation of the 'broken windows' thesis formed the basis 
of the original experiment that Wilson and Kelling (1982) based their analysis of the 
link between anti-social behaviour and serious crime on, in which a car was left 
apparently abandoned to see whether it would eventually be vandalised (see section 
2.3.4). The experiment bad been designed to test the link between crime and the 
spatial regulation of potential enticements to crime, and not the link later investigated 
by Wilson and Kelling between crime and the spatial regulation of potential 
offenders. In section 4.1.2 it was explained that it is the latter, offender-orientated 
interpretation of the thesis that lies at the heart of the potential for crime prevention 
partnerships to become authoritarian institutions of crime control. 
As emphasised in section 3.3.3, in the absence of further empirical research it is not 
possible to conclude that the six partnerships were influenced by an awareness of the 
weaknesses of the model of crime prevention that had been developed through the 
Home Office and the estate projects of NACRO and the Department of the 
Environment in the 1980s (see sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2). Nonetheless, the observation 
that the strategies of six of the nine partnerships analysed did not include law 
enforcement in their analysis of disorder control, and that five did not even promote a 
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need to control anti-social behaviour at all, stood in complete contrast to each and 
every post-Morgan national crime prevention document reviewed for chapter four 
(see sections 4.2 and 4.3). 
The approach taken by two of the three partnerships that gave space for an 
authoritarian approach to crime control (Bexley; Hackney; Lewisham) was equally 
surprising. Two (Hackney and Lewisham) identified law enforcement as the primary 
response'to anti-social behaviour. Both based their approach on the 'broken windows' 
thesis, Hackney, for example, explaining: 
Anti-social behaviour is not necessarily a contravention of the law, but is behaviour which is 
outside 'commonly held standards'... These problems are not simply annoying but can affect 
the quality of life, add to the general fear of crime or can lead to threatening situations 
between neighbours. Research hasindicated links between anti-social behaviour and levels of 
residential crime. Visible signs of neighbourhood deterioration have a negative effect on 
perceptions of safety, affect people's relationships with one another and can create an 
environment where crime can thrive. 
In true moral communitarian fashion, the partnership went on to explain that law 
enforcement was needed to "restore a sense of belonging and control" to the public. 
The partnership did not promote criminal law enforcement. Instead, it gave pride of 
place to the ability of the housing department to evict "troublemakers". 
Lewisham was less explicit on the purported connection between unchecked anti- 
social behaviour and serious crime, but was just as clear on the need to resort to law in 
residential areas with high levels of "disorder and antisocial behaviour": 
... we will investigate strategies 
for taking effective action against the perpetrators of minor 
crime and persistent nuisance. This will be a long-term piece of work, but we hope to be able 
to generate some measurable reductions in both antisocial and criminal behaviour in 
residential areas quite rapidly using a combination of both police and council powers. 
The crime prevention documents o. f Hackney and Lewisham therefore stood in sharp 
contrast to those of Brent, Croydon, Haringey, Harrow, Sutton and Tower Hamlets. 
The potential for the local to become a site of authoritarian crime control was clearly 
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evident in the vision of crime prevention was laid out by the two partnerships. Not 
only did their crime prevention documents 'define anti-social behaviour up' as a 
problem of crime, but they prioritised law enforcement over physical and social 
security as the most appropriate means of responding to anti-social behaviour. 
5.2. Implementing the Crime and Disorder Act 
In the second survey of London boroughs, five partnerships (Camden, Lewisham, 
Merton, Wandsworth and Westminster) put law enforcement on a par with physical 
and social security. Four partnerships (Camden; Merton; Wandsworth; Westminster) 
stood out. as promoting criminal law enforcement as well as legal orders. Of the other 
partnerships, nine (Barnet; Bromley; Hammersmith and Fulham; Harrow; Hillingdon; 
Kensington and Chelsea; Newham; Richmond; Tower Hamlets) focused on physical 
and social security, but nonetheless emphasised that law enforcement should play a 
role in the control of anti-social behaviour. Seven partnerships (Brent; Enfield; 
Greenwich; Haringey; Hounslow; Redbridge; Southwark) did not promote criminal 
law enforcement or legal orders in the context of anti-social behaviour beyond the 
limited context of racial harassment. Enfield and Greenwich stood out as the only 
partnerships not to promote law enforcement as a means of controlling anti-social 
behaviour at all. Finally, in contrast to the decision of fourteen of the twenty-one 
partnerships to promote law enforcement in the context of conventional anti-social 
behaviour, only three partnerships (Hillingdon; Hounslow; Tower Hamlets) included 
mediation schemes. 
Only six partnerships gave definitions of 'community safety'. Of these, four referred 
directly or indirectly to law enforcement, two of which came from the partnerships 
that had put most emphasis on law: 
Our definition of community safety is and always will be broad. We see it including all 
action which protects citizens from the criminal or anti-social behaviour of others and 
enables them to pursue and obtain the fullest benefits from their lives without the fear or 
hindrance of crime and disorder. (Camden) 
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Our long-term plan of action, is based on tackling the underlying causes of crime such as 
deprivation and poor life chances, family breakdown, truancy and social exclusion. But it 
also includes, in the shorter term, taking firm and effective action to deal with those who 
commit crime and introducing measures to improve security, such as the use of CCTV 
cameras. (Lewisham) 
The other two definitions of community safety came from partnerships that had given 
law enforcement a secondary role in crime prevention: 
'Me objectives contain a strategy mix embracing enforcement, both situational and social 
crime prevention, and support of the criminal justice system. (Kensington and Chelsea) 
The approach adopted is derived from audit conclusions that a strategy aimed at substantive 
crime reduction must aim to put in place an integrated programme which balances short term 
crime reduction with longer term prevention aimed at addressing the underlying causes of 
crime and disorder in local communities... action to improve the management and policing of 
the built environment, work to prevent re-offending and longer term investment... 
(Southwark) 
The following review of the content of the documents obtained from the partnerships 
is divided into six sections. The first, The Problem of Disorder, is concerned with the 
representation of crime in the audits. The next two sections, The Problem of Disorder 
Control and Early Intervention into Criminal Areas, explore the relevance of law 
enforcement to the partnerships' visions of crime control, as presented in the audits 
and also in the strategies eventually formed. The fourth section, Early Intervention 
into Criminal Careers, explores the relevance of the (authoritarian) control of 
individual offenders to the partnerships' visions of crime control. It focuses on the 
approach partnerships took to implementing the provisions in the Crime and Disorder 
Act on the setting up of youth offending teams, and the proposed introduction of the 
reprimand and final warning scheme in the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Bill. 
The fifth section, Policing Anti-social Behaviour in Westminster, presents the 
findings of the first aspect of the fieldwork conducted during the course of this 
doctoral thesis. The last section, 'Preaching to the Converted', deals with the 
approach that the partnerships took to consultation with local residents. 
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S. Z. 1. The Problem of Disorder 
Two points need to be made concerning the representation of crime in the audits 
produced by the partnerships. First is the overwhelming emphasis put on conventional 
crime. There were a couple of exceptions to this. Levels of racial harassment were 
given by many partnerships, most from official statistics, but some from complaints to 
housing departments. Further, many partnerships provided data on levels of domestic 
violence from official statistics. However, few went on to analyse what was being 
done about racial harassment and domestic violence. Moreover, in the case of 
domestic violence, none gave figures from complaints to social service departments or 
to voluntary support groups. As Saraga (2001) stresses, the extent of domestic 
violence is notoriously underestimated in official statistics. Of more importance still, 
no data was provided on white-collar crime by any of the partnerships. Nor did a 
single partnership provide data on complaints of excessive or discriminatory use of 
power by government institutions. With little exception, the problem of crime was 
presented as a problem of conventional crime. 
Second is. the representation of the nature of the problem of conventional crime by the 
partnerships. All based their vision of crime control on the moral communitarian view 
that anti-social behaviour should be 'defined up' as a problem of crime. This was 
evident in a number of characteristics again common to the audits of the partnerships 
as a whole, regardless of the emphasis they put on law enforcement. First, most 
partnerships divided 999 calls between those that related to serious crime and those 
that related to anti-social behaviour, emphasising the moral communitarian view that 
the problem of crime is a problem of disorder. Second, levels of fear of crime were 
quoted from the latest annual residents survey conducted by the Association of Local 
Government to cover their borough, this time emphasising the moral communitarian 
view that fear of crime is as important an area of concern as crime itself. Third, police 
statistics were generally broken down between adult and youth offenders, 
emphasising the moral communitarian view that the problem of crime is largely a 
problem of youth. Finally, rates of truancy and exclusion were quoted alongside levels 
of youth deprivation, emphasising the neoconservative communitarian view that anti- 
social behaviour and deprivation are both symptoms of inadequate socialisation. 
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Aside from these similarities, there were significant differences in the way that the 
partnerships presented the problem of crime in their boroughs that corresponded to the 
extent that they promoted law enforcement for the purpose of controlling anti-social 
behaviour. For instance, each of the seven least authoritarian partnerships gave equal 
weight to youth victimisation as youth crime. Hounslow, for example, included the 
results of a victimisation survey of 600 school children. Of equal significance, none of 
the seven partnerships provided data on complaints of anti-social behaviour to 
housing or environmental health departments. Furthermore, while all of the 
partnerships -emphasised the effect of fear of crime on people's quality of life, none 
did so in the context of anti-social behaviour. 
The danger of the 'partnership approach' resulting in the local becoming a site of 
authoritarian crime control was clear to see in the audits of the five most authoritarian 
partnerships, however. For example, three (Camden; Westminster; Wandsworth) 
quoted data from numerous sources to highlight the effect of anti-social behaviour on 
people's quality of life. Westminster, for instance, quoted figures on the number of 
noise complaints received by its environmental health department, the number of 
reports of illegal street trading for which prosecution had been recommended, and 
"incidences of anti-social behaviour" recorded by park managers. Wandsworth gave 
figures on bye-law infractions and the incidences of graffiti, litter, fly posting and 
abandoned cars that had been dealt with. Unlike Westminster, Wandsworth did not 
provide figures on complaints of anti-social behaviour to its housing or environmental 
health department, but stressed that protocols for collecting such data needed to be 
developed. Merton did not provide any statistics on anti-social behaviour, but 
emphasised that youth crime and disorder was more of a problem in the borough than 
in London as a whole. 
5.2.2. The Problem of Disorder Control 
The punitive presentation of crime in the audits produced by Camden, Lewisham, 
Merton, Westminster and Wandsworth was equalled by the authoritarian presentation 
of crime control in the crime prevention strategies that followed. Here, four aspects of 
the documents analysed are of particular importance to the potential for the 
I 
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6partnership approach' to become an extension of the 'enforcement approach' of the 
criminal justice system: the lack of precedence given to dealing with the underlying 
causes of anti-social behaviour, the emphasis put on public reporting of anti-social 
behaviour, the apparent focus on delivering the 'enforcement approach' to crime 
control through highly localised partnerships, and the emphasis put on resorting to 
legal orders as well as (or more often instead of) criminal law enforcement. 
The first issue concerns the emphasis put on holding back anti-social behaviour. This 
related not only to the relative priority given to physical security and law enforcement 
over social work, but also the types of social work that were advanced. When social 
work was promoted in the context of anti-social behaviour, more emphasis was put on 
managing offenders rather than dealing with the underlying causes of their anti-social 
behaviour. With the exception of supporting residents' groups and neighbourhood 
watch groups (covered in a moment), discussion of the role of social workers centred 
almost exclusively on the issue of youth disorder. Typical initiatives included the 
provision of summer leisure schemes, the use of outreach youth workers, citizenship 
progranu-nes in schools, and the reduction of truancy and exclusions from school. On 
the whole, the more authoritarian partnerships put less emphasis on social work as a 
whole, and where they did include social work, they were less likely to include 
initiatives designed to deal with the underlying causes of crime alongside initiatives 
designed to keep potential offenders away from criminal temptations and under 
supervision, mirroring the findings on the pre Crime and Disorder Act partnerships 
studied. Three of the five most authoritarian partnerships failed to include social work 
in their discussion of anti-social behaviour at all outside the context of residents' and 
neighbourhood watch groups. Of the two that did, one (Lewisham) only referred to 
existing central government schemes operating in the borough that aimed to increase 
educational and employment opportunities. 
Second, - all of the partnerships referred to public involvement in crime control, and 
consistent with the emphasis put on the spatial control of anti-social behaviour, all but 
three partnerships referre 'd 
to collective action by geographical communities through 
residents or neighbourhood watch groups. Seven partnerships (Bromley; 
Hammersmith and Fulham; Kensington and Chelsea; Lewisham; Richmond; 
Wandsworth; Westminster) emphasised a need to encourage the public to report 
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incidences of anti-social behaviour to the police and local authority housing 
departments, while another three (Brent; Hounslow; Redbridge) did so in the specific 
context of racial harassment. Five (Bromley; Lewisham; Merton; Wandsworth, 
Westminster) went on to include provisions for witness protection. Westminster gave 
most detail on this 'eyes and ears' approach: 
There are 1,642 police officers in Westminster. We are exploring ways to strengthen this 
number by using council officers as additional eyes and ears on the street to report crime and 
nuisance problems. The council employs 5,451 people, so this could make a big difference. 
However, the figure is small when the number of residents living in Westminster is 
considered - 212,300. For every police officer there are 129 residents, who can all help by 
reporting crime and nuisance problems... 
Wandsworth likewise stressed the role that neighbourhood watch could play in the 
"reporting of graffiti and vandalism". The community safety officer at Wandsworth 
boasted that the borough was the only one in London with local authority support for 
neighbourhood watch schemes, and that the partnership aimed to have 1000 schemes 
in operation by the end of 1998 (field notes, 30 April 1997). 
Indeed, more partnerships promoted the neoconservative emphasis on recruiting the 
population as the 'eyes and cars' of state social control than the 'third-way' emphasis 
on recruiting the population as the 'oars' of the state. Only four (Bromley; Hillingdon; 
Hounslow; Southwark) referred to direct public involvement in offender-orientated 
crime control. The influence of the 'third-way' communitarian vision of non- 
authoritarian crime control was evident among these four partnerships. Hillingdon, for 
instance, wrote of the need to "reduce crime and disorder [in public areas], utilising 
measures including re-design and treatment of the physical environment, bringing it 
more under the control of residents". Detail was not given on how residents might 
control their spatial environments, however. Bromley, Hounslow and Southwark were 
more specific, and devoted whole sections of their crime prevention strategies to the 
issue, under the headings Strengthening Communities (Southwark), Strengthening 
Local Communities (Bromley) and Increasing Community Involvement and Reducing 
the Fear of Crime (Hounslow). Like Hillingdon, the three partnerships emphasised the 
need to embolden the public by building up residents' groups. Each focused primarily 
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on the role that neighbourhood watch plays in informal social control. Bromley was 
most specific: 
Local communities and the people who live in them have a major part to play in keeping their 
localities safe and free from anti-social behaviour. Neighbourhood watch enables local 
people to get together and keep their neighbourhoods; safe. 
None were among the five most authoritarian partnerships. It was not surprising that 
Camden, Lewisham, Merton, Westminster and Wandsworth did not promote the 
informal social controls of geographical communities. As emphasised in section 2.3.5, 
the neoconservative vision of crime control expresses little faith in the right or ability 
of the public to set and enforce standards of acceptable behaviour. That just four of 
the other partnerships did not go on to do so was unexpected, however. Like the 
silence on the issue in pre Crime and Disorder Act strategies, it was possible that 
partnerships were aware of the weaknesses of the 'tblrd-way' communitarian model 
of crime control. However, it was not possible to come to any concrete conclusion 
with the data to hand. Just as important as the absence of reference to the informal 
social controls of geographical communities was the failure of partnerships to provide 
detail on the role that residents and neighbourbood watch groups were to play in 
crime control, in other words the absence of detail on what else, other than acting as 
the 'eyes and ears' of the state, residents' and neighbourhood watch groups were 
being encouraged to do. Enfield was the only partnership to emphasise the role that 
geographical communities play in crime control, stressing the need to "empower the 
community" to take responsibility for its physical environment. This would be 
achieved through the setting up of "resident teams" to clean up graffiti and repair 
vandalised property. It was explained, "[c]rime is just one among a host of inter- 
related problems that impact quality of life issues. We are committed to working with 
local people to address specific local crime problems, nuisance and other factors that 
combine to make areas 'unattractive', and affect 'quality of life"'. 
The influence of moral communitarian interpretations of crime control on the majority 
of the partnerships studied was also apparent in the second issue focused on in this 
section. Six partnerships (Bromley; Enfield; Greenwich; Lewisham; Merton; 
Westminster) included more localised crime prevention strategies within their 
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borough strategies. Three (Lewisham; Merton; Westminster) were among the five 
most authoritarian partnerships, but two (Enfield; Greenwich) were among the seven 
partnerships not to promote an authoritarian approach to crime control at all. 
Critically, Lewisham, Merton and Westminster promoted law enforcement in equal 
measure as their borough strategies. This had not been anticipated by the review of 
national crime prevention policy. Although the Government had provided guidance 
on implementation of the Crime and Disorder Act that promoted resort to law on 
disorderly housing estates (see section 4.3.2), law enforcement had only played a 
minor role in the estate projects of NACRO and the Department of the Environment 
in the 1980s (see section 4.1.2). In the discussion of the estate projects, the point was 
made that while crime prevention partnerships are more likely to become sites for the 
realisation of just and inclusive criminal policy the more localised they are, it remains 
imperative that they are run by institutions with non-authoritarian visions of crime 
control. What had not been anticipated was that localised strategies might be just as 
authoritarian as borough ones. 
The significance of this failure to find . an inverse pattern between the inclusion of 
localised crime prevention initiatives partnerships and authoritarian crime control was 
reinforced by two other factors. The first was that two of the three partnerships to 
include strategies as localised as individual housing estates (Lewisham; Westminster) 
were also among the most authoritarian of boroughs. Second was that these two 
partnerships appeared to have chosen to include localised crime prevention strategies 
as a consequence of their decision to take an authoritarian approach to crime control. 
The partnership at Lewisham explained: 
... victims of anti-social 
behaviour in residential areas told us they wanted more action taken 
against offenders... Our Housing and Disorder Groups will provide a forum for decision 
making between partners in respect of obtaining Anti-Social Behaviour Orders, Child 
Curfews, Child Safety Orders, Parenting Orders and other legislation... Victim surveys and 
victim support groups will be used to encourage reporting of incidents, enable the gathering 
of evidence against persistent perpetrators and to provide support to isolated victims so that 
they feel able to go to court... We will target those estates with the worst problems. 
The partnership at Westminster was less explicit. Unlike other boroughs, Westminster 
planned to produce localised strategies covering the whole of the borough as well as 
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targeted housing estates. This has already been explained (see section 3.2). The part of 
the document that introduced the proposal explained only that "[e]ach area of 
Westminster experiences different crime and nuisance problems". The link between 
local strategies and law enforcement was made clear in the part of the strategy that 
dealt with anti-social behaviour in residential areas. Law enforcement would focus on 
tackling "crime and nuisance problems... identified by the local community safety 
plans". This message was reinforced when the partnership explained its support for an 
4eyes and ears' approach to crime control. The extract from the proposals quoted 
earlier in this section finished with the words "... and by participating in 
Neighbourhood Watch schemes and local community safety plans". 
The last point that needs to be focused on concerning the emphasis that partnerships 
put on authoritarian crime control is the priority given to legal orders over criminal 
law enforcement. As noted in section 5.2, only four partnerships (Camden; Merton; 
Wandsworth; Westminster) mentioned the police power of arrest in the context of 
anti-social behaviour, compared to nineteen that included the use of legal orders. 
Moreover, little attention was given to criminal law enforcement in comparison to 
legal orders. Merton referred to criminal law enforcement in the specific context of 
youth disorder (covered in section 5.2.4), while Camden only made a brief reference 
to "the arrest and detection of perpetrators [of anti-social behaviour]". Westminster's 
reference to criminal law enforcement was only made in the specific context of 
advertising sexual services in telephone boxes. Finally, the only clear reference to 
criminal law enforcement in the context of anti-social behaviour made by 
Wandsworth was an "enforcement strategy to prevent aggressive cycling on 
footpaths". It also promised a "campaign to crack down on traders using the 
highway to display vehicles for sale, registered keepers of abandoned vehicles and 
owners of untaxed vehicles". Such commercial activities are, in theory, criminal 
offences, but as noted in section 4.2.1, may also attract abatement notices available 
under the Environmental Protection Act 1990 and the Town and Country Planning 
Act 1990. To repeat a point made in section 2.2, it is the use of legal orders as 
weapons of crime control rather than criminal law that poses most danger to the 
egalitarian vision of the 'turn to the local' in crime control. Not only does the 
incorporating of legal orders into criminal policy bring with it the resources of 
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institutions not traditionally associated with the criminal justice system, but it allows 
for the punishment of behaviour not traditionally covered by criminal law, and under 
evidential procedures that traditionally fall below those required by the criminal 
courts. 
While it is important to get a feel for the range of legal orders promoted, it is not 
necessary to go into depth on which targets they were advanced for at every borough. 
Most focused on injunctions, evictions and anti-social behaviour orders, though a 
number included the use of abatement notices, and several partnerships also included 
separate sections on the use of legal orders to deal with racial harassment, reflecting 
the approach taken by the estate projects of the 1980s run by NACRO (see section 
4.1.2). Wandsworth and Westminster took the most extensive approaches. 
Westminster referred to using abatement notices, injunctions and possession orders 
against council tenants. Wandsworth promised, among other things, the maintenance 
of a "vigorous, high-profile approach to tackling noise nuisance, making full use of 
publicity through the media", to "further develop eviction procedures, including the 
use of anti-social behaviour orders, for tenants convicted of drug dealing and/or 
involved in anti-social behaviour", and to "review existing approach to tackling 
abandoned vehicles to explore whether further powers are. available, particularly 
with regard to being able to pursue registered keepers for the cost of removal and 
disposal" - 
5.2.3. Early Intervention into Disorderly Areas 
Three more issues remain to be dealt with in order to fully explore the potential that 
the research on individual crime prevention partnerships in London revealed for the 
local to become a site of authoritarian crime control. The first two concern the extent 
partnerships based their promotion of (primarily civil and public) law enforcement 
with the need for early intervention in mind. This section explores the extent that law 
enforcement was promoted under the 'broken windows' thesis. It serves as a 
continuation of the issues for analysis identified in the introduction to section 5.2.2. 
The chapter then moves on to explore whether law enforcement was also promoted as 
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a means of controlling individual offenders. The final section looks at the means that 
the partnerships used to consult the public on their audits of crime and crime control. 
Of the five most authoritarian partnerships, two (Merton; Wandsworth) made direct or 
indirect reference to the 'broken windows' thesis. Merton's was short and indirect. It 
stated the claims made under the thesis that there is a link between anti-social 
behaviour and fear of serious crime, and that areas with high levels of anti-social 
behaviour tend to also be areas of high rates of serious crime, but it did not explain 
how fear of crime is purported to reduce the ability of the public to control their 
spatial environments, or how unchecked anti-social behaviour is purported to result in 
areas 'spiralling into criminal decline'. Wandsworth's adherence to the 'broken 
windows' thesis was clearer. On the issue of the fear of crime, particular alarin was 
expressed on begging and drinking in public: 
While the numbers of those involved is relatively small, [begging and drinking in public] 
give rise to a fear of crime on the part of the general public... [They) are thought to give an 
unquantifiable perception on the part of visitors that these areas are unsafe or "going 
downhill"... There is a need to address the issues both to achieve a reduction in fear of crime 
and to enhance the attractiveness of the locations concerned. 
And on the link between anti-social behaviour and serious crime, it was explained: 
Quality of life crime problems in local areas may be associated with, or lead on to, threats or 
crimes of violence. There is work to be done to ensure that [these concerns] are picked up at 
an early stage by all agencies that could be in a position to take action. 
Camden, Westminster and Lewisham, on the other hand, treated serious crime and 
anti-social behaviour as different areas of concern. Anti-social behaviour was not 
referred to in the context of serious crime, and serious crime was not referred to in the 
context of anti-social behaviour. Westminster mentioned the link between fear of anti- 
social behaviour and serious crime, but only to stress that anti-social behaviour gave 
people the perception that serious crime was higher in the area that it actually was. 
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Three of the other nineteen partnerships to give some space in their crime prevention 
strategies for law enforcement (Hillingdon; Hounslow; Richmond) demonstrated that 
they had done so with the 'broken windows' thesis in mind: 
Neglected and vandalised areas can allow a fear of crime to develop, which discourages 
people from venturing out with confidence. Frequent gatherings of noisy and unruly groups 
can also be intimidating. If allowed to persist unchecked, these elements result in a climate 
where criminal behaviour occurs routinely and communities endure a poor quality of life. 
(Hillingdon) - 
Disorder and nuisance affects the quality of life of the people of Hounslow and contributes to 
crime and the fear of crime. (Hounslow) 
There are a number of actions, which, while not criminal, if not curbed, can engender an 
environment where crime can flourish. Anti social behaviour, such as vandalism and 
nuisance can become threatening and escalate into crime, as well as leading to deterioration 
in the fabric of the local environment, giving greater opportunities for crime and increasing 
the fear of crime. (Richmond) 
Finally, one other partnership (Newham) mentioned the issue of fear of serious crime 
in the context of focusing law enforcement on anti-social behaviour, but like 
Westminster did so in order to make the point that anti-social behaviour gave a false 
impression of levels of serious crime: 
In many aspects, anti-social behaviour and nuisance strongly influence perceptions of he 
scale of crime problems in residential areas more than the more serious types of crime 
because of its "visibility" - particularly in relation to criminal damage, groups of disruptive 
young people hanging about and anti-social neighbours. 
In total, then, five partnerships based their vision of authoritarian crime control on a 
need to prevent disorderly areas becoming areas with high levels of serious crime, two 
of which were among the most authoritarian, but one of which (Hounslow) was 
among the least authoritarian. These indirect references to the 'broken windows' 
thesis were not unexpected, considering the fact that the thesis had been at the heart of 
both the estate projects of the 1980s (see section 4.1.2), much local government 
advice on the development of crime prevention partnerships in the mid 1990s (see 
section 4.2.1), and central government guidance on implementation of the Crime and 
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Disorder Act (see section 4.3.2). Nevertheless, they gave further weight to the 
strength of the conclusion that on the whole the crime prevention partnerships studied 
in London were showing dangerous signs of moving towards the neoconservative 
emphasis on early law enforcement, to facilitate and supplement the informal social 
controls of the public before areas become so disorderly that residents lose control of 
them altogether. 
S. Z4. Early Intervention into 'Criminal Careers' 
The last aspect of the crime prevention strategies relevant to the potential for 'the 
partnership approach' extending rather than acting as an alternative to the 
genforcement approach' of the criminal justice system is the extent that law 
enforcement was promoted in the context of intervening early into the 'criminal 
careers' of individual offenders. 
All of the partnerships included central government plans to intervene earlier into the 
scriminal careers' of youth offenders in their crime prevention strategies. As noted in 
section 4.4, this was the result of the police and local authorities being given a joint 
statutory obligation under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 to set up youth offending 
teams as well as crime prevention partnerships. The object of introducing youth 
offending teams was to administer an incoming reprimand and final warning scheme, 
under which the right of the police to repeatedly caution youth offenders was to be 
replaced with a system which would subject youths to voluntary supervision upon 
their second arrest, and to swift prosecution and obligatory supervision upon their 
third arrest if they pleaded guilty and were given a community penalty. 
In section 3.3.3 it was pointed out that it was not always possible to draw concrete 
conclusions from the documents studied. In a few cases, the partnership did little 
more than state that they would be implementing the youth justice provisions of the 
Crime and Disorder Act. In other cases, detail was given on what the reforms were 
designed to achieve, but this was mostly paraphrased and at times directly quoted 
from the White Paper that had proposed the legal and policy changes (Home Office, 
1997c), or else from central government guidance on the setting up of youth offending 
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teams that was subsequently produced (e. g. Home Office, 1998b). Of importance was 
that all but one of the partnerships that conclusions could be drawn from (Enfield, 
returned to in section 5.2.7) demonstrated support for the central government message 
that youth offenders needed to be prosecuted earlier in their criminal careers in order 
to 'nip their criminal careers in the bud'. This included the five most authoritarian 
partnerships. Merton was clearest, explaining, "[flhere are public concerns about 
[youth] involvement in disorder and anti-social behaviour. We are more likely to be 
successful in diverting young people from crime than adults, and the benefits will be 
longer-lasting". As noted in section 5.2.2, Merton went on take the radical step of 
promoting increased resort to criminal law enforcement in the context of minor youth 
crime. It promised to take "swift and effective enforcement action against young 
offendere', through "intelligence-led policing operations". 
The final point of note is the recognition of the Government's focus on managing 
youth offenders rather than dealing with the underlying issues thaf led them to offend 
in the first place. Most partnerships did not describe the work of youth offending 
teams, but of those that did, reference was made to restorative justice, mentoring and 
parent training, though not to cognitive behavioural therapy. Westminster, for 
example, wrote that it would "use reparation so that young offenders understand the 
consequences of their actions, [and] involve parents and carers in taking responsibility 
for their children's offending". This, of course, was not unexpected considering the 
lack of emphasis that the partnerships had likewise put on offenders' welfare in the 
context of crime prevention. 
5.2.5. Policing Anti-Social Behaviour in Westminster 
Before looking at the approach that the partnerships took to public consultation, it is 
useful to pause for a moment to take a more detailed look at the approach to 
controlling anti-social behaviour taken by Westminster. It has already been explained 
that the extended research on the borough strategy at Westminster served two 
purposes. The first was to illustrate what the 'turn to the local' in crime control is 
likely to entail if, as the review of national crime prevention policy warned that it has 
the potential of doing, it results in the legal powers of local authorities being 
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incorporated into criminal policy. The second purpose was to enable the researcher to 
gain a deeper understanding of inter-agency cooperation in crime control and the 
culture of the different organisations involved. This served as a useful aid to 
interpreting the data obtained on the other crime prevention partnerships in London, 
and also the data obtained through fieldwork on the police sector and estate 
partnerships in Westminster. 
To summarise the main findings of the second survey of London boroughs so far, the 
potential for the local to become a site of authoritarian crime control was evident in 
the crime prevention documents of fourteen of the twenty-one partnerships reviewed. 
The audits were predominantly concerned'with conventional crime, and 'defined anti- 
social behaviour up' as a problem of crime. The crime prevention strategies were 
more concerned with managing anti-social behaviour as dealing with its underlying 
causes, included law enforcement as well as physical and social security, and focused 
on the serving of legal orders by local authorities as well as the use of criminal law 
enforcement by the police. On the role to be played by geographical communities, the 
strategies were more concerned with the public reporting anti-social behaviour than 
becoming involved in managing anti-social behaviour themselves. Furthermore, the 
emphasis put on law enforcement did not diminish when the partnerships turned their 
attention to crime prevention in individual council wards or on individual housing 
estates. Of particular significance, five of the strategies based their vision of 
authoritarian crime control on the claim made in the 'broken windows' thesis that 
high levels of anti-social behaviour is a strong indicator that an area will in the future 
have high levels of serious crime. Finally, just one of the partnerships questioned the 
wisdom of central government plans to introduce a reprimand and final warning 
scheme to enable earlier into the criminal careers of individual youth offenders. The 
overall picture was one of a moral communitarian approach to crime control, at times 
edging dangerously towards the neoconservative vision of authoritarian crime control. 
It has also been seen that Westminster shared most of the moral communitarian traits 
of the average crime prevention partnership in London studied, and generally 
exceeded them. Like most of the other partnerships, it focused on managing 
conventional crime and disorder, and like a number emphasised a need to encourage 
the public to report anti-social behaviour to the police and local authority housing, and 
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included provisions for witness protection. It also included the police power of arrest 
alongside legal orders, and included police sector and estate strategies, which it 
intended would take as authoritarian an approach to crime control as the borough 
strategy. This section explores these points in more detail, and introduces further 
aspects of the partnership's neoconservative approach to crime control that were not 
apparent in its audit and strategy. 
In April 1998 City of Westminster Policy and Resources Committee met to discuss 
the local authority's approach to implementing the Crime and Disorder Act. Its 
existing crime prevention strategy, written in 1994, had identified three aims: 
"reducing fear of crime, designing out crime... and preventing criminality through 
education and diversion" (City of Westminster Directqr of Policy and Regeneration, 
1998a: para. 5.1). The chief executive's department announced to the committee that 
managers from each local authority department had met with the police and had 
agreed a new two-point joint objective to: 
Reduce crime, disorder, nuisance, and the resulting fear that people experience... [and 
develop] practical actions and enforcement measures which concentrate on local concerns. 
(City of Westminster Director of Policy and Regeneration, 1998c: para. 7.3. ) 
The report went on to discuss cooperation between the police and local authority 
under three headings: Enforcement, Designing out Crime, and Youth Offender 
Teams. On the need for law enforcement, it was explained: 
Both the police and the council have powers to enforce against forms of crime, disorder and 
nuisance. By working together, these powers can be used more effectively and make best use 
of resources available [ ... ] The police will be closely involved in working with the council to 
share data and intelligence relevant to enforcement activity... (City of Westminster Director 
of Policy and Regeneration, 1998c: paras. 7.15 and 7.17. ) 
Furthermore, the emphasis of the new approach would be anti-social behaviour rather 
than serious crime. It was explained: 
It is important to note that the approach being developed for community safety planning is 
explicitly seeking to address many of the nuisance and enforcement issues that are sometimes 
not seen as 'crime'. It is clear that residents and businesses do not make this distinction, and 
that the impact of nuisance and disorder are major contributors to fear of crime [ ... 
] 
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Community safety planning will therefore provide an opportunity for the council to develop 
joint action with the Police to address nuisance and disorder issues. (City of Westminster 
Director of Policy and Regeneration, 1998c: paras. 6.4 and 6.5) 
Besides the emphasis put on anti-social behaviour and law enforcement, two further 
aspects of the research question taken into this doctoral thesis can be read into these 
words. First, emphasis was put on the right to set the boundaries of acceptable 
behaviour that fell below the standards set under criminal law. Second, this right was 
said to exist not only because of the right for the public to enjoy the environment they 
live in, but also because of the fear of more serious crime that anti-social behaviour 
reminds people of their vulnerability too. In this chapter it has been seen that these 
two aspects of the moral communitarian vision of crime control were apparent in a 
number of the other crime prevention strategies in London, but that unlike 
Westminster, most had stood gone on to make the claim from the 'broken windows 
thesis' that unchecked anti-social behaviour not only causes fear of serious crime, but 
that fear of serious crime weakens the informal social controls of geographical 
communities that prevent anti-social behaviour from escalating into serious crime. 
The final aspect of the proposals of relevance to the research question was the 
emphasis that the report put on tailoring crime prevention to the needs of different 
areas within Westminster. These proposals were outlined in City of Westminster 
Director of Policy and Regeneration (1998c), but only one observation was made that 
added to those made on the published borough strategy in section 5.2.2. This is 
returned to in a moment. 
A Community Protection Sub-Committee was set up by the council to oversee 
implementation of the Crime and Disorder Act. In its first report to the committee 
(City of Westminster Director of Policy and Regeneration, 1998b), the chief 
executive's department explained that "waging war on crime and nuisance" had 
become one of the council's five "corporate aims". The report focused on cooperation 
between the police and local authority in law enforcement. Emphasis was put squarely 
on the incoming anti-social behaviour order. 
indeed, the weight that the partnership attached to law enforcement was reflected in 
all the other documents acquired during fieldwork. Unlike the partnership's crime 
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prevention strategy (covered in section 5.2.2), the documents generally put equal 
emphasis on criminal law enforcement as the use of legal orders. In its first report on 
the progress of law enforcement within the crime prevention strategy, for example, 
the chief executive's department informed the Community Protection Sub- 
Committee: 
High visibility Police and Council enforcement operations were conducted along the 
Edgware Road to deter illegal street trading, windscreen washers, carding, night caf6 
infringements, begging and short term letting. (City of Westminster Director of Policy and 
Communications, 1999d: para. 3.2) 
The committee was also informed that in the previous three months, thirty-five 
criminal prosecutions had commenced against 'carders' and that eleven injunctions 
had been obtained. In the previous month, ninety-nine abatement notices and sixty 
fixed penalty notices had been served in response to noise nuisance, following the 
setting up of a twenty-four-hour response team, and breach proceedings were being 
considered in five cases. Criminal prosecution or injunctions were also being 
considered for a further twenty-nine 'carders' and a company for fly tipping. Finally, 
the partnership was considering applying for an anti-social behaviour order in the case 
of a 'squeegee merchant' and prosecuting twelve others under criminal laws (City of 
Westminster Director of Policy and Communications, 1999d). 
This mixture of legal orders and criminal law enforcement was duplicated in the two 
meetings of the Community Protection Sub-Committee observed during fieldwork, 
and in all the documents obtained both during fieldwork and through contact retained 
with the three police and community consultative groups in the borough after the 
fieldwork ended. In a later progress report on law enforcement produced by the chief 
executive's department, for example, it was reported: 
Joint action is now taking place on a programmed basis with Police and Council officers; 
working together on targeted enforcement blitzes. The first of these took place on 8 
December focusing on aggressive begging and nuisance in hot spot areas. Illegal street 
traders were targeted later in December... Further blitzes took place later in January to tackle 
prostitutes' cards, squeegee merchants and aggressive begging and a full programme for 
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2000 is being developed. (City of Westminster Director of Policy and Communications, 
2000b: para. 4.1) 
This time the report went on to explain that a total of thirty-four 'carders' were 
considered for criminal prosecution in 1999, and that the partnership was considering 
applying for injunctions for six 'carders'. 238 street traders were being considered for 
criminal prosecution, and contempt proceedings had commenced against two that had 
breached injunctions. Nineteen abatement notices had been served against companies 
for fly posting. Finally, three 'squeegee merchants' had been successfully prosecuted, 
while the cases against nine others had been dropped, as they were under ten years 
old. Like the previous enforcement update, the document did not give any detail on 
the operation against begging. However, included with the document was a letter 
written by the head of the Central London Police Division explaining that twenty-two 
arrests had been made (letter dated 23 December 1999). 
Two further points need to be made about the partnership's approach to law 
enforcement. First, most of the examples of law enforcement uncovered related to 
anti-social behaviour in commercial rather than residential areas, and commercial 
rather than leisure activity. It has already been seen that this aspect of Westminster's 
4enforcement approach' received little attention in its published crime prevention 
strategy, and that Wandsworth was the only other partnership studied in London to 
mention law enforcement in the context of commerce (see section 5.2.2). However, 
this did not necessarily indicate that other London boroughs might also have, like 
Westminster, decided not to mention areas of law enforcement in their published 
strategies. The partnership in Westminster covered the centre of London, which has 
five times as many people entering it for work or pleasure each day than it has 
residents (City of Westminster, 1998a). 
Second was the absence of reference to law enforcement in the context of residential 
disorder other than the use of abatement notices in the progress reports to the 
Community Protection Sub-Committee. This was not a pattern repeated elsewhere. It 
has been seen that the use of injunctions and eviction orders against council tenants 
was highlighted in the crime prevention strategy (see section 5.2.2). Other documents 
produced by the chief executive's department made similar references (e. g. City of 
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Westminster. Director of Policy and Communications, '1999g). Furthermore, the 
partnership drew up a protocol on applying for anti-social behaviour orders (see City 
of Westminster Director of Policy and Communications, 1999ý, and was introducing 
a covert mobile CCTV system to provide evidence for the application and 
enforcement of civil orders on housing estates (see City of Westminster Director of 
Policy and Communications, 1999b, 1999e and 2000a). 
Guidance had also been recently drawn up for housing officers on how to deal with 
complaints of residential disorder in general (City of Westminster Housing 
Department, 1998g) and youth disorder in particular (City of Westminster Housing 
Department, 1998a). The guidance was accompanied by individual documents on, 
among other legal issues, cooperation with the environmental health department in the 
use of abatement notices to deal with noise (City of Westminster Housing 
Department, 1998e), Housing Act injunctions (City of Westminster Housing 
Department, 1998d), possession orders (City of Westminster Housing Department, 
1998d), professional witnesses (City of Westminster Housing Department, 1998k), 
hearsay evidence (City of Westminster Housing Department, 1998i), exchanging 
information on disorderly residents with the police (City of Westminster Housing 
Department, 1998c), and the use of the incoming covert mobile CCTV system (City 
of Westminster Housing Department, 1998h). In the case of injunctions, the following 
three examples of past action were presented: 
in October 1997 Maida Vale obtained Westminster's first injunction with a power of arrest 
using new powers under section 152 of the Housing Act 1996. The case involved the ex- 
boyfriend of a tenant who had threatened to kill other residents and bum the block down. The 
team were called out by residents to a serious disturbance and were able to witness for 
themselves these events. On the basis of this the team obtained an interim injunction to keep 
the ex-boyfriend away from the estate. The date for the full hearing was arranged in mid 
October. Two days before the hearing the ex-boyfriend was spotted on the estate by a 
member of the estate team. He reiterated his threats and was asked to leave. He returned later 
and was again seen by residents threatening and being abusive. An injunction was granted by 
the judge with a power of arrest. 
In November 1997 Bayswater obtained an injunction - again under section 152 - with the 
power of arrest against a resident living in a converted Victorian house who had threatened 
another resident in the same house. The action was taken very swiftly - the day after the 
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incident had occuffed - with the victim giving evidence of what had happened. The team 
were also able to use evidence from the police of their involvement. 
In May 1997 Grosvenor Estate Office obtained an "undertaking" from a tenant not to cause 
"any discomfort, inconvenience, nuisance or annoyance" to his neighbours by using "abusive 
or threatening language and / or behaviour". The tenant agreed to be bound by the 
undertaking until full trial of the matter. To date - November 1997 - the tenant has kept to 
the terms of the undertaking. (City of Westminster Housing Department, 1997f: 7-8) 
The data was obtained following interview with the author of the documents, who 
4played up' the future use of legal orders: 
Six injunctions were obtained last financial year [1998/9), compared to none the year before. 
Two were Housing Act injunctions that included the power of arrest... As a result of the 
Housing Act, all tenants are now put on a one-year probationary period... an intelligence 
support unit was set up last year for covert surveillance... The new anti-social behaviour 
order is available for anyone over ten, but Housing Act injunctions are only suitable for 
people over eighteen. The Community Protection Sub-Committee approved a protocol 
written for the use of anti-social behaviour orders on the 31' of March and we have been 
looking at cases where they might be appropriate since the 1" of April. (Field notes, 21 April 
1999) 
However, on closer inspection it was not so clear that the housing department shared 
the same enthusiasm for law enforcement as the chief executive's department. On the 
whole, the advice given to housing officers was far from punitive, promoting law 
enforcement only when informal resolution of residential disputes had failed. For 
example, the document instructing officers how to deal with a complaint of anti-social 
behaviour started off with the words, -[e]veryone has the right to enjoy life in their 
own way providing they do not cause a nuisance to other residents. Some people may 
respond to simply being reminded that they have caused a nuisance. On the other 
hand a good neighbour should understand the different lifestyles of others" (City of 
Westminster Housing Department, 1998g: para. 2). The document on possession 
orders started off with the words "[y]ou should only consider possession proceedings 
when all other avenues have been explored" (City of Westminster Housing 
Department, 1997d: para. 1). Possession proceedings, it was insisted, were to be 
treated only as a last resort, and injunctions were to be considered as an emergency 
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measure when a dispute had escalated to the point where violence had been used or 
threatened, or as a precursor or alternative to eviction. The document on the use of 
professional mediators made it clear that mediation should be used prior to legal 
action in all cases of non-racial harassment and any complaint that did not concern 
criminal offences (City of Westminster Housing Department, 1998j). Just one of the 
documents contradicted the non-authoritarian message of the documents taken as a 
whole. The document on youth disorder (City of Westminster Housing Department, 
1998a) looked at criminal law enforcement, evictions, and the incoming anti-social 
behaviour order before looking at non-legal measures. It was a factual rather than a 
policy document, however, and did not go beyond advising officers on the options 
that were currently available to them and would become available under the Crime 
and Disorder Act. 
The tentative conclusion that legal orders were, on the whole, regarded by the housing 
department as a measure of absolute last resort was supported by interview with the 
head of the department, who did not refer to them at all (field notes, 18 April 1999). It 
was also supported by other documents acquired during fieldwork. For example, a 
seven-page summary of the department's performance in 1997/8 (City of Westminster 
Housing department, 19981) made no reference to anti-social behaviour, let alone 
legal orders. The lack of concern shown to anti-social behaviour was also reflected in 
the department's business plan for 1998/9 (City of Westminster, 1998b), which 
included a section on anti-social behaviour, but did not set any policy on the means 
that should be used to deal with it. A pilot project that had been set up to look at the 
use of covert surveillance and professional witnesses was mentioned, but so too was a 
pilot project looking at the possibility of mediation services being made available on 
individual housing estates. The housing department set a total "nuisance budgef' of 
; E200, OOO, compared to a "security budget" totalling E1.65m. Finally, and most 
significantly, the emphasis put on delivering the partnership's 'enforcement approach' 
through localised strategies on police sectors and housing estates in Westminster's 
published borough strategy was not repeated in the document. Nor, indeed, was it 
repeated in any documents obtained during fieldwork on the borough strategy. When 
the published borough strategy was re-assessed it was noted that the head of the 
housing department was identified as the lead officer in the section on the police 
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sector and estate strategies, while an officer from the chief executive's department 
was identified as the lead officer in the section on residential disorder. 
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it could not therefore be concluded that the 
depth of enthusiasm for law enforcement expressed by the author of the policy Advice 
to housing officers should be taken as representing the vision of the housing 
department as a whole. It may even be the case that the views she expressed had been 
influenced by the exceptional nature of the interview. This was the only interview 
during fieldwork to specifically address-the issue of law enforcement. As emphasised 
in section 3.3.3, it was possible that the interview had been contaminated by the 
research participant's expectations of what the interviewer wanted to hear. 
The final issue that needs to be dealt with in this section is Westminster's approach to 
youth justice. Westminster was chosen as a national pilot for youth offending teams, 
and had set up its team in October 1998, six months before most other district 
councils and metropolitan boroughs had a statutory duty to do so. The most important 
documents obtained during fieldwork were its youth justice plans 1999/2000 and 
2000/1 (City of Westminster, 1999a and 1999b), and a progress report to the 
Community Protection Sub-Committee made a year after the youth offending team 
was set up (City of Westminster Director of Social and Community Services, 1999). 
Westminster was not one of the partnerships to explore the introduction of the 
reprimand and final warning scheme in detail its crime prevention strategy (see 
section 5.2.4). However, the documents acquired during fieldwork were unequivocal 
in their understanding and support for the authoritarian nature of the central 
government reforms. The objectives of introducing youth offending teams were 
described as being to allow for earlier supervision of offenders (City of Westminster 
Director of Social and Community Services, 1999), but also "to reduce crime and the 
fear of crime and their social and economic costs... [through] challenging [youths'] 
offending and addressing any other area of their life felt to be a risk factor", and "to 
dispense justice fairly and efficiently and to promote confidence in the rule of law" 
(City of Westminster, 1999b: para. 3.1). 
The fieldwork on the borough strategy at Westminster provided a vivid illustration of 
what the 'turn to the local' in crime control could entail if legal orders become a 
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feature of crime prevention. The borough's 'enforcement approach' to commercial 
disorder was more developed than its 'enforcement approach' to residential disorder, 
but there was plenty of evidence that those at the top of the hierarchy had every 
intention of developing the latter as well. 
5. Z 6. 'Preaching to the Converted' 
The last issue that needs to be dealt with concerning the crime prevention strategies in 
London is the approach that partnerships took to public consultation. There was much 
evidence of extensive consultation. First, most of the partnerships referred to sending 
copies of their audits to non-government as well as government organisations. In 
addition, five partnerships (Hounslow; Merton; Newham; Sutton; Wandsworth) held 
open public meetings. A sixth partnership (Camden) used a citizen's panel made up of 
1,500 residents, while another (Hammersmith and Fulham) was in the process of 
setting a citizen's panel up. Most significant of all, focus group meetings were used 
by eleven partnerships (Camden; Enfield; Haringey; Hounslow; Kensington and 
Chelsea; Lewisham; Merton; Newham; Redbridge; Sutton; Wandsworth), while 
another (again, Hammersmith and Fulham) was planning to do so in the future. 
Haringey's approach appeared to be the most extensive. Meetings were held with ten 
groups, including young people, black people, refugees, lesbians and gay men, and 
residents from two areas with high crime rates. Further detail on the approach to 
consultation taken by the 'crime prevention partnerships in London is provided in 
appendix two. 
The significance of focus groups was demonstrated by the experience of Kensington 
and Chelsea. The main concerns raised by the audit were presented to the groups, who 
were then left to discuss their own experiences without direction from project 
coordinators. One was held at a youth club. Among the participants, police 
harassment was a larger concern than being victims of crime. Rather than increasing 
law enforcement, the youths suggested increased emphasis on providing facilities to 
keep youths off the estate walkways during the late evening and at the weekends. 
Similar concerns came out of meetings held with children at a children's home and a 
school. Further, a meeting held with residents of Moroccan descent identified racial 
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harassment by the police and confrontation between the police and young people to be 
of equal concern to conventional crime and disorder. Again, discussion of possible 
solutions did not centre on law enforcement, but on leisure facilities, education and 
welfare support. Finally, a meeting was held with four females in contact with 
Chelsea Women's Aid. Here, discussion centred on the response of the police, council 
and health authority to domestic violence. 
However, these findings were countered by the fact that just four of the other 
partnerships to use focus group meetings (Hounslow; Kensington and Chelsea; 
Lewisham; Redbridge) included meetings with youths. These partnerships did not 
include any of the five that subsequently produced the most authoritarian strategies. 
Furthermore, besides Kensington and Chelsea, detail was provided by just five 
partnerships (Bromley; Hammersmith and Fulham; Harrow; Lewisham; Redbridge) 
on the concerns that had been raised during the process of consultation. Of these five 
partnerships, four indicated that consultation had helped shape the strategies 
subsequently produced, though in the case of Lewisham this only extended to the 
partnership's decision on which areas to focus crime prevention initiatives on, and in 
the case of Redbridge to the less than convincing decision to add street crime and 
disorder to its list of priorities. The general lack of detail raised serious question over 
the extent that the views expressed during consultation were taken into account. Two 
other factors add weight to this conclusion. The first comes when the visions of crime 
control presented in the audits are compared with those presented in the strategies. 
Nineteen partnerships provided information on both their audits and strategies. Of 
these, no significant differences of approach were found between the two documents 
of any of the boroughs. Second, just five of the twenty partnerships that provided 
copies of their strategies referred to consultation with the public continuing once the 
strategies had been implemented. Of these, four did not plan to look beyond existing 
police and community consultative groups. 
The fieldwork that was conducted on the borough strategy at Westminster certainly 
did not raise grounds for optimism. No oral consultation was conducted. Of around 
700 government and non-government organisations sent copies of the audit, less than 
one in seven replied (City of Westminster Director of Policy and Communications, 
1999a), though as shown in appendix two, boroughs that contacted a wider range of 
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groups had even smaller response rates. Of more importance, the non-government 
organisations contacted did not include youth groups. Nor did they include minority 
ethnic groups, which represented twenty-three percent of the local population (City of 
Westminster, 1998a). A summary of the audit was made available in libraries with a 
comment sheet for return (City of Westminster Director of Policy and Regeneration, 
1998b), and a summary of the crime prevention strategy was distributed to all 
households once it had been finalised in April 1999 (Westminster Director of Policy 
and Communications, 1999b). The importance of the need for the partnership to do so 
was highlighted in the youth victimisation and attitude survey written during 
fieldwork for use by the youth offending team at a youth conference held during the 
same period that the consultation process on the crime prevention strategy was being 
carried out (see section 3.3.2). The conference was attended by just under 100 youths, 
from which 55 questionnaires were successfully completed. Just 20 of 59 respondents 
answered that they would "feel a lot or quite a lot safer if more people were arrested", 
while 48 answered that they would "feel a lot or quite a lot safer if there were more 
for young people to do". The survey had relied on youths turning up to the 
conference, which was less likely to include those that had had negative contact with 
the police. It can only be assumed that the figures would otherwise have contrasted 
even more with the official consultation. 
Nor were grounds for optimism raised through the fieldwork that was being 
conducted on the pilot projects at Westminster (see section 5.3). One of the objectives 
of the pilot projects was to explore ways to consult "hard to reach groups" (City of 
Westminster Director of Policy and Regeneration, 1998b). Despite the use of 
questionnaires and meetings with local residents, interviews revealed deep cynicism 
from practitioners and residents alike. Most residents criticised the partnerships for 
not taking account of their views. Many practitioners criticised the partnerships for 
failing to consult individuals and groups that the police and local authority were not 
already used to consulting on other aspects of their work. The police officer most 
closely involved in the police sector project went so far as to describe the consultation 
as "preaching to the converted" (field notes, 22 January 1999). The interviews are 
returned to in more detail in sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2. While it could not be concluded 
that other partnerships that put emphasis on authoritarian crime control were, like 
Westminster, guilty of 'preaching to the converted'. nothing indicated that 
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consultation had any effect on the vision of those that were steering the partnership 
arrangements. No evidence, in other words, had been found to question that it was the 
usual ('top down') order that was being promoted. 
5.2.7. Concluding Comments 
Like the approach to crime prevention taken by the nine partnerships analysed as a 
result of the first survey of London boroughs (see section 5.1), analysis of the visions 
of crime control among the twenty-one partnerships that documents were obtained 
from in the second survey of London boroughs did little to challenge the pessimistic 
view of crime prevention taken into the research project (see section 3.3.1). Two 
particular aspects of the review of come prevention in London served to emphasise 
just how dangerous it is for critical criminologists to lend their support to the 
development of local crime prevention partnerships. First was the finding that only 
two partnerships (Enfield; Southwark) directly questioned the merits of authoritarian 
crime control. As noted in section 5.2.4, the criticism levied by Enfield was made in 
the context of the reforms to the youth justice system. It warned that early penal 
intervention would merely exacerbate the problem of youth crime, as youths would be 
labelled as troublemakers too early in their (potential) 'criminal careers'. The focus on 
intervention through the criminal justice system, the partnership continued, would 
make it difficult for practitioners to build up trust with youth offenders. Southwark 
warned of the negative effect that 'zero tolerance' policing might have on relations 
between the police and the public. Neither Enfield nor Southwark extended this 
critique to legal orders, however. Nor did Southwark appear to see any contradiction 
in criticising the call for increased resort to criminal law enforcement, yet 
commending the reforms to the youth justice system: 
Underpinning the new approach to dealing with youth offending is the need to nip offending 
in the bud before young people get heavily involved in crime. 
Second was the finding that three of the six partnerships to promote crime prevention 
initiatives on individual wards or social housing estates within their borough-wide 
strategies were among the partnerships to put most attention on targeting law 
enforcement at anti-social behaviour, and that two, including Westminster, appeared 
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to have done so as a result of their support for law enforcement. This finding naturally 
had important implications for the fieldwork conducted on the pilot projects at 
Westminster-, to which this chapter now turns. 
53. Targeted Disorder Control in Westminster 
The last part of this chapter presents the findings of the second phase of fieldwork 
conducted at Westminster on the police sector (Westboume, Paddington) and the two 
housing estates (Lisson Green, St. John's Wood, and Churchill Gardens, Pimlico). 
These, as explained in section 3.2, would serve as pilot projects for the development 
of police sector and estate strategies across the borough. The first phase of the 
fieldwork, on the borough strategy, covered an area that the 1991 census recorded as 
having a residential population of 195,000. The 1991 census recorded Westbourne 
police Sector as having a population of just under 30,000. At the time the fieldwork 
was conducted Lisson Green contained around 1,500 homes; Churchill Gardens 
contained around 1,700 homes. 
The data acquired on the larger of the pilot projects, on the police sector, is reviewed 
before the data acquired on the pilot projects on the two estates. The progress of the 
individual projects is broadly reviewed in chronological order, starting with approach 
taken to auditing crime and crime control, before moving onto the approach taken to 
consultation, and finishing with the strategies subsequently fon-ned. 
5.3.1. Policing Westbourne 
2ffijn_Lhýý 
The pilot project on Westbourrie Police Sector was ultimately steered by the group set 
up to oversee implementation of the Crime and Disorder Act in the borough as a 
whole (see section 3.2). The steering group met in the chief executive's department in 
the local authority civic centre, and included the heads of most local authority 
departments alongside representatives from the police and chief executive's 
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department. Other than the police sector inspector, local practitioners from 
Westboume were not present at any of the four meetings observed during fieldwork. 
Nor were representatives from the probation service or the health service, both of who 
were required under the Crime and Disorder Act to cooperate in district council 
strategies (see section 4.1.3). The project was therefore steered from the top and by a 
group that did not include two of the key institutions involved in social work. If the 
project were to develop in isolation from the authoritarian emphasis of the developing 
borough strategy and the chief executive's intention to deliver its 'enforcement 
approach' partly through police sector strategies, resistance would have to come 
through informal channels. 
Auditin Crime and Crime Control 
The audit for the police sector project (City of Westminster, 1998c) was researched 
and compiled in the chief executive's department. Unsurprisingly, it reflected the 
emphasis of the borough strategy on managing conventional anti-social behaviour 
rather than dealing with its underlying causes, and on managing conventional anti- 
social behaviour through physical security and law enforcement more than social 
work. Information was provided on social issues such as homelessness, health, 
education and unemployment, but was presented without reference to the work of 
government or non-government organisations that dealt with them, and was omitted 
from a summary of the audit used for public consultation (City of Westminster, 
1998d). Legal orders featured throughout the remainder of the audit. Most notable 
was a section entitled Nuisance and Anti-social Behaviour, in which data was quoted 
from victimisation surveys and complaints to local authority departments to 
emphasise fear of crime and perceptions of anti-social behaviour and to predict actual 
levels of anti-social behaviour. No mention was made of mediation or social services. 
Emphasis was instead put on the use of introductory tenancies and possession orders. 
Injunctions were promoted in a separate section devoted to prostitution to deal with 
advertising in phone boxes, while abatement notices and fixed penalty notices were 
promoted to deal with noise and street traders caught operating without a license in a 
section entitled Westminster City Council Enforcement Action in the Area. Although 
noise was said to be a minor problem in the area, it was announced that households 
had been leafleted to encourage them to report incidences of excess noise to the local 
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authority. Criminal law enforcement was also promoted in the latter section, but 
limited to the specific contexts of kerb crawling, shoplifting and the use of stop and 
search to deal with drug possession. The section on youth crime, on the other hand, 
did not refer to law enforcement, criminal, civil or public. The section stood out in 
sharp contrast to the rest of the audit, both in the full text and summary. Emphasis was 
put on leisure schemes, employment opportunities and health services. 
This negative interpretation of the audit as a whole was shared by a number of 
practitioners interviewed during fieldwork that were involved in the project. Two 
interviewees were critical of the failure of the audit to look beyond conventional 
crime. The first was a manager of a voluntary organisation for homeless refugee 
families. The audit, she said, had given no sense of the problems faced by the large 
number of families living in temporary accommodation in the area. One thing that 
particularly disappointed her was that figures on the age and ethnicity of local 
residents had been based on census data, which only included those with a permanent 
address in the area (field notes, 21 January 1999). The second was a community 
liaison manager from the health authority, who stressed the lack of attention given to 
domestic violence, racially motivated crime and drug and alcohol addiction, all of 
which were prevalent in the area (field notes, 27 January 1999). Other criticism from 
practitioners involved in the project focused on the punitive nature of the audit. 
Strongest criticism came from a senior practitioner at the youth offending team, who 
questioned the way youths had been portrayed in the audit, explaining that the section 
on youth crime did not disguise the fact that the section on residential disorder Also 
focused on youths. He then turned his attention to the treatment of youth across the 
local authority as a whole, accusing the council of being more interested in finding 
short-term solutions to anti-social behaviour than finding ways to solve it in the long 
term. The language the council used to describe anti-social behaviour was "not 
holistic", he said, and there was a general feeling that the council ran "a two-tier 
system that was anti youth" and "was not interested in their views" (field notes, 29 
January 1999). 
The most important point for current purposes, however, was not the punitive nature 
of the audit. This was expected, considering the 'top down' nature of the project. 
What was important was the anguish local practitioners expressed at the direction in 
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which the chief executive's department had made it clear it wanted to take the project. 
It appeared that if the project had been steered by local practitioners, the audit would 
have been more holistic. 
Public Consultation 
Public consultation officially took the form of a one-day open event held in a local 
primary school. To advertise the event, leaflets were posted door to door, posters 
displayed in public places, and an advert paid for in a local newspaper. Around eighty 
people attended, including twenty-four local practitioners. Residents were mainly 
drawn from the local police and community consultative group, the sector working 
group, and the chairs of a number of residents' panels and neighbourhood watch 
groups. Several elderly people also attended. Just two of the residents were from 
minority ethnic groups, however, despite minority ethnic groups making up twenty- 
four percent of the local population (City of Westminster, 1998c). None appeared to 
be below the age of thirty (field notes, 18 July 1998). 
The absence of youth and minority voices did not go unnoticed among interviewees. 
For example, as noted in section 5.2.6, the sector inspector described his experience 
of the event as "preaching to the converted". He added that those who attended were 
all from groups with whom the police and local authority already had established 
relationships (field notes, 22 January 1999). Nevertheless, the fact that the event had 
failed to attract individuals and groups that the council was not already in contact with 
was treated as inevitable by interviewees. Indeed, the fact that more 'active citizens' 
had turned up than was usually the case was treated as a success in itself Examples 
included a youth worker, who wrote "[t]he event was extremely useful as it offered 
the opportunity for local people and professional groups to 'network' on very 
important issues and themes" (letter undated), and the chair of the sector working 
group: 
The consultation day was very successful as it brought in new people, but consultation is 
needed on a wider basis. Public meetings are not for this. We should go to them, for example, 
homeless families. The problem is time. (Field notes, 16 September 1998) 
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In the minutes of a meeting of a working group set up to oversee implementation of 
the project (covered in a moment), the project leader wrote that personal contact 
might have attracted more members of the public, but that some groups would never 
want to attend such an event. However, when interviewed she accepted, "youths were 
missing... ethnic groups were also missing. Therefore I can't say with confidence that 
their concerns were covered" (field notes, 18 January 1999). In a report to the 
Community Protection Sub-Committee the project coordinator presented a highly 
distorted picture of the event, emphasising, for example, that an interpreter had been 
recruited for the event, and claiming that "approximately 75 people, representing 
nearly all sectors of the local community, participated in discussions" (City of 
Westminster Chief Executive's Department, 1998: 3). Nevertheless, she 
acknowledged the need to approach "hard to reach groups" in the report, and 
recommended that for the other sector plans a copy of the audit should be sent to all 
interested groups along with a questionnaire. 
At the event, rooms were set aside for the discussion of separate topics, which 
participants were invited to 'drift' in and out of The topics for discussion were 
chosen at the beginning of the event. The following topics were forwarded for 
discussion by practitioners: Youth Facilities; Street CCTV Systems; Displacement of 
Crime; Alcohol and Drug Abuse; Relations between the Public and the Police and 
Council; Rehabilitation of Offenders; Women as Victims; Licensing Hours; and Fear 
of Crime. The following topics were forwarded for discussion by members of the 
public: Noise, Security on Estates, Public Drinking, Prostitution, Police Foot Patrols; 
and Cycling on the Pavement. Naturally, practitioners focused their time on the 
discussion groups that concerned their own area of work. Considering the social 
make-up of members of the public involved, the subjects that residents prioritised 
came as no surprise. Nor did the fact that they congregated in these groups. The result 
was a two-tier system of discussions, one side made up of practitioners discussing 
issues of social welfare and physical security and swapping contact details, and the 
other made up of residents complaining that the police and council were not available 
or not prepared to 'clamp down' on anti-social behaviour. It was possible to spend a 
short time in each of the rooms, and to make notes on the recommendations made by 
the chairs of each discussion topic, which were displayed for the last hour of the event 
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(field notes, 18 July 1998). The recommendations were later written up by the pilot 
project leader. 
The most important issue to come out of the discussion groups forwarded by 
practitioners was the absence of reference to law enforcement among thirty-two 
recommendations made. The only exception was a need to fine people "for alarms left 
unattended". Legal enforcement featured in the discussions of a number of topics 
forwarded by residents, however. Discussion of cycling on the pavement, for 
example, hardly went beyond the technical issue of which authorities had the 
strongest legal powers during the time it was observed. Among the twelve 
recommendations recorded by the project leader were: "[o]n the spot fines; fixed 
penalties; parking attendants with power to stop; registered cycles - with certificate - 
with bye-law;... education of cyclists with enforcement of current laws;... legislation; 
enforcement by police and local authority; judiciary information... ". Of seven 
recommendations made by the group that discussed prostitution, one was to "[p]ursue 
action to prosecute card 'placers' with larger fines or prison sentences". Finally, the 
second of two recommendations for estate security was "[z]ero tolerance considered 
as police policy". 
The Wodk-im-G-ronup- 
Before conclusions are made on the approach to public consultation taken on the 
police sector, it is necessary to turn to observations made of a local working group 
that was set up to advise and help steer the project. The terms of reference of the 
group were "to act as a line of communication between sections of the community", 
-to plan and run community-wide consultationý', "to offer views on the identified 
actions which emerge from consultation", and "to suggest appropriate methods of 
ensuring implementation and monitoring of the final action plaW'. Membership of the 
group included local practitioners, religious leaders, chairs of local residents' panels 
and neighbourhood watch groups, and members of the police sector working group 
and Paddington and. Marylebone Police and Community Consultative Group. The vast 
majority of local residents that attended the steering group meetings observed during 
fieldwork came from the sector working group. 
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Two points were of particular note regarding the working group. First was the 
professional and social make-up of those that attended meetings. Aside from the 
project leader, the sector inspector and a housing officer were present at each of the 
three meetings observed during fieldwork, but no health workers, probation officers 
or environmental health officers. Youth workers were present at just one of the 
meetings, and the manager of the voluntary organisation for homeless refugee 
families at another. Among the public, not a single attendee appeared to be under 
forty. Further, all attendees were white, and only one appeared to be foreign, in spite 
of the fact that half of the local population was born abroad (City of Westminster, 
1998c). The failure of the group, like the consultation event, to include youth and 
minority ethnic voices spurred the sector inspector to take action over the make-up of 
the sector working group. At a meeting of the sector working group attended during 
fieldwork, he announced that the group needed to re-write its terms of reference, 
explaining: 
There are 220 ethnic groups in London and 105 in Paddington. Therefore we need to open 
out. we also need to include youths. The community safety plan will ask searching questions. 
We will need others involved to answer these questions. We might also need other agencies 
to get involved... [Unlike us] other ' 
sectors run their working group as public meetings. Now 
we must review the progress of [the pilot project], so change is needed... This area was 
chosen for the pilot project due to the diversity of the area... (Field notes, 16 September 
1998) 
The chair of the sector working group added, "we have existed for five years, but 
have only had odd appearances [from minority ethnic groups] on particular issues". 
During interview the project manager admitted that no attempt had been made to 
contact minority ethnic groups. Nor had she thought of contacting minority religious 
groups (field notes, 18 January 1999). However, neither she nor the vast majority of 
residents involved in the group perceived the lack of minority ethnic participation to 
be a problem. The chairperson of the police and community consultative group, for 
example, explained that public apathy with local issues was a real problem, but: 
The project working group was as representative as we could get considering that the 
members were all volunteers. As the sector working group, to expect it to have been 
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representative of the local population was to live in 'cloud-cuckoo land'. (Field notes, 5 
February 1999) 
Another member of the police and community consultative group wrote that the 
project as a whole "was very useful in bringing a much wider selection of people 
representing a far larger strata of residents" (letter undated). The impression given 
was that most involved in the project had little idea if the priorities of minority ethnic 
residents would differ from their own. For example, two members of a local residents' 
association confessed that their group had no contact with non-white people on their 
estate (field notes, II January 1999). The most outspoken person on the working 
group, an ex-anny officer neighbourhood watch coordinator, used his interview to 
criticise the council for taking money from other local authorities to take on 
responsibility for housing homeless asylum seekers, emphasising that the council had 
recently taken over a local 450 room hotel in the area for this purpose (field notes, 13 
January 1999). The only local residents involved in the group to question the social 
make-up of the group were two representatives from local churches. One referred to a 
"feeling that more local groups should have been represented". The other was more 
forceful, referring to the group as "artificial, contrived and unrepresentative" (letters 
undated). More criticism was encountered among practitioners, however. The 
criticism of the representative from the health authority was strongest. She described 
discussion at the working group meetings as bordering on blatant racism (field notes, 
27 January 1999). 
The professional and social make-up of the group was broadly reflected in the issues 
focused on during the three working group meetings observed. Outreach youth 
services were discussed at the meeting attended by youth workers (field notes, 14 
September 1998), and homelessness and drug addiction services at the meeting 
attended by the manager of the voluntary organisation for homeless refugee families 
(field notes, 3 August 1998). Otherwise, social service provision was not discussed at 
any of the meetings. By far the biggest issue Of concern to arise at the meetings was a 
perceived need among residents, like that expressed at the consultation event, for 
in ore legal powers to deal with cycling on the pavement. The following is an extract 
from a conversation between residents over the issue: 
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[Sector inspector] The Home Office have promised a new law for cycling on the pavement: 
fixed penalty notices... At present the police must prove dangerous riding. Fixed penalty 
notices would change the attitude of the police towards cycling on the pavement. At the 
moment it's a waste of time to arrest people for it as it doesn't result in prosecution. 
[First resident] How about local authority officers? Or parking attendants? 
[Second resident] Parking attendants don't have the powers. Fining them doesn't work as 
their addresses can't be checked. The police could check their addresses if they could arrest 
them. Can't they confiscate their bikes? 
[nird resident] The Crown Prosecution said at a meeting that the judiciary don't want to 
know. They need to be informed about the problem. (Field notes, 3 August 1998) 
At the following meeting, the sector inspector again explained that fixed penalty 
notices would be available by the end of the year, and promised that the police would 
mount operations against cycling on the pavement (field notes, 18 August 1998). 
When the issue was returned to in the third meeting observed, the last of the working 
group, the sector inspector explained that the fixed penalty scheme would be an 
improvement on the current situation, as magistrates limited the number of 
summonses the police could issue if penalties were not paid (field notes, 14 
September 1999). Interestingly, the only other example of anti-social behaviour to be 
discussed at any length at the meetings was at the meeting attended by youth workers, 
which addressed the issue of elderly people being afraid of youths 'hanging out'. The 
chair and sector inspector brought up the issues of noise and racial harassment at two 
of the meetings, but neither subject attracted debate (field notes, 18 August and 14 
September 1998). 
The last point that needs to be made about the working group is the lack of decision- 
making power given to the group, as reflected in its terms of reference, but also by the 
project being coordinated by a practitioner from the chief executive's department (see 
section 3.2), and the failure of the project to be backed by extra financial or human 
resources. When interviewees were asked for their views on the strategy that was 
eventually produced (covered in a moment), most emphasised that nothing new had 
emerged from the project. The chairperson of the police and community consultative 
group was most critical, emphasising that the chief executive's department "was 
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criticised for editing out what it didn't want to bear" (field notes, 5 February 1999). 
The sector inspector rather cynically explained, "[t]hose at the top will decide whether 
to implement the strategy" (field notes, 22 January 1999). The estates manager 
dwelled longest on the issue: 
The plan has some things in it that have already been done or agreed upon. These were not 
outcomes of the project... many concerns were also dropped as unachievable, for example, 
CCTV on local estates. It would be better to have included them all and admitted they could 
not be achieved. It would also have been better to admit which objectives were not new 
ones... for example, the setting up of the youth project and the provision of a new youth 
worker, although association with the group helped me gain an extra E15,000 for the set up 
costs... The concerns were watered down to those that were broadly achievable without 
indicating who had responsibility for them. Consider environmental design. This was an 
example of an objective that we will not be able to prove wasn't done... The plan also 
mentions support for housing schemes under threat, but this won't help as there isn't any 
money available. (Field notes, I February 1999) 
A similar depth of concern was expressed by the manager of the voluntary 
organisation for homeless refugee families: 
At the working group it felt like a lot of decisions had already been made, though this was 
inevitable due to the timescale of the project... the project hasn't generated much action. It 
has only flagged up what's already going on. It triggered some things off, for residents 
associations, for example, but nothing regarding us. It could have achieved more, but it 
would have needed more money. (Field notes, 21 January 1999) 
overall, the fieldwork on the working group resulted in two important sets of data. 
The first, following on from observations made on the audit and the consultation 
event, was that local practitioners did not share the authoritarian vision of crime 
control of the chief executive's department. Indeed, law enforcement was not brought 
up by local practitioners in any of the interviews either. Of most significance, this 
included the secto r inspector (field notes, 22 January 1999) and the manager of the 
estates in the area (field notes, I February 1999). The data suggested that the working 
group would have been broader based and more holistic in its approach to crime 
control if it had been coordinated and chaired by local practitioners. 
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The second set of data concerned the issue of consultation, and in particular the depth 
of apathy that practitioners expressed over the possibility of spreading public 
consultation beyond those that they were already in contact with. As noted in section 
5.2.6, the views of residents at the consultation event and on the working group were 
not ultimately taken into account. The project may have been local enough for 
practitioner resistance to structural, national and, in the case of Westminster, local 
political trends to surface, but not it seemed for public resistance. Considering the 
authoritarian nature of the borough strategy, it could be reasonably concluded that a 
crime prevention partnership covering areas the size of a police sector is unlikely to 
become an institution of authoritarian crime control so long as it is steered by local 
practitioners, but it could not be concluded that such a partnership would not come 
under pressure from local residents to do otherwise, or that local residents would not 
have a stronger voice than those in Westboume. Perhaps broad consultation would 
help to counter this danger. The youth questionnaire conducted during fieldwork on 
the borough strategy suggested this would be so, as did the review of consultation at 
other London boroughs (see section 5,2.6). Yet, at Westboume only three of the 
practitioners interviewed, the youth offending team worker, the health worker and the 
manager of the voluntary organisation for homeless refugee families, emphasised that 
consultation should and moreover could have been more proactive. The latter of these 
interviewees, made the point that professional consulters could have been employed 
(field notes, 21 January 1999). As has also been emphasised in this chapter, the 
empirical research conducted during the course of this doctoral thesis suggested that 
such efforts might be the exception and not the non-n (see section 5.2.5). 
The Crime Prevention Strate 
The crime prevention strategy was written by the steering group at the chief 
executive's department. With the exception of racial harassment the group chose not 
to refer to anti-social behaviour or law enforcement at any point of the strategy. Most 
surprising was that this included sections on the two issues that local residents had 
demanded that the partnership took an authoritarian line to, cycling on the pavement 
and estate security. This did not mean that the strategy was holistic. For example, as 
the manager of the voluntary organisation for homeless refugee families emphasised, 
"the project was not particularly relevant to homeless people" (field notes, 21 January 
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1999). Nor did it touch upon issues of white-collar crime. Finally, racial harassment 
was not included in the first draft of the strategy. The project leader explained that it 
was added only after it had been brought to her attention by Westminster Racial 
Equality Forum (field notes, 18 January 1999). Indeed, it was later discovered from 
the representative from the health authority that the director of the council's race 
equality forum had made a formal complaint on the project asa whole (field notes, 27 
January 1999). 
These points aside, the crime prevention strategy did not comply with the neo- 
conservative vision of crime control. However, it was not possible to draw concrete 
conclusions as to why the vision of crime prevention that the partnership displayed in 
its borough strategy (see section 5.2.5) was not ultimately reflected in the police 
sector project. The fieldwork indicated that that the project was sufficiently localised 
that resistance to 'top down' pressures would inevitably arise, but it far from clear 
that local practitioners had had much influence over the outcome of the project. Three 
particular variables encountered during fieldwork prevented such conclusions from 
being made. First, other than the sector inspector, local practitioners were not 
involved on the steering group that finalised the crime prevention strategy. Second, 
most of the local practitioners interviewed that were critical of the chief executive's 
department chose to stay away from the working group meetings. Local practitioners 
were likely put off from attending the working group by the terms of reference of the 
group and the lack of resources available for the project, but their absence cast further 
doubt on the view that they had had a hand in shaping the strategy that emerged. At 
no point during the fieldwork was evidence encountered of local practitioners 
influencing the project 'behind the scenes'. 
The third variable was the sector inspector, whose non-authoritarian vision of crime 
prevention shone through the whole project. Several examples of the particularly 
holistic view that the sector inspector took into the project have been cited in this 
section. The most important example observed during fieldwork was at the third 
meeting observed of the steering group, where the objectives of the strategy were 
finalised. At the beginning of the meeting the sector inspector set the tone for the rest 
of the discussion by emphasising that in contrast to the findings of the audit, "a public 
attitude survey on the sector showed concern about anti-social behaviour to be 
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relatively low". Unlike the previous two steering group meetings observed and 
moreover the three working group meetings observed on the police sector, he 
dominated discussion, at the expense of the official chair, the project leader of the 
police sector project. The only time the possibility of law enforcement entered 
discussion was in the context of drug dealing, which he dismissed, explaining, "'[d]rug 
dealing is an enforcement question, not a prevention one" (field notes, 8 September 
1998). The sector inspector had clearly played an important role in the outcome of the 
project. In the absence of evidence that other local practitioners involved in the 
project had likewise had a hand in shaping the crime prevention strategy, it could only 
be concluded that the authoritarian vision of crime control of the chief executive's 
department had been resisted due to the particular views and influence of one local 
practitioner. 
5.3.2. Policing Churchill Gardens and Lisson Green 
The last section of this chapter looks at the question whether crime prevention 
partnerships have an even better chance of operating in isolation to structural and 
political trends if they are focused on yet smaller geographical areas than a police 
sector. One of the interviewees involved in the police sector project (the sector 
inspector) expressed support for the proposed future alignment, of police sectors with 
local authority wards, which would result in future crime prevention strategies 
covering areas of around 10,000 people (field notes, 22 January 1999). As noted in 
section 4.1.3, one of the central recommendations of the Morgan Report was that the 
police and local authorities be given a statutory duty to produce ward as well as 
borough strategies. It was not possible to analyse ward strategies at Westminster. 
However, the opportunity to conduct fieldwork on the housing projects was better 
still, as the projects were focused on areas with populations of around 5,000. 
Steering the Projects 
Like the police sector project, working groups were set up on the estates, but unlike 
the police sector project these groups were officially given the task to forinulate the 
resultant crime prevention policies. The terms of reference of the two groups were the 
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same, to: "develop the plan in accordance with the community safety proposals of the 
Crime and Disorder Bill and based on an audit of local crime issues; develop the plan 
in full consultation with as wide a representation of the community as possible; ensure 
that the plan contains long and short term targets for the reduction of crime and 
disorder which are manageable and achievable and include clearly identified 
responsibilities, resources and time scales against each target; [and] monitor progress 
of the plan from its commencement and ensure that the agreed targets are met". 
The steering groups were predominantly made up of local practitioners, though (as 
noted in section 3.2) both were led by a project manager from the central housing 
department. Besides the project manager, the group for the Lisson Green project 
involved two local housing officers, two youth workers, the manager of a local health 
centre, an officer from an estate action team operating on the estate, and three police 
officers (two local officers and one divisional commander). The group for the 
Churchill Gardens project was led by the same person from the central housing 
department. It likewise involved two local housing officers, along with two local 
police inspectors, a second officer from the central housing department, an officer 
from the chief executive's department, and the chairperson of the residents' 
association on the estate. A number of issues discussed in section 5.2.5 were relevant 
to the direction that the projects might take. First, fieldwork in the housing department 
suggested that the project leader was likely to steer the projects away from law 
enforcement. The significance of the inclusion of the second central housing officer at 
Churchill Gardens was less clear, as she was the author of the policy documents 
advising how housing officers on their response to complaints of residential disorder, 
which included the use of legal orders. The inclusion of the officer from the chief 
executive's department at Churchill Gardens was more interesting still, due to the 
chief executive department's intention to deliver its 'enforcement approach' through 
estate as well as police sector strategies, but also due to the fact that he was involved 
in writing documents on the potential use of a covert mobile CCTV system to provide 
evidence for the application and enforcement of civil orders on housing estates. 
The last issue regarding the make up of the steering groups that needs to be 
highlighted was the lack of participation of residents. The coordinator of the projects 
admitted that no residents participated in steering group meetings on Lisson Green. At 
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Churchill Gardens, however, in addition to the chair of the residents' association, nine 
local residents attended steering group meetings at some stage of the project on 
Churchill Gardens, including according to the project leader, three youths (field notes, 
27 January 1999). This point is returned to in the conclusion to this section. 
As demonstrated in the following paragraphs, no punitive attitudes to anti-social 
behaviour were encountered among local practitioners involved in the steering groups 
on either estate. The same was the case with local resident that participated on the 
group on Churchill Gardens or residents involved in public consultation. Examples 
are highlighted over the following pages. The non-authoritarian vision of crime 
prevention shared by local practitioners served to confirm the findings on the police 
sector project. The more important finding was that of local residents. This point is 
returned to at the end of the section. 
e Control 
In the description of the two sites chosen for the pilot projects, the project manager 
emphasised the anti-social behaviour of local youths on the estates: 
Churchill Gardens Estate is a self contained housing estate... [containing] 1,692 homes... 
There are residents associations representing both tenants and lessees which are very active 
on the estate and the main concerns are youth nuisance and access to blocks. 
Lisson Green Estate is a self contained housing estate... Its 27 blocks, completed in 1973, 
contain 1,466 homes. An E49m. Estate Action programme of improvements to the estate is 
underway which includes aspects of redesign to tackle crime. There is an active residents' 
association and the Estate Action programme has necessitated establishing other forums for 
resident consultation. There is a significant tension between residents and youth on the estate 
and, although crime tends to be restricted to vandalism and motor crime, there have always 
some instances of crime against the person. (City of Westminster Housing Department, 
1998b: 1-2) 
As expected, however, the housing department indicated that it had no intention to 
steer the pilot projects towards law enforcement. The document went on to identify 
fourteen possible objectives of the crime prevention strategies by the local authority 
and the police and, of which only one made indirect reference to law ("acting on 
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tenancy agreement breaches"). The majority of the objectives related to physical 
security. Five ("increased youth provision7'; "school visits [by the police]"; 
"mediation service"; "support for Neighbourhood Watch"; "removal of rubbish and 
graffiti") were welfare orientated, albeit with a moral communitarian emphasis on 
holding crime back rather than dealing with its underlying causes. 
Unlike the police sector project, however, an outside institution, the Safe 
Neighbourhoods Unit, was commissioned to conduct the audits. As noted in section 
4.1.2, in the 1980s the Safe Neighbourhoods Unit was at the centre of the estate 
projects run by NACRO, which had not taken an authoritarian approach to crime 
control. The non-authoritarian vision of crime control of NACRO in the 1980s was 
not reflected in either audit, however (Safe Neighbourhoods Unit, 1998a and 1998c). 
The audits focused on general perceptions of practitioners and residents on the two 
estates. Negative pictures were painted of both. The audit for Lisson Green reported, 
"the main issues appear to be: youth nuisance - groups of young people hanging 
about, not always causing nuisance but generating fear and concern; vandalism; noise 
nuisance; some drug problems, although mainly cannabis; alcohol abuse; motorbike 
crime, including riding on pavements etc.; street crime; car crime" (Safe 
Neighbourhoods Unit, 1998c: 3). The issues for concern on Churchill Gardens were 
identified as, "[y]outh nuisance - groups of young people hanging about on the estate 
and in blocks, causing minor damage, behaving anti-socially and intimidating 
residents; drug taking on the estate and in particular blocks and, to a lesser extent, 
drug dealing; noise nuisance, although to a lesser degree; property crime And violence 
are relatively minor problems; many problems are generated by a small number of 
families and their off-spring" (Safe Neighbourhoods Vnit, 1998a: 2). The audit for 
Lisson Green also cited two previous surveys, the first conducted by a local drug 
project earlier in the year, and the second by Brunel University the year before. Both 
surveys had highlighted anti-social behaviour, in particular youths hanging about 
drinking, smoking cannabis or vandalising property, and theý fear that such behaviour 
causes. The audit for Lisson Green recommended more activities be provided for 
youth, but that (in typical neoconservative language) residents also needed to be 
reassured that their concerns were being addressed, through restricted access to blocks 
within the estate and "visibly effective action against anti-social behaviour (if only for 
symbolic reasons)" (Safe Neighbourhoods Unit, 1998c: 7). The audit for Churchill 
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Gardens likewise recommended more activities for youth, but that "[i]t is important 
that effective action is taken in relation to a small number of families on the estate 
which generate most of the probleme' (Safe Neighbourhoods Unit, 1998a: 4). The 
document went on to explain that this required more effort to protect witnesses, and 
greater support for the housing department from the police and the courts. 
As emphasised in section 3.3.3, the impression given from the emphatic nature of the 
reports was that the Safe Neighbourhoods Unit had made up its mind to 'define anti- 
social behaviour up' as a problem of crime and promote law enforcement as a means 
of dealing with it whatever the results of interviews with local practitioners and 
residents, in other words that the Safe Neighbourhoods Unit was influenced by its 
own institutional culture, or else chose to tell the housing department what it thought 
it wanted to hear. This suspicion was confirmed at Churchill Gardens, where a 
number of letters were received from local police officers and residents during 
fieldwork. None expressed any concern over the issue of anti-social behaviour. 
Indeed, the only interviewee to mention anti-social behaviour, the secretary of the 
estate's neighbourhood watch group, did so in criticism of and not support of the 
audit: 
As far as the "Summary of findings, of the Crime Audit of Churchill Gardens Estate", dated 
July 1998,1 do not find it a rigorous report, and some of its wording is unfortunate... 
Churchill Gardens Estate is a generally safe environment with a low level of nuisance and 
petty criminal activity. It is one of the safest estates in the whole of London... I pointed out 
to [the project leader] that based on police statistics submitted at the Monthly meetings of the 
Neighbourhood watch, the figures for alleged crime incidents were lower this year than last. 
This is different from the view stated in the report. It seems to me that there was for some 
people, a desire or belief that Churchill Gardens Estate was a high crime area and that when 
looked into it was found (disappointingly? ) not to be so... [For example, money that has been 
allocated for CCTV in a street parallel to the estate] could be better and more effectively 
spent on providing facilities for young people... Although knowing that petty crime / 
nuisance is caused by youths, the position is that the police will record these activities, rather 
than having an investment that would aim to prevent the incidents from happening the first 
place... [The local authority's response] to the possible displacement of activity into the 
estate is that there should be more cameras - in the estate! (Letter dated 8 February 1999) 
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The same was the case with local practitioners and residents observed during an open- 
day consultation event. This is returned to in a moment. 
The fieldwork at Lisson Green was less conclusive. Letters received from the 
divisional commander and one of the local police officers involved in the Lisson 
Green project were likewise silent on the issues of anti-social. behaviour and law 
enforcement. An open-day consultation event was also observed on Lisson Green 
(also returned in a moment), where a conversation overheard between a local police 
officer and a local housing officer briefly turned to housing injunctions (field notes, 
17 September 1997). Otherwise, no other discussion on law enforcement was 
recorded. Anti-social behaviour was found to be more of a concern than at Churchill 
Gardens during the remaining fieldwork, however, though not to the degree that it 
was portrayed in the audit. For example, the housing manager expressed support for 
the findings of the audit and regret at the lack of resources that were available to deal 
with anti-social behaviour, but did not explicitly refer to law enforcement (field notes, 
5 February 1999). Similar support for the finding that anti-social behaviour was a 
problem on the estate was expressed at the steering group meeting observed, in which 
the findings of the audit were discussed. The emphasis that the audit had put on law 
enforcement was not mentioned, however, as demonstrated in the following summary 
of the notes that were taken: 
[Auditor] Disorder is the problem. And soft drugs. And street crime... [A local drugs project] 
showed that there is a problem of kids hanging about, resulting in drug use and anti-social 
behaviour... though fear of anti-social behaviour is lower than the borough average... Thirty 
percent of people on the estate are under eighteen. Child density is the one indicator of anti- 
social behaviour since research began in the 70s. Government projects on housing the over 
the past ten years have been aimed at families. This has resulted in child density rising. 
Single person's accommodation is being wiped out in many boroughs. 
[project leader] Housing departments need to keep figures on age groups. The census is only 
every ten years. 
[Auditor] And age ranges. For example, five year olds now will be ten years old in five years 
time. [ ... ] 
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[Auditor] Demands for block security are linked to youths hanging out. It just moves the 
problem on. Youths therefore need to be given other things to do. [ ... ] 
[Estate action team officer] The safer cities project [in the area] has finished now. Crime 
prevention was a part of it, but it was undirected. [ ... ] 
[Project leader] The [crime prevention strategy] needs to be linked to plans on other estates 
locally as people always complain about kids from estates other than their own. 
[Auditor] Youth projects should be short rather than long term. For example, skating parks 
take two years to build, and go out of fashion in the meanwhile. (Field notes, 2 September 
1998) 
The final piece of evidence that the audits exaggerated local practitioner and resident 
views on the problem of disorder on the estates, and in particular on Churchill 
Gardens Estate, comes from questionnaires posted to residents on the two estates. The 
survey did not confirm the findings of the initial audit of local perceptions of disorder. 
While youths 'hanging out' was identified as the biggest problem on both estates, just 
seventeen percent of respondents to the questionnaire on Lisson Green and ten percent 
of respondents on Churchill Gardens said that they "worried a lot about insulting and 
threatening behaviour on the estate". Moreover, just 172 responses were received at 
Churchill Gardens, and 100 at Lisson Green, representing response rates of just ten 
percent and seven percent respectively. 
Consultinz the Public 
As contact between the chief executive's department and local residents pre-existed 
the pilot project at Westbourne through the sector working group, contact between the 
housing department and local residents pre-existed the estate projects through 
residents' panels. Housing services were contracted out by the council, and residents 
panels had an official role in monitoring performance targets. Under local authority 
rules, residents' panels could only be formed with the signatures of a minimum of 
twenty percent of residents on the estate concerned. 
Local authority contact with residents' panels was supplemented by the questionnaires 
written by the Safe Neighbourhoods Unit, which included a section on priorities for 
176 
action. In the questionnaire, residents were asked to select up to six priorities from a 
list of fifteen, one of which was "tougher action against anti-social residents". On 
Lisson Green, "tougher action against anti-social residents", was the fourth most 
popular choice; on Churchill Gardens it was the second (Safe Neighbourhoods Unit, 
1998b and 1998d). The strength of the findings was tainted by the way the survey was 
conducted, however. Not only were residents asked to select six potential actions, but 
they were not asked to put them in order of preference either. Moreover, summaries of 
the main findings of the audits were included in the covering letters. Both letters 
identified "strong enforcement" against "a small number of residents [who] behave 
anti-socially" as one of the four (in the case of Churchill Gardens) or five (in the case 
of Lisson Green) main issues facing the estates. 
The final element of public consultation on the estate projects, as already noted, was 
through open-day events. Unlike the police sector consultation event, the events were 
not structured. Consultation on Churchill Gardens took place over two days. A total of 
six residents attended on the first day, which was observed during fieldwork. Like the 
police sector event, these did not include youth or minority ethnic residents. All were 
elderly. Unlike- the police sector event, however, law enforcement did not enter 
discussion. The main concern of local residents was a lack of youth facilities (field 
notes, 10 September 1998). The Lisson Green event was held on one day. Attendance 
was better, though it still numbered no more than two-dozen local residents. Youths 
and minority groups were again not represented, but one young man and several 
young women attended. The inclusion of young adults was the only part of the 
consultation process at all three pilot sites observed to succeed in obtaining the views 
of residents with direct knowledge of the concerns of local youths. Like Churchill 
Gardens, discussion at the event was anything but punitive. The following extract 
from the notes taken at the event covers a conversation overheard among local 
residents: 
Four young mothers are arguing that local kids have nothing to do and nowhere to go. That 
they end up taking drugs. That the estate needs a community club where both parents and 
kids can go. There could be different activities for parents and kids. The kids would be 
supervised and safe. It would also be an opportunity for adults to get to know the kids on the 
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estate and their parents. This would lead to stronger control over kids overall. (Field notes, 17 
September 1998) 
One last point needs to be emphasised concerning public consultation on the estate 
projects. Like the police sector project, interviews with police and housing officers 
involved in the estate projects revealed disappointment, but otherwise little concern 
about the low turnout at the open-day events. For example, the director of the housing 
department emphasised the depth of contact that the department had with residents' 
associations, and that in light of this attendance at the open days had been sufficient 
(field notes, 18 April 1999). The leader of the two projects described the turnout as 
46modesf'. He highlighted the questionnaires, which he described as having has a 
66good response" (field notes, 27 January 1999). In a report on the projects written to 
the housing department's Operational Sub-Committee, he wrote, "[a]lthough 
attendance at the Open days was modest, t he response to the questionnaires was 
excellent" (City of Westminster Acting Director of Housing, 1998: 2). This served to 
reinforce the conclusion made during the review of borough crime prevention 
strategies and fieldwork on -the police sector project that a crime prevention 
partnership operating in an areas where 'active citizens' take a punitive view to local 
problems of disorder will not necessarily counter the pressure that this will inevitably 
put on them by taking means to consult so called 'hard to reach' groups. 
However, as has been demonstrated in this section, consultation on the two estates 
suggested that a crime prevention partnership op * erating at such a highly localised 
level and with such clearly defined boundaries as a housing estate is not actually 
likely to come under pressure from local residents to take an authoritarian line to anti- 
social behaviour. The impression given by research participants was that the views 
they expressed were informed by their understanding that decisions made by the 
partnerships would directly affect their acquaintances and neighbours. The opinions 
encountered among local residents during fieldwork on the estates projects stood in 
sharp contrast to those encountered during fieldwork on the police sector, where it 
was seen in section 5.3.1, the image of anti-social people portrayed by residents that 
participated on the steering group or in consultation in the project among residents 
reflected the one that informs national crime prevention policy: of 'outsiders' or 
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renemies within', who pose threat to the quality of life of the established community 
(see section 2.1-3). 
The Crime. Prevention Strateý-, i 
Before the crime prevention strategies were concluded, the Safe Neighbourhoods Unit 
provided the housing department with a list of recommendations. The documents 
repeated the emphasis in the audits on taking legal action against certain residents on 
the estates. The report on Lisson Green explained: 
Dealing with the nuisance and anti-social behaviour of a minority of residents is an issue here 
as it is on many similar estates. It is recognised that concerted action is needed on the part of 
Housing, the police and residents to tackle this... Meetings are being held involving housing, 
the police and solicitors to discuss the implication of the Anti-Social Behaviour Order 
provision in the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act... There is strong argument for establishing 
protocols with the police to ensure that there is an effective, collaborated approach to tackling 
the issue. (Safe Neighbourhoods Unit 1998d: 9) 
The report on Churchill Gardens came to a similar conclusion. It repeated the words 
used in the audit: 
It is important that effective action is taken in relation to the small number of families on the 
estate which generate most of the problems... A protocol needs to be agreed with the 
police... (Safe Neighbourhoods Unit 1998b: 7) 
included among the appendixes were examples of model protocols for information 
sharing between housing departments and the police. 
At Churchill Gardens, the pressure put on the steering group by the safe 
Neighbourhoods Unit to take an authoritarian approach to crime control was resisted. 
The crime prevention strategy that was later produced included the use of abatement 
notices to deal with rubbish and excessive noise under the heading Nuisance, but 
made no reference to criminal law enforcement, evictions, injunctions or anti-social 
behaviour orders. The strategy produced for Lisson Green, on the other hand, 
promoted "covert surveillance against criminal activity leading to prosecution" under 
the heading Youth, and "covert surveillance against criminal activity and anti-social 
tenants leading to prosecution and/or eviction" under the heading Nuisance. 
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The fieldwork data did not provide a clear explanation why the partnership on Lisson 
Green chose to take such an authoritarian approach to crime control. It had only been 
possible to observe one steering group meeting, and to conduct an oral interview with 
one local practitioner involved in the project. The leader of the projects did not 
provide the same level of access to fieldwork as the leader of the police sector project. 
For example, the names and addresses of a number of potential interviewees were not 
made available until 15 January 1999, just four weeks before the policy-related 
reports were due to be provided to the chief executive's department (see section 
3.3.4), at which point access to the three pilot projects would end. 
Of the three players in the partnership (the housing department, local practitioner and 
local residents) the data indicated that local residents were the least likely source of 
the punitive nature of the strategy. This only left the housing department. Critically, 
the fieldwork did not uncover evidence that local practitioners outside the housing 
department had any influence over the project. No steering group meetings were 
referred to by the local police officer (letter undated), and the only time the estate 
manager referred to practitioners outside the housing department concerned the 
police, who she described as lacking commitment to the project (field notes, 5 
February 1999). Finally, no local practitioners outside the housing department 
attended the one steering meeting observed during fieldwork. The absence of local 
practitioner involvement outside the housing department and police force has already 
been noted on Churchill Gardens. The data suggested that even where a crime 
prevention initiative is locally steered, the smaller the initiative is the less likely it will 
attract a broad range and number of practitioners. The fewer local organisations, and 
moreover the fewer parishioners actively involved in a crime prevention partnership, 
the less predictable its policies will be. 
What appeared to make the difference on Churchill Gardens was local resident 
involvement. As was also noted earlier in this section, the steering group at Lisson 
Green did not involve any local resident participation. Moreover, although Lisson 
Green had a residents' association, indicating that it had some level of organised 
contact with the housing department, the letter received from one of the police officer 
involved in the project indicated that the residents' association did not have contact 
with the local police (letter undated). In contrast, it was noted that the steering group 
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at Churchill Gardens included a local resident among its membership and that nine 
other residents had attended at least one steering group meeting, including three 
youths. Five of the six adults that attended meetings replied to the letters sent during 
fieldwork. All but one expressed support for the outcome of the project. The 
fieldwork, in other words, suggested that the community at Churchill Gardens had 
stronger working relationships with local government authorities than the community 
at Lisson Green, and that it was this variable that explained the difference to the crime 
prevention strategies that were produced. The fieldwork indicated that a crime 
prevention project on a housing estate with clearly defined borders would potentially 
encounter a sufficiently strong enough sense of geographical community to steer it 
away from authoritarian crime control, but that the power that local residents are able 
to exercise is dependant on them having established an established links with local 
practitioners. 
This, of course, is a conclusion that goes against the observations made on the 
housing department's contribution to the borough strategy, but it is the only one that 
the data allows. Furthermore, as noted in section 5.2.6, the conclusion drawn that the 
housing department did not share the chief executive department's vision of 
authoritarian crime control was tentative at best. The particular nature of the internal 
politics between the two departments (see section 3.3.4) prevented any concrete 
conclusions being made. It may be the case that, in the absence of local resident 
resistance, the housing department chose to tell the chief executive's department what 
it wanted to hear, and that the sirategy was destined to never be implemented. Yet, it 
may equally be the case that the lack of resistance from residents allowed the housing 
department to do what it had intended all along. What it has been possible to 
demonstrate in this chapter is that top down' pressure to take an authoritarian 
approach to crime control'is likely to be felt by crime prevention partnerships 
operating in large and small areas alike, but that resistance 'on the ground' is likely to 
be encountered in areas with residential populations of 30,000 or below, through 
practitioners on larger partnerships, but through residents on the smaller. However, 
the influence that local practitioners and residents are likely to have on the shaping of 
local crime prevention policies will vary from one partnership to another. 
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Chapter six 
New Penal Boundaries 
The very same intellectuals and reformers who had been the apostles of the new order now 
cast themselves as the prophets of doom... The benevolent-sounding decarceration package 
had turned out to be a monster in disguise, a Trojan horse. (Cohen, 1985: 37 and 38) 
If the 'partnership approach' to crime prevention results in the local becoming a site 
of authoritarian crime control, which the empirical research conducted during the 
course of this doctoral thesis indicates that it has the potential of doing, Cohen's 
(1985) analysis of the failure of the proliferation of punishment in the community in 
the mid to late 20'h Century to live up to the social democratic vision of progressive 
decentralised criminal policy will soon be replicated in criminological analysis of the 
proliferation of crime prevention partnerships. In section 3.3.1 it was emphasised that 
the researcher went into the empirical research in hope that the evidence would point 
to the contrary, if only, as van Swaaningen puts it, "because in the 1980s the critique 
of net widening led to 'Nothing works' defeatism and put an end to any restructuring 
potential that critical criminology may have had" (2002: 270). Having been brought 
up in inner city London in the 1980s, the author is only too aware of the negative 
effects that conventional crime and disorder can have on people's quality of life, yet 
at the same time the negative effects of the post-industrial economy on working class 
communities, and the defiance that those at the margins of the post-industrial 
economy, especially youths, show to legal authorities. Something needs to be done 
about anti-social behaviour, and the answer lies with local residents and local 
practitioners, but the author cannot lend support to the 'turn to the local' in crime 
control if it is to become an extension of the criminal justice system. Before exploring 
the implications of the theoretical and empirical research conducted during the course 
of this doctoral thesis, this chapter first turns to the question whether the national 
trends in crime prevention in the 1980s and 1990s identified in chapter four have 
continued into the 2000s. 
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6.1. The 'Enforcement Approach' Continues 
6.1.1. The Police Continue to Take a Back Seat 
The first point that needs to be emphasised is the continuing failure of the police to 
respond to the neoconservative call for a 'zero tolerance' approach to crime control. 
HMIC, for example, produced three reviews of policing policy in light of the Crime 
and Disorder Act 1998, covering the police contribution to crime prevention 
partnerships (HMIC, 1998), the policing of anti-social behaviour (HMIC, 1999), and 
implementation of the Crime and Disorder Act (HMIC, 2000), none of which made 
any reference to the term 'zero tolerance' policing, nor reference, direct or indirect, to 
the 'broken windows' thesis. The first two reviews stood out further for limiting their 
discussion of the role of criminal law enforcement to intelligence-led initiatives aimed 
at serious crime. The only exceptions were an indirect reference to short-term 
(crackdowns' on anti-social behaviour (HMIC, 1998: para. 2.6), a statement of 
support for the new anti-social behaviour order (HMIC, 1999: para. 3.2.6), and 
references to cooperation with local authorities in gathering evidence for prosecuting 
people for minor crime (HMIC, 2000: para. 2.11), for the use of anti-social behaviour 
orders (ibid.: para. 5.9), and for the use of evictions (ibid.: para. S. 19). The references 
to legal intervention in the latter report were brief, and appeared isolated from the 
broad vision of crime prevention of HMIC. Before the measures were set out, HMIC 
referred to the recommendation of the report that social crime prevention be put on a 
par with situational crime prevention (see section 4.2.3). Unlike the Home Office, in 
other words, it did not include legal intervention as a third category of crime 
prevention (see section 4.3.2). 
This apparent lack of enthusiasm for authoritarian criminal law enforcement among 
the police was confin-ned in Home Office research on the contribution of the police to 
controlling anti-social behaviour. Two papers were published on the issue in the 
period surrounding implementation of the Crime and Disorder Act. The first (Leigh et 
al., 1998) was a comparative study of Cleveland and Leicestershire constabularies, the 
fon-ner of which is famous for its promotion of 'zero tolerance' policing. The second 
(Bland and Read, 2000) focused specifically on the contribution of law enforcement 
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to controlling anti-social behaviour. It compared the approach taken to policing anti- 
social behaviour by nine forces, again including Cleveland. Leigh et al. noted the 
emphasis put by Cleveland on authoritarian criminal law enforcement, but 
acknowledged that Cleveland was the only area in the country where such a 
neoconservative interpretation of community policing had been put in place. This was 
confirmed Bland and Read. Their findings are worth quoting in full: 
Many, if not all, of the forces we visited, used street-level, direct policing methods to tackle 
aspects of anti-social behaviour. However, the approach adopted by the police to enforcement 
differed. In some cases, intervention against aspects of anti-social behaviour was described as 
an integral part of the force's policing style. In practice, what this entailed was the police 
taking action against individuals engaged in anti-social behaviour, rather than turning a 
'blind-eye' to these activities. 
For example, in a description of the policing approach employed in the Middlesborough 
Division of Cleveland Constabulary, the then Crime Manager suggested that his officers 
should 'confront, interact and assert' in the face of anti-social behaviour. Officers should 
make a point of directly tackling individual incidents of anti-social behaviour that they might 
have ignored in the past; littering for example, or members of the public urinating in the 
street. The officer claimed that as a result of encouraging officers to be positive, and to 
intervene at a low level, public confidence in the police would increase, general fear of crime 
diminish, and changes be effected in the public's behaviour. The aim was to provide a 
consistent response to these sorts of activities within the division. 
There were, however, also examples where forces undertook direct enforcement against anti- 
social behaviour, but in a targeted manner, either in relation to an identified problem or in a 
specific location. Cleveland, for example, has adopted a problem-oriented policing (POP) 
approach throughout the force. A number of initiatives introduced under POP have involved 
targeting anti-social behaviour through the use of patrol and enforcement. Problems with 
youths congregating at a local school in Stockton were tackled by the local beat officer 
arranging for patrols, both by community beat officers (CBOs) and by shift officers, to attend 
the school and remove people from the school grounds. In Middlesborough, problems with 
prostitution in one particular part of the town were made a divisional target. (Bland and Read, 
2000: 7-8) 
Significantly, both papers gave as much attention to cooperation between the police 
and local authority housing departments in the use of legal orders as criminal law 
enforcement. Leigh et al. (1998), for instance, found as many incidences of 
184 
"disorder/theft" in Cleveland and Leicestershire to have resulted in notices to evict as 
in arrests, while Bland and Read (2000) ended the section of their report on criminal 
law enforcement by complaining about the lack of legal powers available to the police 
to deal with anti-social behaviour, before going on to give numerous examples of the 
use of legal orders by local authorities, including abatement notices, injunctions, anti- 
social behaviour orders and possession orders. 
Cleveland was therefore the only police force in England and Wales in the 1990s to 
adopt a 'zero-tolerance' approach to crime control in the true neoconservative 
interpretation of the term. The emphasis among police forces on encouraging local 
authorities to take the lead in intervening legally into anti-social behaviour was more 
recently confin-ned in another Home Office publication, Campbell's (2002) study on 
the use of anti-social behaviour orders. Campbell quoted local authority 
disenchantment with a lack of police commitment to anti-social behaviour orders, and 
criticism by some parts of the police force of them being "a hammer to crack a nut". 
The difference in attitude between local authorities and the police was evident in the 
lack of attention given to authoritarian policing in the police journal Police Review, 
which the current author analysed between January 1996 and March 2000 (see section 
3.3.2). In comparison to the review of the housing journal Housing Today, conducted 
between November 1996 and March 2000 (see sections 3.3.2 and 4.2.1), there was a 
virtual absence of reference to coordinating the use of legal powers with local 
authorities or to the use of anti-social behaviour orders in discussion of the 
implications of the Crime and Disorder Act. 
The Primacy of Legal Orders 
On the other hand, the trend towards local authorities taking an authoritarian approach 
to crime control appears to have continued. Political pressure on them to do so has 
certainly built up from central government. First, the emphasis that the Home Office 
put on the use of legal orders in guidance surrounding the Crime and Disorder Act 
(see section 4.3.2) has been reflected in the reports on crime prevention of other 
central government institutions, for example by the Audit Commission (1999) and the 
Social Exclusion Unit (2000), the former of which, unlike HMIC (2000), followed the 
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line taken by the Home Office in identifying "enforcement" as a third approach to 
crime prevention alongside situational and social crime prevention (see section 4.3.1). 
There was, the Audit Commission commented, an overemphasis on situational crime 
prevention in partnership initiatives, which was at the expense of both enforcement 
and social crime prevention. 
The authoritarian approach to crime control taken by the Home Office has also been 
embraced by the Local Government Association (see e. g. Local Government 
Association, 2002), and by local authorities across the country (see e. g. Housing 
Today, 12 July 1999,30 March, 14 September and 26 October 2000, and 25 January 
2001; Inside Housing, 18 June 1999). Moreover, guidelines produced for housing 
associations and other registered social landlords by the Housing Corporation, the 
National Housing Federation and the Chartered Institute of Housing all prioritise legal 
intervention over social and situational crime prevention (see Housing Corporation, 
2001; National Housing Federation, 1999; Papps, 1998). At a workshop on residential 
disorder at a housing reform conference run by the Socio-Legal Studies Association 
and Society of Public Law Teachers at University of Westminster attended by the 
researcher in 2002, conversation revolved exclusively around the problems 
encountered trying to persuade judges that the use of legal orders was a proportionate 
response. Delegates were quick to defend the use of legal orders as a housing rather 
than criminal issue, yet no question was made of the need for them to be used in 
cooperation with the police (field notes, 15 May 2002). If anything can be taken as an 
indication that local authorities are be coming institutions of crime control, then it is 
the coordination of activities with criminal justice institutions. It would be artificial to 
treat. the arrest of a youth vandalising a car as criminal policy, but the serving of an 
anti-social behaviour order or Housing Act injunction on them or the eviction of their 
family as housing policy. Finally, housing authorities have been at the forefront of 
promoting informal coercive initiatives' such as reducing housing services to 
disorderly tenants (see e. g. Housing Today, 20 August 1998), and offering youths the 
opportunity to sign acceptable behaviour contracts as an first step before the authority 
resorts to seeking an anti-social behaviour order (see e. g. Housing Today, 27 April 
2000). Both measures have again been promoted in a language of crime control, not 
housing management. 
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These are all developments that central government departments have been keen to 
encourage. Acceptable behaviour contracts, for example, were commended by 
Campbell (2002), DTLR (2002), Home Office (2003b and 2003c) and Local 
Government Association (2002), while in 1999 the Home Office's first Tilley Award 
(presented "for excellence in problem orientated policing and crime reduction") went 
to an initiative in which Housing Act injunctions had been obtained to deal with 
youths 'hanging out' on an estate (see Police Review, 8 October 1999). Central 
government recommendations for changes in housing law to deal with anti-social 
behaviour have included: the replacement of the local authority power to permanently 
exclude people from their housing registers with a new power allowing for temporary 
exclusion or reduced prioritisation (DETF, 2000b: para. 9.13), for local authorities to 
be given the power to reduce the housing benefits of disorderly tenants (DETR, 
2000b: para. 5.4), for housing authorities to be given either a public law duty or a 
contractual duty to consider taking legal action when complaints are made of 
residential disorder (Law Commission, 2002: paras. 13.30 and 13.34), for the courts 
to be able reduce people's tenancy rights when they had breached an injunction or 
a, nti-social behaviour order (DTLR, 2002: para. 1.61), and for the courts be allowed to 
attach a power of arrest in breach of any injunction obtained by a social landlord "to 
prevent a breach of a nuisance term which amounted to serious housing related anti- 
social behaviour" (DETR, 2002b: para. 13-65). While it might be argued that the 
proposals of DETR and the Law Commission were made in the context of housing 
management, the same certainly cannot be said of DTLR, which presented its 
proposals within the context of the 'broken windows' thesis: 
if action is not taken to help social landlords tackle anti-social behaviour effectively, then the 
lives of very many individuals and communities, particularly in deprived areas, will continue 
to be blighted. The problem is likely to worsen over time for the following reasons: 
Perpetrators and potential perpetrators will be emboldened and their behaviour is 
likely to worsen over time. Anti-social elements may be attracted in from outside the 
area if it is perceived that that landlord cannot or will not take tough action. 
Landlords who have tried to use their powers and failed, perhaps through inadequate 
preparation or lack of understanding of the most appropriate course of action to take, 
will be put off trying to use those powers in the future. 
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Existing residents will not believe in the landlord's ability or willingness to tackle the 
problem. 'Mey may simply leave, or they may take the law into their own hands. 
Local businesses and providers of local services may become reluctant to operate in 
that area. 
Potential residents (as well as businesses and service providers) will not wish to move 
into the area. 
A spiral of decline may be set up, as the reputation and conditions in an area decline, with 
very grave long-term consequences. In the long run, unchecked anti-social behaviour may 
even lead to wholesale demolition of an area. (DTLR, 2002: 62) 
The recommendations of DETR, DTLR and the Law Commission (2002) culminated 
in the White Paper Respect and Responsibility (Home Office, 2003c). The White 
Paper made explicit reference to the 'broken windows' thesis (para. 1.8), before going 
on to promote strict enforcement of anti-social behaviour orders (para. 4.19), 
possession orders (para. 4.36) and injunctions (para. 4.39), and to introduce a number 
of proposals for the strengthening of legal orders, most of which are now contained in 
the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003. The most significant new proposals were a 
requirement on social landlords to publish summaries of their policies and procedures 
on dealing with anti-social behaviour (now contained in the Anti-Social Behaviour 
Act 2003, section 13), the extension of the power to apply for injunctions under the 
Housing-Act 1996 from local authorities to housing action trusts and registered social 
landlords (now contained in the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003, section 13), and the 
introduction of a right for social landlords to demote tenancy agreements (now 
contained in the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003, sections 14 and 15). The White 
paper made further recommendations concerning fixed penalty notices that had been 
introduced under the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, but were still being 
piloted. E80 fixed penalty notices were already available to the police to use against 
adults accused of "causing harassment, alarm or distress". It was recommended that 
chief constables be given the power to devolve the right to issue fixed penalty notices 
for anti-social behaviour beyond the police force (para. 5-8). This would mean them 
becoming available not only to local authority officers (see the Guardian, 29 October 
2004), but also non-govemment officials such as private security guards (see the 
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Guardian, 13 March 2003). The notices would also become available to use against 
anyone over sixteen (para. 5.9), which was reduced to over tens by the time the Anti- 
Social Behaviour Act was passed. The White Paper is explored in more detail in 
section 6.2. 
The neoconservative emphasis on liability rather than duty, on public responsibility 
for supporting the state in authoritarian crime control, and on removing the legal 
obstacles that stand in the way are also reflected in the Home Office Strategic Plan 
2004-2008 (Home Office, 2004a), the most recent government proposals for reforins 
to the criminal justice system (Home Office, 2006a), and in recent Home Office 
policy documents on the Government's approach to anti-social behaviour (e. g. Home 
office, 2003d and 2006b). Even if there were the space to do so here, it is not 
necessary - to go through each of these documents or each of the measures introduced 
by the Government since the Crime and Disorder Act to tackle anti-social behaviour 
in detail. To provide a summary, among the numerous new measures are: the 
provision of resources to crime prevention partnerships for enforcement (totalling 
film in 2005/6); the use of anti-social behaviour orders to enable compulsory drug 
treatment for people who have not been convicted of a criminal offence; "nuisance 
neighbourhood hotlines"; "nuisance neighbourhood panels"; "anti-social behaviour 
courts"; "anti-social behaviour prosecutore'; the use of video links or screens when 
witnesses to anti-social behaviour are giving evidence in court; the inclusion of 
unsigned witness statements as admissible evidence; the fast-tracking of "anti-social 
behaviour proceedings"; and the extension of the local authority and police duty to 
consider the implications of their activities for the control of anti-social behaviour 
(contained under the Crime and Disorder Act) to the implications of their activities for 
the control of "anti-social and other behaviour adversely affecting the local 
environment" (recently given statutory status under the Clean Neighbourhoods and 
Environment Act 2005). Measures that the Government have proposed, but would 
need further legislation for, include a duty for local authorities to consider taking legal 
action when complaints of anti-soci4l behaviour are made, and a power to 'close' any 
property where its occupants are accused of anti-social behaviour. If the 
Government's authoritarian approach to crime control could be dismissed as punitive 
rhetoric in the late 1990s, which the author certainly believed it could not (see section 
4.3.2), then it would surely be naive to dismiss it as punitive rhetoric now. Indeed, the 
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Government's approach to anti-social behaviour recently received strong endorsement 
by the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (House of Commons Home 
Affairs Committee, 2005). 
The use of anti-social behaviour orders is still not significantly high, but is on a rapid 
upward trend. Only 9,853 anti-social behaviour orders were obtained between their 
introduction on I April 1999 and 31 December 2005 (see crimereduction. gov. uk/ 
asbos/asbos2. htm). Yet, 4,060 of these were obtained in 2005 alone (ibid. ). The use of 
other legal orders as tools of crime control is also on the increase. For example, 1,614 
injunctions and 822 possession orders were used in response to serious crime or anti- 
social behaviour in the period I October 2004 to 30 September 2005, compared to 
946 injunctions and 654 possession orders in the previous twelve months (Home 
Office, 2006c). Finally, the police are making strong use of fixed penalty notices. For 
example, 64,007 were served for behaviour 'causing harassment, alarm or distress' in 
2005 (see the Sunday Telegraph, 7 January 2007). In a Home Office study of the use 
of fixed penalty notices while they were being piloted between August 2002 and July 
2003 (Halligan-Davis and Spicer, 2004), it was estimated that between twentY-five 
and fifty per cent of notices were issued in cases where the offender would not 
otherwise have been cautioned or charged. 
if the average local authority is to follow the example of Manchester City Council or 
Westminster City Council, as central government is doing everything to encourage 
(see e. g. DETR, 2000a, and the Guardian, I September 2004), then these figures will 
continue to rise. Home Office (2003c) and Local Government Association (2002) 
quote Manchester as obtaining between 300 and 400 Housing Act injunctions a year, 
while Shelter quotes Manchester as having evicted 283 people for anti-social 
behaviour between 1995 and 2003 (see Guardian Society, 4 June 2003). Of the 4,060 
anti-social behaviour orders granted by the courts in 2005,433 were obtained by 
Manchester City Council (Pitt, 2006). If these figures were replicated around the 
country (based on relative size of residential population), there would have been over 
40,000 anti-social behaviour served in England and Wales in 2005. Manchester also 
served 529 injunctions and forty-one possession orders with respect to crime and 
disorder in 2005 (ibid. ). These figures would equate to over 50,000 injunctions nation 
wide. The same applies to the approach to authoritarian crime control being taken at 
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Westminster. The housing department at Westminster continues to emphasise that 
legal intervention should only be -used as a matter of last resort (see City of 
Westminster Housing Department, n. d. ), but nevertheless set up an anti-social 
behaviour unit in 2003 to coordinate the use of legal orders with the police (ibid. ). In 
2005 Westminster had thirty-three anti-social behaviour orders in place (City of 
Westminster, 2005). If these figures were replicated around the country, there would 
be close to 8,000 anti-social behaviour orders in operation in England and Wales. 
Correcting the Anti-Social Behaviour of Youths 
Finally, the trends towards earlier intervention into criminal careers (see section 4.4) 
has likewise continued. Again, for current purposes it is not necessary to go through 
the measures that have been introduced since the Crime and Disorder Act in detail. 
Five examples will suffice to demonstrate the point. The first four concern the focus 
put on parental responsibility. Under the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003 it became a 
statutory obligation for youth offending teams to consider asking parents to sign a 
parenting contract where a parenting order was not considered appropriate, and for the 
courts issuing an anti-social behaviour order to consider the need to issue a parenting 
order alongside. The courts were given a further statutory obligation to take refusal to 
sign a parenting contract or breach of the contract into account when deciding 
whether to issue a parenting order (for government guidance on the relationship 
between parenting contracts and parenting orders, see Home Office et al., 2004). 537 
parenting orders and 1,296 parenting contracts were obtained in the period I October 
2004 to 30 September 2005 (Home Office, 2006c). In Home Office (2006b) the 
Government recommended that this movement towards making it compulsory for 
parents to attend training sessions on how to discipline their children should be 
strengthened through the introduction of a right to reduce housing benefits for those 
that refuse. The last example of increasing focus on parental responsibility to be 
highlighted in this section is the introduction of parental compensation orders under 
the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005. Like parenting orders, parental 
compensation orders can be applied for by local authorities. They require parents to 
compensate victims for tbeft and damage to property caused by children under ten 
years old. 
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The last example concerns the depth that the movement towards 'self regulation' (see 
section 2.1.1) has resulted in restored faith in the ability of the criminal justice system 
to rehabilitate youth offenders: referred by Pitts (2001) as the "new correctional ism". 
In 2000 the Government set up a national body, the Youth Justice Board, to oversee 
the changes to the youth justice system brought in by the Crime and Disorder Act and 
the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999. Four years on the new approach 
had been put into practice. As the following quotes from Youth Justice Board 
publications of the time demonstrate, the youth justice system was now fully geared 
towards the moral communitarian emphasis on correcting anti-social behaviour 
through treating people as responsible for the consequences of their actions, and the 
neoconservative insistence that offenders can be reformed through legal as well as 
correctional controls, both as a means of making correctional interventions 
compulsory, and as a means of reforming offenders through the simple experience of 
being punished. On the overall vision of the youth justice system, it was explained: 
The new criminal justice system seeks to involve the community more in tackling youth 
crime. Communities suffer the effects of young people's offending behaviour as a group and 
as individual victims. New court orders and the increasing use of restorative justice 
techniques impress upon offenders the impact of their behaviour on other people and the 
consequences for themselves. (Youth Justice Board, 200 1 a: 9) 
Persistent young offender cases are now consistently prioritised through the justice process... 
it confronts the young person with the conseq 
' 
uences of their actions quickly and helps them 
to address their offending behaviour in a positive way. (PA Consulting Group, 2001: 1-2) 
On the role to be played by families, the views of a number of parents were presented 
in Youth Justice Board (2001b), all of which stressed the importance of them being 
taught how to communicate with their children, and how to gain the confidence to 
exert a positive influence over them. 
Finally, the views of youths involved that had succeeded in realising the errors of 
their ways were presented, including: 
I think before I do stuff now. (Youth Justice Board, 200 1 b: 6) 
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It taught me what happens if I steal.... I haven't stolen since. Both give me a bit of respect I 
suppose, so my mum respects me now because I'm not stealing or mitching [truanting] or 
anything. (Youth Justice Board, 200 1 b: 9) 
I know I am paying something back for what I've done. It has taught me not to do anything 
like that again. (Youth Justice Board, 200 1 b: 11) 
6.2. A 'Mesh Thinning' of Crime Control 
Cohen's analysis of the 'mesh thinning' effects of punishment in the community was 
applied to the early days of formal cooperation between the police and local 
authorities in the 1980s by Gordon (1987), cited in the introduction to this thesis. van 
Swaaningen applies the same question fifteen years later. In contrast to Gordon, who 
saw no potential benefits to'SUch cooperation, van Swaaningen urges criminologists to 
fight for a "replacement discourse' that will allow them to tackle the "conceptual 
vagueness [that has] allowed the extreme right to hi-jack the term 'community safety' 
in a plea for zero-tolerance policing7' (2002: 27 1). 
The research conducted during the course of this thesis failed to find a strong foothold 
for such a replacement discourse to be put in place. First, in chapter two it was 
demonstrated that there is not only immediate political, but also structural pressure on 
crime prevention partnerships to become institutions of authoritarian crime control. 
Coleman and Sim write that social scientists who focus their analysis of the 'turn to 
the local' in government on the 'responsibilisation strategy' (see section 2.1.1) "have 
ignored the centrality of coercive aspects of power directed at dissenters from 
neoliberal rule" (2000: 634). While their point may be exaggerated, the link between 
the proliferation of crime prevention partnerships and the post-industrial need for 
more control of the marginalised has not been explored to the extent that the link 
between crime prevention partnerships and the post-industrial need for less 
intervention into the lives of the majority has. Observations on the link between the 
, turn to the local' in government and the need to recruit the population into the 'oars' 
of government are stronger when they are applied to the governing of the compliant 
majority than when they are applied to the governing of the defiant minority. In the 
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case of the latter, there is an increasing rather than decreasing need for intervention 
into the lives of individuals, including legal intervention. 
Second, in chapter two it was further demonstrated that the potential for the right to 
hijack the 'turn to the local' in crime control finds its roots in 'third way' as well as 
neoconservative communitarian visions of crime control. In chapter four and in this 
chapter it has been further demonstrated that those that threaten to hijack the 'turn to 
the local' in crime control are at the centre of national politics, and not at its right- 
wing margins. Not only has it been the Labour Party rather than the Conservative 
party that has been at the centre of the movement towards authoritarian crime control 
in England and Wales, but the Labour Party has also done so through appeal to 
socialist rather than conservative values. When explaining the Government's recent 
decision to introduce yet more authoritarian legal measures to deal with anti-social 
behaviour (see section 6.1.2), Prime Minister Tony Blair, for example, insisted: 
[The Labour government] inherited a system which was increasingly unable to deal with the 
problems it faced. Anti-social behaviour was becoming a very serious problem on some 
estates but the courts were too cumbersome a process to deal with it expeditiously... The 
choice was stark; either we accepted that nothing could be done... or we granted new powers 
to local authorities and the police. This was, and still is, the rationale for all the so-called 
summary powers that we have introduced. These powers have a strong philosophical 
justification, from within the Labour tradition. Social democratic thought was always the 
application of morality to political philosophy. One of the basic insights of the left, one of its 
distinguishing features, is to caution against too excessive an individualism. People must live 
together and one of the basic tasks of government is to facilitate this living together, to ensure 
that the many can live without fear of the few... Our critics , who usually do not live in the 
communities most affected by crime and anti-social behaviour, often describe these measures 
as overly punitive and a threat to basic legal principles... But this is not a debate between 
those that value liberty and those who do not. It is an argument about the very types of liberty 
that need to be protected given the changing nature of the crimes that violate them. And it is 
an attempt to protect the most fundamental liberty of all - freedom from harm by others. 
(Quoted in the Observer, II December 2005) 
Next, the empirical research conducted on local crime prevention policies uncovered 
evidence in the late 1990s of crime prevention partnerships failing to resist structural 
and political pressure on them to become institutions of authoritarian crime control. In 
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chapter five it was demonstrated that three out of nine crime prevention partnerships 
analysed in 1998 were resorting to civil or public law orders in response to anti-social 
behaviour, and fýurteen out of twenty-one partnerships analysed a year later in 1999. 
Of particular significance, it was demonstrated that two of the partnerships analysed 
in 1998 and five of the partnerships analysed in 1999 put law enforcement on a par 
with physical and social security. Empirical research that has since been conducted in 
the 2000s has likewise uncovered evidence that many crime prevention partnerships 
are turning to law at the expense of other interventions (see Bumey, 2005). Bumey 
highlights a survey of sixty-two partnerships (Nixon et al., 2003), in which all but two 
of the respondents identified the police as the main partner that dealt with complaints 
of anti-social behaviour. As Bumey stresses, "[a]ny hope that [crime prevention 
partnerships] will transcend their crime and disorder reduction role to address wider 
$safety' and social justice concerns seems fairly remote if they cannot even enrol the 
more socially-orientated public services in the cause of alleviating anti-social 
behaviour" (2005: 120). 
Finally, in chapter five it was demonstrated that even when crime prevention 
partnerships operate at the most local of levels, there is no guarantee that they will 
operate at sufficient 'arms length" to macro ideologies and central and local state 
bureaucracies to steer the away from the neoconservative communitarian emphasis on 
making people criminal responsibility for anti-social behaviour. The fieldwork 
conducted on a police sector and two estate crime prevention projects in Westminster 
uncovered empirical evidence that 'bottom up' resistance to a district-level crime 
prevention partnership intent on resorting to law enforcement in the control of anti- 
social behaviour is likely to be encountered in areas with residential populations of 
30,000 or below. The fieldwork on Churchill Gardens estate also uncovered empirical 
evidence in support of the view that "democratically accountable strategies of 
empowerment are not entirely utopian hopes" (Hughes, 1996: 28). However, as 
emphasised in the conclusion to section 5.3.2, when taken together, the fieldwork- on 
the three pilot projects in Westminster indicated that the influence that local 
practitioners and residents are likely to have on the shaping of local crime prevention 
policies will vary from one partnership to another. The point remains that even the 
most localised of crime prevention partnerships still run the risk of becoming caught 
up in "the politics of enforcement" (see Jordan, 1996). 
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The last. issue that needs to be dealt with concerns the choice of title for this 
concluding chapter. This relates to the consequence of the movement towards earlier 
and more intensive legal intervention into the lives of the minority for the rule of law, 
as defined under western liberal democratic social contract theory: that penal laws 
should be clearly defined, that those accused of breaking them should be presumed 
innocent, and that those found guilty should be not be punished in excess of the harm 
they have caused. 
First, it needs to be cmphasiscd that the use of legal orders as weapons of crime 
control is an example of penal as well as spatial or correctional intervention. In this 
thesis it has been seen that injunctions and anti-social behaviour orders are being 
turned to by crime prevention partnerships in order to put restrictions on people's 
liberty. It has also been seen that, with the exception of possession orders, each of the 
legal orders attracts criminal penalties in breach proceedings. As far as the researcher 
is aware, figures on breach proceedings are not systematically collated by the courts, 
though in 2004 the Home Office released figures that revealed a breach rate of forty- 
two percent for anti-social behaviour orders issued between I June 2000 and 31 
December 2003 (see Burney, 2005). Of these, fifty-five percent resulted in prison 
sentences (ibid. ). Finally, it has been seen that legal orders are being promoted in 
national and local crime prevention policies as sovereign and juridical remedies, 
aimed at retaining control over areas that the state is in danger of losing control over, 
in terms of its monopoly over defining and maintaining the boundaries between 
acceptable and anti-social behaviour, and as means of deterring and denouncing anti- 
social behaviour. These messages were all reinforced, for instance, in the White Paper 
Respect and Responsibility (Home Office, 2003c). On the need for legal orders to 
enable the state to maintain sovereign control, and moreover the need for the 
boundaries of acceptable and unacceptable behaviour to be policed by the state, it was 
stressed: 
Every society has to have rules and standards of behaviour. Those rules and standards have to 
be enforced. People who behave anti-socially should not be allowed to get away it with any 
longer and we believe it is time for the community to take a stand [ ... ] The role of 
individuals, families, communities and businesses is to get involved and take responsibility. 
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Parents are responsible for ensuring that their children attend school and are supported in 
their learning. Citizens have the responsibility for being part of the criminal justice system 
through jury service. Witnesses of crime have a responsibility to give evidence and a right to 
feel secure in doing so. Businesses must do the simple things like removing or paying for the 
removal of rubbish from outside their premises. And together we must support public 
services to tackle anti-social behaviour. (Home Office, 2003c: paras. 1.11 and 1.14) 
Faith in the coercive potential of legal orders was demonstrated, for example, in the 
emphasis put on 'naming and shaming' those that have had legal orders applied on 
them: "[a]ppropriate publicity of action taken is a key part of any strategy to tackle 
anti-social behaviour. It provides reassurance to local residents that the authorities are 
taking action... Publicity of an order sends out a clear message that anti-social 
behaviour will not be tolerated" (para. 5.25). Finally, on the need to denounce anti- 
social behaviour, it was explained, "[i]t is important for communities to set the 
standards of behaviour by which they expect people to live. But if these standards are 
to be credible and respected, it must be clear to everyone that swift and effective 
action will be taken against unacceptable behaviour" (para. 5.1). 
The use of legal orders as weapons of crime control challenges all three boundaries of 
western interpretations of the rule of law. The threat to the first aspect of the rule of 
law, that people are only punished for breaking clearly defined laws, lies in the broad 
definitions of anti-social behaviour used by the state. This has been noted in this 
thesis, for example, in the definitions of the behaviour required for the issuing of 
Housing Act injunctions (see section 4.2.1). A further example is the definition of 
behaviour required for the courts to issue an ý anti-social behaviour order under section 
I of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998: "that the person has acted... in an anti-social 
manner, that is to say, in a manner that caused or was likely to cause harassment, 
alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the same household as himself; and 
that such an order is necessary to protect persons in the local government area in 
which the harassment, alarm or distress was caused or was likely to be caused from 
further anti-social acts by himý'. The other two aspects of the rule of law, the 
presumption of innocence and proportional punishment, have been stressed 
throughout this thesis. It has been seen that crime prevention partnerships are turning 
to civil and public law orders because they allow for both easier and earlier resort to 
law than is the case with criminal law: easier in the sense that there is less need to 
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provide evidence that the alleged behaviour has actually occurred, and earlier in the 
sense that they can be used against people who are deemed to be potential rather than 
actual offenders, or if they are not potential offenders themselves, that their behaviour 
has the potential to encourage others to commit crime. 
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Appendix one 
Fieldwork Interviews and Observations 
VAiile the research question was being developed, interviews were held with the 
following community safety officers: 
Martin Davis, London Borough of Merton, 2 April 1997 
Robert Grieves, London Borough of Wandsworth, 30 April 1997 
And interviews were held with the following researchers: 
Sheradon Morris, Home Office Crime Prevention Unit, 15 July 1997 
Scott Ballintyne, Institute of Public Policy Research, 26 June 1997 
In addition, letters or emails were sent and received from the following from 
practitioners and researcbers: - 
Superintendent Ted Bellingham, Police Staff College, letters dated 27 March 1997 
and 30 May 1997 
Acting Inspector J. Cracknell, Metropolitan Police Service, letter dated 18 March 
1997 
Nigel Fielding, University of Surrey, letter dated 25 April 1996 
Assistant Superintendent John Fisher, Metropolitan Police Service, letter dated 25 
March 1997 
Mike Hough, South Bank University, email sent 3 September 1997 
" David Riley, DETR, letter dated 18 August 1997 
" Frank Warburton, NACRO, letter dated 2 July 1997 
" Mollie Weatheritt, Police Foundation, letters dated 11 March 1997 and 2 June 
1997 
i 
Chief Inspector John Wood, Devon and Cornwall Constabulary, letter dated 30 
June 1997 
In the first survey of local authorities in London (conducted in January 1998), the 
following documents were obtained: 
" Bexley Strategy (1997/1998), audit and consultation 
" Brent Strategy (1997/2000), audit and consultation 
" Croydon Strategy (1998/1999) 
Hackney Strategy (1997), audit and consultation 
Haringey Strategy (1997) 
Harrow Strategy (1997/1999), audit and consultation 
Lewisham Strategy (1997/1998) and audit 
Sutton Strategy (1995/1997) and consultation 
Tower Hamlets Strategy (1997/1998) 
Interviews were subsequently held with the community safety officer at the following 
boroughs: 
* Ruth Clarke, City of Westminster, 24 June 1998 
o Allistar Barron, Corporation of London, 5 May 1998 
" Morevike Jameson, London Borough of Croydon, 2 June 1998 
" Debbie Seaborn, London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham, 17 June 1998 
" Ian Pearce, London Borough of Harrow, 9 February 1998 
" Gordon Falconer, London Borough of Sutton, 29 April 1998 
* Nozmul Hussain, London Borough of Tower Hamlets, 8 March 1998 
The following meetings and events were attended during fieldwork research at 
Westminster: 
Chief Executive's Department Policy Unit Management Working Group, 8 July 
1998,3 August 1998,8 September 1998 and 9 December 1998 
* Churchill Gardens Estate open day, 10 September 1998 
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* Lisson Green Community Safety Plan Working Group, 2 September 1998 
* Lisson Green Estate open day, 17 September 1998 
9 Paddington and Marylebone Community Consultative Group, 8 September 
1998 and 10 November 1998 
" South Westminster Community Consultative Group, 4 May 1999 
" Westbourne Police Sector Community Safety Plan Working Group, 3 August 
1998,18 August 1998 and 14 September 1998 
" Westbourne Police Sector Working Group, 16 September 1998 and 4 
November 1998 
Westboume Police Sector public consultation day, 18 July 1998 
Westminster City Council Community Protection Sub-committee, 18 January 
1998 and 30 March 1999 
" Westminster City Council Education and Leisure Committee, 28 January 1999 and 
2 March 1999 
" Westminster City Council youth conference, 18 February 1999 
" Westminster City Council Education and Leisure Youth Conference Working 
Group, 10 February 1999 
" Westminster City Council Environment and Planning Committee, 30 March 1999 
" Westminster City Council Housing Department Committee, 23 March 1999 
And the following interviews were held: 
Westminster City Council 
Environment and Planning Department: director 
Housing Department: director, two project managers, and three estate office 
managers 
Chief Executive's Department: project manager 
Youth Offending Team: senior practitioner 
Other local govemment and non-govemment organisations 
* Kensington, Chelsea and Westminster Health Authority: community liaison 
manager and drugs action team co-ordinator 
Bayswater Families Centre: manager 
iii 
Metropolitan Police: Westbourne Police Area Sector Inspector 
Safe Neighbourhood Unit: director 
Public 
" Neighbourbood Watch co-ordinator 
" Paddington and Marylebone Police and Community Consultative Group: 
chairperson 
" South East Bayswater Residents Association: chairperson 
" Wessex Gardens Estate Residents Association: chairperson and two other 
members 
" Westbourne Police Sector Working Group: chairperson 
" Whiteley's Shopping Centre, Bayswater: manager 
While the following research participants replied to postal questionnaires: 
Westminster City Council 
Education and Leisure Department: outreach youth worker 
Metropolitan Police 
Chief superintendent and two inspectors 
Public 
Churchill Gardens Estate Residents Association: chairperson and four other 
members 
Churchill Gardens and Russell House Neighbourhood Watch: co-ordinator 
Paddington and Marylebone Police and Community Consultative Group: vice- 
chairperson 
Pimlico Police Sector Working Group: chairperson 
St Mary of the Angel Catholic Church: friar 
0 St Matthews Church: reverand 
Westminster Play Association: manager 
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Finally, in the second survey of local authorities in London (conducted in April 1999) 
the following documents were obtained: 
" Barnet Strategy (1998/2001) 
" Brent Strategy (1999/2002), audit and consultation 
" Bromley Strategy (1999/2002), audit and consultation 
" Camden Strategy (1999/2002), audit and consultation 
" Enfield Strategy (1999/2002) and audit 
" Greenwich Strategy (1999/2002), audit and consultation 
" Hammersmith and Fulham Strategy (1999/202 1), audit and consultation 
" Haringey Strategy (1999/2002), audit and consultation 
Harrow Strategy (1999/2002), audit and consultation 
Hillingdon Strategy (1999/2002), audit and consultation 
Hounslow Strategy (1999/2002), audit and consultation 
" Kensington and Chelsea Strategy (1999/2002), audit and consultation 
" Lewisham Strategy (1999/2002), audit and consultation 
" Merton Strategy (1999/2002), audit and consultation 
" Newham Strategy (1999/2002), audit and consultation 
" Redbridge Strategy (1999/2002), audit and consultation 
" Richmond Upon Thames Strategy (1999/2002), audit and consultation 
" Southwark Strategy (1999/2002), audit and consultation 
" Sutton Strategy (1999/2002), audit and consultation 
" Tower Hamlets Audit and consultation 
" Wandsworth Strategy (1999/2002), audit and consultation 
V 
Appendix two 
Public Consultation under the 
Crinle and Disorder Act 1998 
The Home Office Crime and Disorder Strategies (Prescribed Descriptions) Order 
1998 listed the following organisations for consultation on the partnerships' audits: 
National Health Service trusts. 
Governing bodies of schools. 
Proprietors of independent schools. 
Governing bodies of institutions within the further education sector. 
Social landlords. 
Drug action teams. 
Alcohol action teams. 
Training and Enterprise Council. 
Chamber of Commerce. 
Voluntary organisations dealing with young people. 
Crown Prosecution Service. 
Court manager of crown courts. 
Magistrates' court committees. 
Neighbourhood watch co-ordinators. 
Crime prevention panels. 
Victim Support. 
Rape Crisis Centres. 
Transport providers. 
British Transport Police. 
Chief fire officers. 
Local members of parliament and members of the European Parliament. 
Women's groups. 
Youth groups. 
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Elderly groups. 
Racial Equality Council. 
Physically and mentally handicapped groups. 
Racial groups. 
Homosexuals' groups. 
Residents' groups. 
Community leaders. 
Religious groups. 
Companies. 
Retailing groups. 
Trade unions. 
Doctors. - 
National health service trusts. 
Consultation in London 
The following is a summary of the approach to consultation taken by the partnerships 
studied besides Westminster. The detail provided varies depending on the 
information obtained: 
Brent circulated 10,000 summaries of its audit, included a questionnaire in a council 
magazine distributed to all households, and conducted an opinion survey of 1000 
school children. 
Bromley circulated 2,200 copies of its audit, and held telephone interviews with 154 
businesses. It also included the questionnaire in a council news paper. 399 responses 
were received to the questionnaire. The partnership had hoped to analyse opinion 
across ethnic groups and ages, but in the event only four responders were black or 
Asian, and only two were under 25. 
Camden distributed 5,000 copies of its audit. '108 responses were received. Focus 
group meetings were also held with an undisclosed number of youths, minority ethnic 
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groups and business people. Finally, a pre-existing citizens panel of 1500 residents 
was consulted. 
Enfield held publicity campaigns in local newspapers over three weeks, and held 
focus group meetings with an undisclosed number of "community" and "hard to 
reach" groups. No detail was given on distribution of its audit. 
Greenwich distributed 7,000 summaries of its audit, translating it into five languages 
to target particular minority ethnic groups. 250 replies were received from residents, 
31% of which from black or Asian people, but only 13% from people under 25. 
Differences in opinion between different age and cultural groups and between males 
and females were analysed. 
Hammersmith and Fulham advertised a summary of its audit in local newspapers. it 
also distributed 1,400 leaflets, 'questionnaires and posters among local residents. 
opportunity was given to respond to the questionnaire by telephone. No detail was 
given on distribution of its audit. 
Haringey advertised a summary of the audit in local newspapers for three weeks, 
inviting comment on suggested priorities. Ten focus groups were also held with 
young men, young women, adult women, the elderly, Afiican/African-Caribbean 
residents, refugees, other minority ethnic residents, lesbians and gay men, and two 
residents groups. No detail was given on distribution of its audit. 
Hillingdon distributed over 500 copies of its audit. No other details were given. 
Hounslow included a leaflet in a council newspaper delivered to each household with 
a summary of the audit and a freepost return slip. 250 replies were received. It also 
ran six public meetings and six focus group meetings with youths, minority ethnic 
groups and neighbourhood watch co-ordinators. No other detail was given on 
distribution of its audit. 
Kensington and Chelsea held focus group sessions with youths, women and 
Moroccan residents. 
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Lewisham distributed 17,000 summaries of the audit, and advertised its availability in 
local newspapers and posters. Focus group meetings were also held with offenders, 
victims of disorder and young black men. 
Merton published a summary of the audit in local newspapers, and printed 15,000 
pamphlets for public distribution. Around 250 responses were received. An 
undisclosed number of public meetings were also held, and focus. group meetings 
arranged with young people, the elderly and minority ethnic groups. 
Newharn distributed its report to over 3,000 local organisations, and leafleted a 
summary of the main audit findings to each household. Focus group meetings were 
also held with Asian women and victims of domestic violence. Finally, public 
meetings were held in six areas. 
Redbridge distributed 2,200 copies of its audit, and received 102 replies. In addition, 
19 focus group meetings were conducted with the elderly, youth, the disabled, gays 
and lesbians, ethnic minority groups, victims of domestic violence and drug users. 
Richmond gave no detail on distribution of its audit. It received seventy responses. 
Southwark gave no detail on distribution of its audit or the replies received. 
Sutton held two public meetings and six focus group meetings. No detail was given 
on distribution of its audit. 
Tower Hamlets commissioned London Guildhall University to design and conduct a 
survey of residents views. No detail was given on distribution of its audit. 
Wandsworth distributed over 4,000 copies of its audit, and held focus group meetings 
with elderly people, women, minority ethnic groups and 250 neighbourhood watch 
co-ordinators. In addition, a public meeting was held. - 
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